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PARAMETERS



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The Strategic Value of Conventional Forces

CARL E. VUONO

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As the United States enters the decade of the 90s, we confront not only a revolution in the world order but also a proliferation of strategic thought. On television and in the columns of our major newspapers, new strategies seem to emerge daily, each professing to offer the final answer to the management of national security in this tumultuous era. Much of this debate rests on the assumption that the global strategy at the foundation of our nation's security for 40 years is no longer relevant to the times.

In this article, I want to lay out the lessons we should glean from our experiences of the past two generations and outline what I believe will be our single most significant national asset in preserving the peace and in shaping the future in the years ahead—our conventional forces. In this era of historic political ferment, we must approach the issues of national security with daring and imagination, as tempered by a realistic assessment of the nature of the community of nations in the years ahead.

The Lessons of the Past

Forty years ago, with an implicit faith in the appeal of democracy, the United States set about the task of containing the expansion of the Soviet empire. In the beginning, we believed that the American nuclear arsenal was largely sufficient to deter Stalin from military adventurism on the continent of Europe. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the first use of nuclear weapons in war, conventional forces were thought to be relics of the past. Bernard Brodie, the dean of that early American school of nuclear deterrence, argued that "thus far, the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose."¹

As the Soviets acquired a nuclear capability of their own, however, the equation became far more complex. It became less and less credible to assume that the United States would seize the nuclear option as the sole and immediate response to aggression in Europe or anywhere else in the world. Indeed, soon after the advent of the nuclear age, Kim Il-sung's invasion of South Korea demonstrated the inability of strategic nuclear weapons to deter certain forms of aggression and reminded us of the enduring importance of maintaining capable, credible conventional forces to defend our interests and preserve the peace. In short, it became apparent that America's strategic nuclear umbrella would shelter us from only a portion of the deluge of challenges we would confront. Foes throughout the world doubted that the United States would use such weapons, and we proved them right.

Our task then became to extend the deterrent value of our military power—our conventional forces as well as our tactical and theater nuclear weapons—to regions of potential conflict where deterrence could not be assured by strategic nuclear forces alone. This concept of extended deterrence became embodied in the strategy of Flexible Response, a strategy that has been successful for nearly 30 years. Flexible Response moved away from an exclusive reliance on nuclear weapons. It recognized the necessity for powerful conventional forces to provide forward-deployed units with a genuine capacity to contain and defeat aggression without immediate and automatic escalation to nuclear war.

Ten years ago, Sir Michael Howard persuasively articulated this point. Referring to conventional forces, he said, "It is this warfighting capability that acts as the true deterrent to aggression and is the only one that is convertible into political influence."² Indeed, Flexible Response has worked in Europe precisely because it has rested on the backs of American and allied soldiers on the ground, supported by air and naval forces, whose governments drew a line in the dirt and said, "No farther." These soldiers have constituted the steadily strengthening land forces that presented the Soviets with the prospect of protracted conventional war and the very real possibility of eventual defeat. It is this realization, more than the fear of nuclear war, that has served to temper and restrain aggressive Soviet designs.

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To be sure, deterrence has been buttressed by nuclear weapons—weapons that cover the spectrum from short-range systems that would instantly change the complexion of the battlefield to strategic weapons that would change the complexion of the world. But make no mistake, these weapons of mass destruction themselves depend upon conventional forces for their utility—for it is only at the top of an escalatory ladder that nuclear weapons achieve genuine credibility. And this ladder must rest on the solid foundation of capable conventional forces. As President Bush pointed out, “There are few lessons so clear in history as this—only the combination of conventional forces and nuclear forces has insured the long peace in Europe.”³


Through Flexible Response, the United States was successful in containing Soviet expansionism by making aggression a singularly unattractive alternative. Our conventional forces have thus been the basis for a seamless web of deterrence not only because of their linkage to our nuclear response but also because of their ability, in and of themselves, to punish an aggressor and to prevent him from achieving his objectives. And it has been our conventional forces that have bought the time necessary for the contradictions inherent in communism to bring the oppressive regimes of Eastern Europe to their knees.

The most important lessons of the postwar era can be summed up as follows. Since the advent of the nuclear age, the value of strategic nuclear forces has been limited to their passive ability to deter a Soviet attack. They are useful only when they are not used. It is equally apparent that the value of conventional forces has resided in our ability to employ them actively in a wide variety of peacetime tasks as well as in combat. They are useful when they are properly used. As we move into a new and uncertain future, neither theoreticians nor practitioners of national security can afford to ignore this fundamental difference.

Into the Future

These lessons from the past are of more than academic interest. If we are to escape from the simplistic nuclear deterrence paradigm, then our salient experiences from history must now join hands with the emerging realities of the international environment to shape our vision for security in the 21st century and the ideal military force needed to realize that vision. For, despite the democratic resurgence in Eastern Europe, the world remains a dangerous place. As Paul Nitze recently pointed out, “We have won only a partial and uncertain victory.”⁴

We must remember that radical political change never occurs without great danger. Throughout history, we have seen that the collapse of mighty empires, the realignment of traditional power groupings, and the restructuring of individual nations are invariably accompanied by instability, armed conflict, and



A soldier of the XVIII Airborne Corps provides a definition of “readiness” during Operation Just Cause in Panama, December 1989.

human suffering. Events within the Soviet orbit reaffirm this lesson of history and show the potential for violence that lurks just beneath the surface as the Soviet empire struggles with cataclysmic change.

It may be that the turmoil can be confined to the Soviet interior and that it will not threaten the security of NATO. But we cannot operate under such an assumption. The United States must be prepared—politically and militarily—to defend our national and alliance interests by helping to anchor European security in what will surely be a time of enormous challenge.

At the same time, we must never forget that our security and, indeed, the very prospects for global peace depend upon factors extending far beyond the confines of Europe. Ongoing interstate rivalries, historic national conflicts, religious animosities, and the lust for economic and political power fester throughout the Third World. These potential sources of instability are fueled by the proliferation of sophisticated weapons—from modern tanks to poison gas to ballistic missiles—that can continue to threaten our vital interests.

Despite these mounting threats, and despite our experiences in two land wars in Asia, we have historically treated the developing world as politically marginal and militarily insignificant. Consciously or not, we have

kept the faith of Hilaire Belloc, who gloated at the turn of the century over the invention of the recoil-operated machine gun:

Whatever happens,
We have got
The Maxim gun
And they have not.⁵

In the past 20 years, this time-honored boast has become obsolete; the “Maxim guns” of the 1990s are now in abundance throughout the world.

Our first hint of this new reality occurred in the Arab-Israeli conflicts of 1967 and 1973, during which we saw tank battles of a magnitude unparalleled since World War II and levels of destruction unprecedented in the developing world. Any lingering doubts about the military power of the Third World were erased by the Iran-Iraq War, characterized by large-scale tank engagements, heavy artillery duels, ballistic missile exchanges, poison gas attacks, and more than one million dead. Conflict in the developing world no longer presents us with business as usual. It is a new and expanding challenge that we must be prepared to confront. We also face the ongoing threat of insurgencies, guerrilla operations, international terrorism, and the trafficking in illicit drugs—collectively sometimes called low-intensity conflict. These can undermine peace and freedom as surely as more traditional sources of conflict.

Hence, even as we bask in the relaxation of East-West tensions, we must remain prepared to deal with the sizable military capabilities of a host of foes, both potential and acknowledged. We cannot ignore ten millennia of human experience on the basis of six months of revolutionary change. It is abundantly clear that the international environment of the 21st century will be no simpler, and possibly no safer, than the world of the Cold War. We cannot predict with certainty where or when the United States will be required to employ its forces in the future. But we can predict with certainty that if we ignore the lessons of history and fail to maintain forces to meet the challenges of tomorrow, future generations of Americans will pay for our irresponsibility with their treasure and possibly with their blood.

Strategic Conventional Forces

In such an environment, we must recognize that the key to the defense of our vital interests in the next century will rest with our conventional forces—forces that can be adapted quickly to deal with the ever-widening range of challenges occasioned by an era of uncertainty and change of historic magnitude. The contributions to our national security provided by conventional forces are unique and cannot be replaced by our strategic nuclear arsenal, no matter how modern, how destructive, or how accurate it may be. To borrow from Herman Kahn, “thinking about the unthinkable” of nuclear war has become an art unto

itself—essential to the survival of the nation but of little practical utility in meeting the overwhelming preponderance of challenges that we will confront.

As long as groups and nations continue to compete for land, resources, and political control of people, the words of historian T. R. Fehrenbach will continue to ring true:

You may fly over a land forever. You may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it, and wipe it clean of life. But if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did—by putting your young men into the mud.⁶

Thus, if the United States is to control the turmoil and exploit the opportunities that lie ahead, it must have powerful conventional forces and an Army that is second to none—a strategic Army with a global reach and a broad functional mandate.

Today, the expanding web of economic and political interdependence linking together the global community compels us to continue to exercise a leading role in that community. The archaic concept of Fortress America simply no longer has economic or military relevance for the United States. Indeed, we should have learned that bitter lesson from our nostalgic flirtation with isolationism in the interwar years. Our unwillingness to fulfill our role as a world power contributed directly to the largest war in history and cost humanity 50 million dead. In the 1990s and beyond, the United States must have the capacity to project land combat forces in the responsible exercise of power worldwide; we must be able to defend our interests wherever and whenever they are threatened.

More specifically, the United States must have conventional forces that can be tailored to respond to challenges across the operational spectrum ranging all the way from peacetime competition to major war. In peacetime, we must never lose sight of the fact that the American soldier—forward deployed or based in the United States—is our first echelon of strategic deterrence. When we put our forces on the ground, the power and prestige of our nation are fully committed. This is practical policy that has preserved peace in Europe and in Northeast Asia for two generations.

***We must never lose sight of the fact that the
American soldier is our first echelon
of strategic deterrence.***

The contributions of conventional forces during peacetime go far beyond deterrence. Our extensive cooperation with the armies of nearly 120 friendly nations, for example, is an effective and peaceful means of strengthening their capabilities to defend themselves. This is an option far preferable to deploying American Army units to protect our interests when a crisis is already underway. Security assistance programs—such as emergency supplies for Colombia to combat drug traffickers, medical aid for the Philippines, law enforcement equipment for Panama, and other efforts beyond number—are a sound investment in the future and often help to save lives.

Moreover, the Army participates actively in support of nationbuilding—assisting governments throughout the world to address common sources of internal conflict and instability. In developing nations, the US Army has worked alongside host armies to develop their abilities to build national infrastructures—the bridges, highways, schools, and clinics that are fundamental to alleviating human misery worldwide.

Furthermore, because of the political and social importance of armies in many countries, the US Army's professional contacts with them provide an important avenue of influence that might not otherwise be available. Indeed, the Army has helped scores of friendly governments to develop professional forces within the context of democratic values.

On yet another level, our conventional forces are among our most effective tools for enhancing political stability in the international order. US forces on the ground in Korea and elsewhere in Northeast Asia provide security and encourage stability, thus establishing the freedom to cooperate among such countries as Japan, China, and Korea, who have endured centuries of mutual antagonisms. And without our peacekeeping forces in the Sinai, the historic peace treaty between Egypt and Israel might never have come to pass. As we look to the future, American forces in Europe will continue to be essential in providing an anchor of stability as the winds of change rip through the continent—a reality recognized by Europeans of all political persuasions.

Finally, credible deterrence requires capable forces. Our forces must be trained and ready to fight and win as the ultimate guarantors of our nation's security on the battlefields of the future. As we consider the great issues of national security in this decade and beyond, we would be wise to heed the words of Plato, echoing over the span of 2500 years: "Only the dead have seen the end of war."

Down the Road

In the years ahead, our conventional forces will grow smaller as we adjust to a changing Soviet threat and steep budget reductions. Even as we respond to change, however, we must also maintain continuity—continuity of readiness and of capability that will protect the nation during an uncertain era.

*We would be wise to heed the words of Plato,
echoing over the span of 2500 years:
“Only the dead have seen the end of war.”*

Regardless of their size, our conventional forces must possess three qualities that are essential to our security in the future: versatility, deployability, and lethality.

First, our conventional forces must be versatile—able to respond to a widening array of challenges, while drawing from the same reservoir of forces. For this nation, the key to versatility lies in our ability to orchestrate our conventional forces in joint operations—operations in which we exploit the unique capabilities of each of the services, pulling them together into force packages that are appropriate for the political purposes we are trying to achieve. In a complex world of multidimensional interests and multifaceted challenges, we can no longer deceive ourselves into believing that national security can be ensured by relying on any one service or any single military capability. Our conventional forces will fight jointly, or they will not fight at all.

Versatility also demands that we retain combat power in units forward-deployed in Europe, Asia, Central America, and in other areas where presence itself is appropriate to protect vital US interests. Moreover, we must have powerful forces based within the United States that are designed to respond to contingencies worldwide. And we must have the unquestioned capability to reinforce our forward-deployed units or our contingency forces with units from our active and reserve components. Finally, versatility requires that we maintain our active forces and our reserve forces in the proper proportion—a proportion driven by the missions we must execute, the timeliness requirements we must satisfy, and the quality we must maintain throughout the armed forces.

Second, our conventional forces must be deployable—able to project substantial combat power rapidly wherever our interests are threatened. Nathan Bedford Forrest is credited with reminding us that the Army that wins is the one that gets there “the fustest with the mostest.” In the last decade of the 20th century, this homely admonition remains as valid as it was more than 125 years ago.

Depending upon the threat, we may be required to deploy only a minor force, such as a carrier battlegroup or an AWACS detachment. Alternatively, it may demand a major joint operation, built around a contingency force of armored divisions to contend with an adversary that itself possesses a powerful arsenal of tanks.

It is no secret that our ability to project substantial land combat forces is decidedly inadequate—we simply do not have sufficient airlift or sealift to support our requirements under the quite conceivable contingencies that could realistically require US forces. But the solution to this dilemma does not lie in stripping our forces of their combat power; it would be folly to commit American forces to battle without giving them the wherewithal to fight and win. Instead, the deployability dilemma must be addressed in a comprehensive manner that looks at imaginative and affordable solutions to moving forces rapidly throughout the world. This must be the center of a major national defense effort.

Finally, our conventional forces must be lethal—lethal to bolster deterrence and lethal to ensure defense. Lethality demands modern weapons, tough, realistic training, and young Americans of character and ability who volunteer to fill our ranks. For if we are committed to battle, we will go to win, and we will do what we must to achieve victory. In the midst of our discussions about the future of our conventional forces, we must never lose sight of this single, overriding mission—to fight and win the wars of our nation.

To Conclude

Forty-five years ago, the postwar nuclear thinkers broke new ground in the theory of the future of war. They had the intellectual courage to discard old dogma and look to an uncertain future with imagination and daring. Today, as we confront an equally uncertain era, we can be no less bold, no less imaginative, no less daring. We must have the courage to ask the tough questions and to reexamine the assumptions about deterrence and defense that we have inherited from past generations.

We must have the courage to see the world as it really is—a world abundant with opportunities, but also beset by challenges—a world in which conflict remains a way of life and the principles of freedom and democracy remain very much at risk. In this world, we must recognize the continued primacy of conventional forces, backed by the presence of a controlled nuclear arsenal, in the preservation of peace and in the shaping of a global order where freedom and democracy can take deep root and bloom with rich vitality. The nation and the world expect no less.

NOTES

1. Bernard Brodie, "Implications for Military Policy," in *The Absolute Weapon*, ed. Bernard Brodie (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1972), p. 76.
2. Michael E. Howard, "On Fighting a Nuclear War," ACIS Working Paper No. 31 (University of California, Los Angeles, January 1981), p. 19.
3. George Bush, Oklahoma State University Commencement Address, 4 May 1990.
4. Paul Nitze, "A U.S. Mission for the 90s," *The Washington Post*, 21 May 1990, p. A11.
5. Hilaire Belloc, *The Modern Traveler* (London: Campion Press Ltd., 1959).
6. T. N. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 427.

Military Police in Contingency Operations: Often the Force of Choice

CHARLES A. HINES

Within the last decade, the Military Police Corps has often been selected as the preferred force in responding to contingency situations. Military police are uniquely qualified to carry out a variety of peacekeeping and peacetime contingency missions in low-intensity conflict operations. This article explores the unique qualifications of MPs to undertake such roles and discusses the analytical process for determining the contingency situations most appropriate for their use.

The capability to field combat-ready forces in response to worldwide contingencies is one of the Army's primary strategic roles for the 1990s and beyond. The process of tailoring force packages that sufficiently demonstrate US resolve and protect national interests while preventing or de-escalating open military conflict is an essential component of strategic contingency planning. Today's volatile and politically charged international environment challenges strategic planners to design force packages capable of responding to specific contingency scenarios in a wide range of environments. The importance of tailored force-packaging is emphasized in FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*:

Regardless of perspective, the instruments for the resolution of a conflict must be appropriate to its nature. The arsenal of national power includes political, economic, informational, and military instruments. The nature of the conflict environment determines the way leaders employ them.¹

The mix of forces selected for a contingency mission is influenced by the principles of METT-T (Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, and Time Available) as well as a political element that is becoming increasingly dominant. Clausewitz's assertion that "war is simply a continuation of political

intercourse" applies also to contingency operations, for they too must be viewed as political instruments.² Consequently, particular scrutiny must be given to the political suitability of forces selected for a given contingency situation. Force suitability is not solely a function of mission capability or force structure. Political objectives shape military decisionmaking from the tactical to the strategic levels. Military courses of action, therefore, must be consistent with political aims even if unorthodox or nontraditional force structuring is entailed. Decisionmakers must be completely attuned to the policy goals attending each contingency, which may transcend purely military considerations. When selecting forces for contingency operations, for example, they must be sensitive to the perceptions of the local population, the international community, and the American public.

The last decade has seen a number of contingency situations where the Military Police Corps became the obvious choice. It has participated in events ranging from hurricane disaster relief in St. Croix in the Virgin Islands to Operation Just Cause in Panama. Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., has described the military police as "today's cavalry" that goes to the rescue in contingencies around the world.³ While this analogy might curl the spurs on some cavalrymen's boots, recent years have shown Colonel Summers' observation to be on the mark. The overwhelming support and gratitude shown to the military police by the people of St. Croix after Hurricane Hugo demonstrated that such soldiers can excel at coming to the rescue.

Force Selection: Military Police Vis-à-vis the Combat Arms

The broad principles for force-tailoring in behalf of military actions falling anywhere on the operational continuum are depicted schematically in the accompanying diagram.⁴ The diagram highlights the missions and appropriate occasions for employment of military police in comparison with those of the traditional combat arms. Unique capabilities of the military police, coupled with their domestic and international acceptability as a security force, frequently make them the most appropriate force for contingencies occurring at the lower end of the operational continuum. Conversely, as the lethality of a situation intensifies

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operations across the continuum, they may be the leading actor for operations falling within the left half of it—that of assisting and protecting.

The mission of *assistance* applies to those operations conducted by US forces to aid American and host-nation personnel during periods of heightened tension (e.g. noncombatant evacuation operations, natural or man-made disaster situations, and all other operations where the primary purpose of the force is the reestablishment or maintenance of normal peacetime activities). These operations may often be extensions of habitual missions conducted by US forces as part of their mission-essential task list. Threats in these situations may range from an antagonistic populace engaged in rioting, looting, and demonstrating to more hostile actions by elements who desire to disrupt or discredit governmental operations.

Military police units are uniquely suited to perform assistance missions as a result of their training and experience in dealing with citizens during periods of high stress and confusion. US objectives for these types of missions are support of the local population and protection of US interests and personnel while projecting a non-threatening, politically acceptable signature. Combat units, therefore, may not be the most preferred in these situations. Such units inherently cast a provocative, bellicose profile in the view of international and domestic communities. When the 82d Airborne Division is dispatched somewhere, for example, the entire world sits up and takes notice. Such publicity alone might jeopardize or impair a mission's success. But when a US Army military police battalion is flown to a trouble spot, no alarm bells jangle in capitals around the globe.

The mission of *protection* encompasses operations conducted by US forces providing for the security of American or foreign personnel, sites, facilities, and units. Implied tasks within this mission include those security measures required to deal with threats that have begun to actively target US interests. These are threats at the low end of the operational continuum: sabotage, hostage-taking, bombings, and attacks against individuals, groups, or businesses by terrorists or insurgents. Military police units can successfully perform this type of contingency operation, capitalizing on the low-threat signature they project.

While the organic capabilities of combat units might rate highly against the expected threat in protection scenarios, their use is often counterproductive. Circumstances in such cases usually require operating in a significantly force-restrictive environment against a predominantly covert threat. Maintaining low visibility would be difficult for combat forces. Further, insertion of combat units into this environment might be interpreted by the international community as an act of naked imperialism or aggression, extending well beyond the announced motives of protecting American personnel or facilities.

As the diagram suggests, selection of the most appropriate force becomes more difficult upon entering the transitional zone of the operational

continuum. Military police utility, though diminished here, may be considered adequate in light of overall national policy. Selection of military police might facilitate de-escalation to a protection mission. The lethality of the threat, however, and the threat's potential to increase in lethality must be closely monitored to ensure that military police capabilities are not overwhelmed and combat units are not introduced too late.

Missions involving *low-order combat operations* are those that counter forces threatening US personnel, sites, facilities, and units. The expected threats include those envisaged for the assistance and protection missions as well as operations by small enemy conventional and guerrilla units. Such threats thus include all previously discussed covert activities plus overt tactical operations against US targets by organized forces. Mission requirements for American security forces would now include active external screening and protection missions around critical targets, preemptive operations against threat strongholds and caches, and limited offensive operations. Combat forces are of course highly suited to these types of contingency operations.

While the desirability of military police as principal forces decreases as threat lethality increases, military police traditionally perform many critical tasks in support of forces engaged in combat operations. MP participation throughout all phases of contingency operations can relieve combat forces of tasks that detract from their primary mission. During the American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, for example, difficulty in placing military police units on the ground early resulted in a shortage of personnel available to guard detainees. In one instance US troops handed rebel prisoners (Constitutionalists) over to Loyalist soldiers, who promptly shot them.⁵ General Bruce Palmer, Jr., who commanded US forces during the Dominican intervention, summed up his thoughts on the use of military police units as follows: "The military police



MPs search suspects during Operation Just Cause in Panama, December 1989.

were worth their weight in gold. Early in the intervention we found that a major weakness in the initial troop lists was a shortage of MP units, and we soon had to give them a priority on a par with combat units."⁶

Missions designated as *high-order combat operations* involve force-against-force actions where defeat of enemy combat forces per se is the immediate aim of US units. These operations are conducted when the United States has become decisively engaged, and the host-nation government may or may not be sympathetic to American interests. Consistent with American objectives, the function of our units is to close with and destroy opposing forces. Since this is the primary mission for which they were designed, combat forces are obviously best suited to perform operations occurring during this phase of the operational continuum. Here as always, however, military police units will have important collateral missions and must be included in the force package.

Military Police in Past Contingency Operations

We have already glanced at military police involvement during the US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965; a similar pattern has continued during the past decade. During Operation Urgent Fury in October 1983, military police were sent to Grenada as part of the initial deployment force. While operations by combat units were the focus during the mission's early phases, military police in their protection roles performed a variety of security missions, patrolled, and conducted detainee/internee processing.⁷ When combat operations terminated, the need remained for a force capable of helping host-nation law enforcement authorities regain their effectiveness. Military police were chosen to stay in Grenada and remained there long after the end of Urgent Fury.

Operation Golden Pheasant in Honduras in March 1988 illustrated how contingency missions can range rather widely along the operational continuum. Military police had been performing security and force protection operations in Honduras for some time, demonstrating a non-threatening but tangible US presence. When Nicaraguan Sandinistas crossed the Honduran border, the JCS initiated Golden Pheasant, ordering in combat units as a show of force.⁸ This action achieved the desired results and the Sandinistas withdrew. Combat forces were then redeployed as the military police resumed force protection operations, thus maintaining the desired US presence. These events demonstrated the dynamic interplay of military police and combat forces during contingency operations as the threat waxes and wanes and the US response is adjusted accordingly.

The unique capability of MPs to respond to civil disorders formed the basis for their deployment to St. Croix after the devastation of Hurricane Hugo in September 1989. The hurricane had traumatic effects on the National Guard, police, medical services, and other governmental agencies on the island. Riots and looting threatened the safety of residents, businesses, and property.⁹ A force



MPs proved again during Operation Just Cause that they are well-suited to fill a variety of roles in contingency operations.

was needed capable of imposing firm order on a civilian populace while observing stringent rules-of-engagement safeguards. As Colonel Summers observed:

Until recently, it would have indeed been the cavalry—that is, combat forces—pressed into riot-control duty. But this time the Army sent in more than 1000 combat support men and women especially organized trained and equipped for such duty. . . . These professionals soon had the situation well in hand.¹⁰

Military police were the force of choice for the St. Croix mission. They stopped the looting, reestablished law and order, and demonstrated their ability to work hand in hand with territorial and federal agencies and island residents.

Prior to Operation Just Cause in December 1989, military police had been rotating to Panama to provide security augmentation forces capable of protecting US interests in the area while projecting a nonthreatening political signature.¹¹ The critical need for restraint in the use of force and the necessity to work with Panamanian paramilitary police units made military police particularly appropriate. As Operation Just Cause kicked off and gained momentum, military police intensified site-security operations, performed detainee/internee processing missions, and provided ready-reaction forces.

When the situation de-escalated, military police assisted Panamanian law enforcement agencies in the reestablishment of discipline, law, and order and resumed their security-enhancement duties. A salient aspect of Operation Just Cause was noted by Bernard Adelsberger, writing in the *Army Times*: "The military intervention in Panama highlights the Pentagon's ability to select elements from a wide array of military units for specific missions."¹²

The force-selection process may be initiated at any point along the operational continuum and periodically reassessed and adjusted to accommodate changing international conditions and evolving national policy objectives. Force-mix adjustments by the CINCs and National Command Authorities can serve to escalate, de-escalate, or simply stabilize a situation to allow time for further assessment.

The Dominican Republic, Grenada, Honduras, St. Croix, and Panama have demonstrated the necessity of a guiding concept in the force-selection process—one that factors in the political imperatives and carefully correlates the type of military unit employed with the type of threat to be encountered and the type of military task to be performed. Analysis based upon such a guiding concept will show—perhaps surprisingly—that US interests are often best served not by the trumpeted forced entry of a US expeditionary force bristling with big guns and seconded by the full panoply of war—but rather by the unobtrusive introduction of constabulary soldiers trained to satisfy those basic needs of any society: law, order, security, and civil assistance.

NOTES

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3. Harry G. Summers, Jr., "Today's Cavalry to the Rescue," *Washington Times*, 28 September 1989, p. F4.

4. The operational continuum consists of three general states: peacetime competition, conflict, and war (JCS Test Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations* [Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1990], pp. I-6, 7). The degree of force and violence involved generally increases as operations move from left to right along the continuum. The diagram shown here is adapted from a Force Selection Model prepared by the Military Police School, Ft. McClellan, Alabama.

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6. Bruce Palmer, Jr., *Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965* (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1989), pp. 151-52.

7. Allen Gibbs and Allen Grammer, "Grenada Chronology of 82nd MPs," *Military Police Journal*, 11 (Spring 1984), 34-35.

8. Ned B. Ennis, "Exercise Golden Pheasant: A Show of Force," *Military Review*, 69 (March 1989), 20-26.

9. Dennis Hevesi, "Bush Dispatches Troops to Island In Storm's Wake: Looting and Violence Reported on St. Croix," *The New York Times*, 21 September 1989, p. A1.

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11. 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne) After-Action Report for Panama Security Augmentation, August 1988, p. 2.

12. Bernard J. Adelsberger, "The Army of the Future? Package of Forces Demonstrates Wide Variety of Abilities," *Army Times*, 1 January 1990, p. R3.


The New Soviet Defensive Policy: Khalkhin Gol 1939 As Case Study

CHRISTOPHER D. BELLAMY and
JOSEPH S. LAHNSTEIN

Mikhail Gorbachev's dramatic changes in the Soviet political and military scene often raise more questions than they answer. One such problematic change to Soviet strategy and operational techniques is the new emphasis on defense. Discussion centers on whether defense in this context means defensive defense or offensive defense.

Soviet analysts have identified four models for a defensive strategy, and in every case historical analogies are used in their discussion. These are (1) an immediate counteroffensive following an enemy attack (the forces for the counteroffensive would in practice be indistinguishable from offensive forces); (2) an initial defensive phase to draw in the enemy and weaken him prior to a counteroffensive *into enemy territory* (e.g. the Battle of Kursk); (3) a counteroffensive that does *not* enter enemy-held territory; and (4) a highly defensive model, renouncing all offensive action above the tactical level, using fortifications, strong points, and small local counterattacks.¹ There are reliable indications that option three is the front-runner, and the Soviets have claimed that the outstanding example of this option is the Battle of Khalkhin Gol, involving Soviet and Mongolian forces against Japanese and Manchukuoan troops, which was fought in August 1939.²

There is certainly much to commend this battle for an important place in Soviet and general military history. It produced a key Japanese defeat which protected the Soviet Union from a two-front war after the German invasion. At Khalkhin Gol the Soviet Union tested many of the operational precepts that matured successfully in the later periods of World War II. It is recognized as an important formative experience for Marshal Georgi Zhukov, arguably the preeminent Soviet commander in World War II.³



Map 1: Disputed Area, Northwest Manchuria

The Khalkhin Gol incident is best approached within the context of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-45. The Japanese, having long sought to replace the Chinese and Russians as the dominant power factors in Manchuria, succeeded in establishing a puppet state there in 1931 which they called Manchukuo. With the advance of Japanese imperialist ambitions in the late 1930s, the Soviet's own satellite state—the Mongolian People's Republic—began to feel the pressure.

Lying adjacent to and immediately to the west of Manchukuo, the Mongolian People's Republic—seconded by the Soviets—disputed Manchukuo's dynastic claims to a 25-kilometer-wide strip of land lying between the Khalkhin Gol (the Halha River) and the town of Nomonhan to the east. In other words, Manchukuo, backed by Japan, claimed that the Khalkhin Gol marked the border between the two states, while the Mongolian People's Republic and the Soviets insisted on a border lying farther to the east, on a line running generally southeasterly through Nomonhan. The situation came to a head in May 1939 when Soviet troops occupied the disputed territory between the Khalkhin Gol and Nomonhan. The Japanese attacked with a reinforced division and were initially successful. Thus the stage for Khalkhin Gol was set.⁴

If Khalkhin Gol evinces the Soviet Union's current views about defensive concepts, it should answer several questions as a litmus test. The distinctive feature of this option is that the action remains confined *within the territory being defended*. But what is the legitimacy of the claim that the battle occurred only as a result of a Japanese incursion into the recognized territory of a Soviet ally, specifically the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR)? That is the first question. Second, how did differences in organization, equipment, and national commitment affect the battle's outcome? Third, what is peculiar to the Soviet operational techniques used in the battle which gave it a defensive nature? Last, what does Khalkhin Gol as part of the Soviet-Japanese conflict of 1939 tell us in general about the Soviet Union's view of limiting conflict?

Whose Side of the Wire?

Conflict between Japan and the USSR in the 1930s was almost inevitable. Severe fighting between the Soviets and Japanese had already taken place a year earlier (11 July-10 August 1938) at the site of a dispute over a poorly defined border area at the junction of Manchukuo, Korea, and Siberia. The boundary dispute regarding the Khalkhin Gol was over 200 years old.⁵ Disputes among warring Mongol factions to secure a scarce water source for their herds led to an acceptance of a transparent border in the Khalkhin Gol basin. Imperial Russian incursions into an increasingly fragmented China became exacerbated by the two even more dynamic and expansionist powers: Imperial Japan and Soviet Russia.

Though the Soviets had good cause to worry about their interests, the open hostility to the Soviets manifested by Japan's Kwantung Army in Manchukuo was diametrically opposed to the attitudes of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. The Japanese central government had no intention of provoking war with the Soviet Union in any circumstances and wished at all costs to limit the

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damage done to their relations by disputes over historically ill-defined borders. What the Japanese civil government wanted desperately was a set of recognizable and set boundaries between the Soviet Far East and Manchuria. To that end the Japanese government embarked on a policy of seeking negotiations to demarcate the border regions from 1935 onward. The lack of success in these negotiations implied that the border disputes would be solved only by force of arms.

This puts the question, "Whose side of the wire?" into a different context, making fixing the location of the wire an issue. Several factors, such as the control of the Khalkhin Gol drainage basin and its flow into Lake Buir, fueled the conflict over this semi-arid stretch of Asian steppe. Sensitivity of the Soviet Union to its own border integrity and the Mongolian political situation also played a role; the MPR's position as a new fraternal socialist country and its internal instability created a climate which invited the Soviet Union to take an active interest.

The Soviet assertion that they fought the battle in August 1939 to repel Japanese invaders can therefore more properly be characterized as a determination on the Soviets' part to settle a dispute over an undefined border by force of arms. The Soviet Union was defending its client's border claim based on its own interests, as against competing and similar Japanese claims.

General Strategic Situation


The Far Eastern USSR prior to and during World War II, which formed a strategic horseshoe around Japanese-occupied Manchukuo, remained critically dependent on the trans-Siberian railroad. The Soviets had never deployed the main body of their army in the Far East, and the Japanese considered it inconceivable that they would do so. Therefore, it was impossible to defeat USSR power by operations on the Far Eastern front alone. Having decided that they could not win a full-scale war against the Soviets by themselves, the Japanese could not allow any armed clash to escalate to this level. The conflict would be constrained politically and geographically to the uncertain frontier.

Hostilities began at a time when the situation in Europe was itself about to boil over. Soviet attempts to conclude an alliance with Britain and France had failed, but the Nazi-Soviet Pact (23 August 1939) would provide temporary security against German attack. The German-Soviet invasion of Poland was imminent.

It was against such a backdrop that the consummate Soviet counter-offensive was launched at Khalkhin Gol on 20 August 1939 against a self-limited Japanese force. By so doing, the Soviets would discourage Japanese aggression against the USSR, removing the specter of a two-front war. Another factor was the early Mongolian winter, during which the Soviet-Mongolian soldiers and equipment would have a decisive advantage.⁶ Khalkhin Gol offered the Soviets a unique window of opportunity in time and circumstance.

Early Clashes

Soviet sources date the sequence of events leading directly to the Khalkhin Gol campaign from an alleged Japanese border violation on 28 May, although parties of Mongolian horsemen had occupied positions on the Bashagal Heights, near the Nomonhan cairn which marks the MPR-claimed border, on 4 and 11 May. Both sides assert that the other fired first.⁷



Map 2: The Khalkhin-Gol Operation, 20-31 August 1939.

On 28 May a Japanese force of reinforced-regiment size endeavored to encircle a Soviet-Mongolian task force to the east of the Khalkhin Gol. This failed, but highlighted a number of Soviet weaknesses. In June major air battles occurred over Bain Tsagan. On 22 June, for example, 95 Soviet aircraft reportedly engaged 120 Japanese. The nature of aerial warfare is such that it is difficult to respect boundaries: Japanese bombers ranged over territory west of the Khalkhin Gol and Soviet fighters pursued Japanese well into Manchukuo. Having reinforced substantially, the Japanese attacked Soviet-Mongolian forces with a division-size force, intending to strike across the Khalkhin Gol to cut off their escape. On 3 July, the Japanese crossed the Khalkhin Gol in the vicinity of Bain Tsagan, the only time during the entire campaign that ground forces of either side crossed what they claimed to be their border. This force beat back counterattacks by Russian armor until 5 July, but after losing about a third of its strength withdrew to the east bank of the river. The Japanese unsuccessfully endeavored to push Soviet-Mongolian forces to the west bank with a sizable effort on 23-25 July. The Japanese reserves, 20-30 kilometers to the east, were unable to influence the battle owing to intense air attack. These preparations gave the Russian-Mongolian forces a useful screen and bridgehead for the decisive August counteroffensive.⁸

Japanese Forces

The Japanese realized they would be generally outnumbered, their working assumption of roughly three to one according well with today's estimates of 65,000 Soviet-MPR troops against 28,000 Japanese-Manchukuoan. In terms of larger tactical units, the battle was ultimately fought by three Soviet divisions and five armored brigades against the reinforced Japanese 23d Division. Local Japanese superiority could be obtained only by nimble tactical massing, weakening other sectors temporarily, and then repeating the process. Some sources indicate that Japanese assessment of the Russians was based on the relatively poor showing of the Russian Imperial Army in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.

Japanese staff planners, however, were more realistic, apparently assigning a Soviet division a value of 0.8 as against 1.0 for a Japanese division. Soviet materiel was expected to be superior in quantity and in some cases quality, but the materiel actually fielded by the Soviets exceeded Japanese expectations in both respects. The Japanese would have to rely on superior morale and esprit.⁹ In this respect, too, they underestimated the Soviet-Mongolian forces.

Soviet Forces

The principal Soviet force in Mongolia was the 57th Special Corps. Overseeing Soviet military activity was Army Commander 1st Grade G. M.

Shtern, who had commanded at Lake Khasan in August 1938 and then commanded the Red Banner Army of the Far East. On 5 July he was appointed to head the Far East Front Directorate, based at Chita, "coordinating [all] Soviet and Mongolian forces' activity" in the Far East.¹⁰

On 2 June, Georgi Zhukov was summoned to People's Defense Commissar Voroshilov in Moscow and ordered to proceed to Mongolia to report on the situation. He was selected specially by Voroshilov, with Stalin's agreement. He arrived at 57th Special Corps Headquarters at Tamtsak (Tam-sag) Bulak on 5 June. Zhukov was appalled by the great 120-kilometer distance of the headquarters from the front and refused to accept the lack of telegraph lines and airfields as an excuse.¹¹ Zhukov concluded that 57th Special Corps alone was not sufficient to hold against a major Japanese attack and presented a plan to seize and hold a bridgehead on the east bank of the Khalkhin Gol and launch a counterattack "from Mongolian territory."¹²

It therefore appears that the operational plan to trap and encircle the Japanese within the claimed borders was formulated by Zhukov on his arrival at the scene on 5 June. Following the plan's acceptance by Stalin the next day, Zhukov assumed command and requested reinforcements consisting of aircraft, three rifle divisions, a tank brigade, and much artillery. On 15 July, the reinforced 57th Special Corps was redesignated 1st Army Group under Zhukov. Although Shtern was involved in the planning, it appears that Zhukov's new command was not subordinate to Shtern, but reported directly to Moscow.¹³ Political and geographical circumstances dictated that this reinforced corps, having drawn on resources from across the Soviet Union, and with a special mission warranting control direct from Moscow, would be acting very much in isolation, severed from other friendly forces by desert and distance. For the Soviets, this was a corps battle.

The proposed operation would take place some 650 kilometers from the nearest Soviet supply railhead. First Army Group Headquarters staff set up a conveyor-belt arrangement with motor vehicles over the 1,300- to 1,400-kilometer round trip, shifting all supplies from the railhead to a depot near the front in five days. Every available vehicle was used, including artillery tractors. Had the Soviets been subject to attacks on this supply line, or had they been involved in fierce fighting at the front, this huge logistical movement would have been impossible.¹⁴ This effort dwarfed the logistical preparations of the Japanese; indeed, it dwarfed anything the Japanese believed possible.

Maskirovka

The 20 August counteroffensive was planned under conditions of tight security by a small team within Army Group Headquarters. Now that Zhukov had the go-ahead for his operation, he worked with a tight-knit group reporting only to Stalin. The chiefs of supporting arms each worked only

within the confines of their specialty. Only one typist was used to prepare the orders. Machines were used to fake the sounds of tank engines (to get the Japanese used to "armor" movement) and construction work, and conspicuous quantities of timber and other defensive materials were brought up. Leaflets supposedly aimed at friendly troops were distributed, stressing the *defensive* nature of the preparations; and false information concerning Soviet intentions was transmitted by telephone and radio in a code difficult enough to be convincing but easy enough for the Japanese to decipher. By 15 August, the 10 or 15 Soviet radio receivers were handling only about 20 transmissions a day. The Japanese were dealing with 230 to 250. By 17 and 18 August, Soviet radio traffic was virtually zero, thus giving away nothing.

In addition to measures to deceive the Japanese, movement of forces into and within the area and training of assault troops were rigorously concealed. Reconnaissance was carried out as covertly as possible.¹⁵ Soviet intelligence was very good, with Zhukov expressing operational interest "most of all in the exact location and numerical strength of the Japanese troops," a prerequisite for a successful encirclement.¹⁶

Preliminaries

Artillery duels and air battles raged during the run-up to the operation. The Russians fired at night to keep the Japanese awake, prevent them changing position, and cover the noise of their offensive preparations. By early August, the Russians were firing one round a second during light bombardment and two to three during intense periods, a luxury permitted by their heroic logistical preparations.¹⁷ In contrast, after the Japanese offensive in late July, they were rationed to two or three shells per medium gun per day. The Japanese observed that the flat terrain and the extraordinary visibility possible in the clear Mongolian air gave the engagements some of the character of war at sea. The Russians, with their longer-range heavy guns and ample ammunition supplies, were at an advantage.¹⁸ The image of war at sea is also relevant with regard to the difficulty of identifying and adhering to territorial limits.

In the air, the first Soviet priority was to keep enemy reconnaissance planes from observing secret movements. On 7 August, Tokyo authorized a Japanese air offensive against Soviet air bases in Mongolia, which were well west of the Japanese-claimed boundary, thus underlining the different rules applying in the air as opposed to the ground.¹⁹

Attack

The general timing of the Soviet attack was determined by the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the imminent invasion of Poland. The exact date of 20 August was chosen because it was a Sunday and many

Japanese generals and key officers would be away. The Japanese appeared lax and overconfident, clearly not expecting a Soviet operation on this scale. Japanese frontline troops seem to have sensed that something was up, but this perception was not shared by the higher headquarters that could have ordered an alert and other preparations. The deceptive signals, indicating that the Soviet-Mongolian forces were digging in for the defensive, were accorded greater weight than the tactical encounters consisting of aggressive probing attacks.²⁰ Zhukov had thought bigger than the enemy, and his rigorous logistic preparations had put everything necessary in place. The trap was ready to be sprung: "To win decisively, even spectacularly, would alone suffice."²¹

Soviet troops began pressing forward on both flanks on 19 August. At dawn on 20 August a thick mist hung over the Khalkin Gol. By this time, Zhukov had all his main forces, except for 6th Tank Brigade and the long-range corps and high command reserve artillery units, across the river to the east bank. Japanese forces extended along a 60- to 70-kilometer front, separated by the Khailastyn Gol tributary, which was of little significance as an obstacle but was the only source of water for the Japanese forces. The pattern of intense Soviet artillery and air support was to become standard for offensives; in operational terms, this was in no way a defensive battle. The Japanese responded vigorously in the air, mounting 160-aircraft raids against Madat and Tamsag, well into Mongolian territory. After two days, they realized they must conserve their forces to deal with the overwhelming concentration of all Soviet Far East air assets in direct support of ground operations. Soviet aircraft also attacked the Japanese reserve west of Chiangchunmiao, well beyond their claimed border.²² Soviet tanks attacked and destroyed Japanese logistical facilities near Lake Uzur Nur in an action that may have involved crossing the claimed boundary.²³ The 9th Brigade from the north and 8th from the south made contact on 24 August, closing the ring around the Japanese while skirting but not transgressing the Soviet-claimed border.

The battle followed what was to become the classic pattern of Soviet encirclement: establishing an outer front of mobile forces to fend off attempts to relieve the encircled force, while an inner front, largely infantry in this case, worked to destroy the trapped enemy. The Japanese divisional commander and 400 survivors just managed to escape, reaching Chiangchunmiao on the morning of 31 August.²⁴

Conflict Termination

On the evening of 30 August, the Deputy Chief of Imperial General Headquarters, Tokyo, arrived at Kwantung Army headquarters with Order 343 stating that, in order to prepare against a possible invasion of Manchukuoan territory by the USSR, and to maintain tranquillity in the north while the domination of China was secured, every effort should be made to terminate

operations in the Nomonhan area. The Kwantung Army was already planning a counteroffensive with three fresh divisions, however, and their generals sought clarification.

Then on 3 September the Kwantung Army, still in fighting mood, suddenly received Imperial Order 349: "Bring the border incident to voluntary settlement."²⁵ Because of the acute situation in Europe, the Japanese government sought diplomatic negotiations for an overall adjustment of relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.²⁶ The Emperor, the highest political and strategic authority, had spoken—mindful, among other factors, of the uncertain and dangerous situation now that World War II was two days old. A cease-fire agreement was signed in Moscow at 1530 on 15 September.

Military Lessons

Soviet and Japanese estimates of casualties are shown below. Irreconcilable though the claims are, the losses were clearly such as to sustain the conclusion of a Soviet study that this was "a real war."²⁷

Personnel Casualties and Aircraft Losses

	Japanese Figures	Soviet Figures
Soviet Personnel	?	18,500
Soviet Aircraft	c. 1200	207
Japanese Personnel	18,000	61,000
Japanese Aircraft	149	660

Although Soviet casualties were high, the Soviets' meticulous operational planning, elaborate deception measures, purposeful integration of combined arms, aggressive maneuver, and use of the air component to achieve local air superiority and seal off the battlefield—plus the remarkably imaginative and diligent solution to their acute logistics problem—all contributed to a remarkable victory. And we should mention too the Soviet chief of signals, whom Zhukov praised for always providing adequate communications and thus troop control.²⁸

Khalkhin Gol is above all the paradigm of the encirclement battle in modern conditions. Although cavalry played an important part in drawing the initial cords round the enemy, armor played the vital role. Shtern was quick to grasp its significance: "I think it will become the second perfect battle of encirclement in all history."²⁹

A distinctive feature of the battle of Khalkhin Gol was the creation of inner and outer encirclement fronts: the inner front to trap the enemy, the outer to fend off attempts to rescue him. Soviet authorities assert that Khalkhin Gol was the first example in Soviet military art of this key pattern, a technique that later came to full fruition in the great encirclements at Stalingrad, Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy, and elsewhere.³⁰ Another feature replicated in later operations



Clausewitz's dictum on war as "an extension of politics" is illustrated by this group around the battle map. From left to right: N. N. Voronov, G. M. Shtern, an unidentified officer, USSR Ambassador to Mongolia I. A. Ivanov, Marshal of the MPR Kh. Choybalsan, and Georgi Zhukov.

(Stalingrad, again) resulted from the Japanese-Manchurian command decision to place the weakest troops—Manchukuoan cavalry—on the flanks, thus facilitating Soviet breakthroughs there and the consequent encirclement at relatively little cost. It was, in the Soviet view, the first use of armored and mechanized forces to achieve *operational*, as opposed to merely tactical, goals.³¹ Zhukov had, indeed, glimpsed the shape of future war.

The operation also underlined the value of new equipment used *in concert with operational surprise* and *en masse*. Whereas previously the Japanese had encountered only light Soviet tanks, they now met large numbers of the excellent BT medium tanks with effective high-velocity guns.³²

Conclusion

At the highest, politico-strategic level, in view of the unstable situation in Europe and the need to avoid a two-front war, one can argue persuasively that Khalkhin Gol had defensive aims. Indeed, from the Soviet perspective the operation merely restored by force of arms the status quo ante. At the operational level, however, the battle was anything but defensive. The Academy of Science's publication *Victory on the Khalkhin Gol* describes it unequivocally as the "August offensive operation!"³³ The uncertain border at Khalkhin Gol gave the Soviets an opportunity to deliver a surgical strike against the Japanese without the entangling consequences of invading undisputed Manchukuoan or Japanese territory.

Border disputes can still occur, particularly in a Europe where the disintegration of the Eastern bloc can easily resurrect ages-old bones of territorial contention. Recent Polish concerns over whether a reunified Germany would reassert claims to the former German territories is a case in point. Chancellor Kohl, at Camp David on 25 February of this year, issued soothing statements on the matter, but declined on constitutional grounds to renounce entirely German concerns over the German-Polish border.³⁴ The parallel between the Soviet-Mongolian situation in 1939 and the Soviet-Polish situation is striking. Soviet forces have been quite disposed to act in concert with those of their allies in promoting those allies' interests as their own. While Chancellor Kohl has moved to defuse this potential impediment to German unification, other borders—Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, Moldavia/Romania, Lithuania, etc.—remain as potential crisis areas in Europe.

To return to our initial questions, it is clear that Khalkhin Gol cannot be regarded simply as a counteroffensive in response to an invasion of Mongolian territory. Thus Soviet claims that it is a paradigm for defense of its own borders need to be regarded critically. With the exception of the Japanese attack in early July, both sides held back from crossing their own claimed borders with ground forces, but ranged fast, far, and aggressively into the other's airspace. Russian numbers, equipment, logistics, deception, and imagination were all superior, and these, combined with limited commitment on the part of the Japanese High Command in Tokyo and the remoteness of Kwantung Army, consigned the reinforced 23d Division to destruction. The Japanese had signaled unwillingness to escalate, which gave the Russians a free hand, and after the Russian victory the Emperor decreed that enough was enough. There was nothing defensive about the conduct of the battle itself, or indeed about the plan to trap and destroy the Japanese forces (there was never any question of simply pushing them back: that would not have been a permanent solution and would not have had the required traumatic effect).

As a limited war, judged in terms of the forces involved, the terrain traversed, its isolation from the heartland of the USSR, and the limited

objectives, this conflict is exemplary. As a theater action, wherein an operational venture serves as part of a strategic or grand strategic design, the operation is also exemplary. And it is a model too with regard to controlled escalation and conflict termination: directives from the highest level on both sides switched off the conflict as World War II began to unfold. On the Russian side, the surgical instrument, a reinforced corps, was controlled directly from the Kremlin, bypassing the theater command but drawing on the latter's resources as necessary. The operation provides a good perspective on General Yazov's warning that "the Warsaw Pact's defensive military doctrine . . . certainly does not mean that our actions would possess a passive character."³⁵ Above all, it is an illustration of the old saying, which applies equally to the battles of Stalingrad, Kursk, and maybe today, that there is nothing quite as dangerous as a Russian on the defensive.

NOTES

1. Extracts from *Problems of Preventing War* by A. A. Kokoshin and V. V. Larionov, *Mirovaya Ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* (World Economy and International Affairs) (1988), pp. 23-31. Kokoshin had earlier addressed option two in *Kurskaya bitva v svete sovremennoy oboronitel'noy doktriny* (The Battle of Kursk in the Light of Contemporary Defensive Doctrine) (August 1987), pp. 32-40.

2. Ibid. Option Three "envisages that the sides are capable only of routing an invading enemy formation on the territory they are defending, without going over to a counteroffensive outside their borders." This suggestion was also made by a member of the Soviet delegation to the 1988 Edinburgh Conversations held in December 1989. These informal talks among American, British, and Soviet scholars and diplomats are conducted annually, alternately in Moscow and Edinburgh.

3. For example, the Soviet film *Marshal Zhukov-stranitsy biografii* (Marshal Zhukov—Pages from a Biography) (Moscow: Central Documentary Film Studios, 1984), part 1, makes this point six times.

4. G. Zhukov, *Reminiscences and Reflections*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Progress, 1985) is one of the prime sources on this important operation. The preeminent Western study is Alvin D. Coox, *Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939*, 2 vols. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1985). Also Edward J. Drea, *Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939*, Leavenworth Paper No. 2 (Washington: GPO, 1981). Another essential study is the HQ USAFE and Eighth US Army (Rear) series *Japanese Studies on Manchuria*, 13 vols. (Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1956), hereafter cited as *JSM*. Vol. I, *Japanese Operational Planning Against the USSR*; Vol. XI, *Study of Strategic and Tactical Peculiarities of Far Eastern Russia and Soviet Far Eastern Forces*; and Vol. XIII, Part 3, Books A-C, *The Nomonhan Incident* are particularly useful. Saburo Hayashi, *Kogun, The Japanese Army in the Pacific War* (Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Association, 1959) also gives a Japanese view. The operation is described in John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command: A Military Political History, 1918-1941* (London: Macmillan, 1962), pp. 517-22. There are excellent Soviet sources on the operation. One is *Sovetskaya voyennaya Entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopedia, hereafter *SVE*), Vol. 8 (1980), pp. 353-54. One of the best studies is S. N. Shishkin, *Khalkhin-gol* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1954), an edited version of which is translated as Appendix H to *JSM* Vol. XI, 3, C, pp. 563-634. The authors used the Polish edition of the original, S. Sziszkin, *Chalchin-gol* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo ministerstwa obrony narodowej, 1956). E. Gorbunov, *20 Avgusta 1939* (Moscow: Molodaya gvardiya, 1986) has excellent maps and photographs. The Academy of Sciences of the USSR, *Pobeda na reke Khalkhin-Gol* (Victory on the Khalkhin Gol River) (Moscow: Nauka, 1981) has some odd insights and is good on the influence of the battle on later military theory and practice. N. K. Kiryukin, ed., *Forpost Geroev* (Outpost of Heroes) (Moscow: Khabarovsk, 1973) is a collection on the history of the Soviet army in the Far East, as is N. F. Kuz'min, *Na strazhe mirnogo truda, 1921-1940* (On Guard for Peaceful Work), History of the Red Banner Army of the Far East (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1959). N. N. Voronov, *Na sluzhbe voyennoy* (In Military Service) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963) has criticism of G. M. Shtern, the theater commander, as has I. I. Fedyuninskiy (commanded 149th Motorized Regiment), *Na Vostoke* (In the East) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985). Surprisingly, in view of its stated importance, P. A. Zhilin, ed., *Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva* (History

of Military Art) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1986) with a highly Eurocentric perspective and beginning its scanty treatment of the Pacific War in 1941, has no specific treatment of this operation.

5. The thorny border issue is investigated in Coox, I, pp. 142-82. For an interesting Imperial Russian perspective see Prof. E. Yu. Petra, and Yu. M. Shokal'skiy, *Bol'shoy vsemirny Atlas Marksa* (*Mark's Great World Table Atlas*) (St. Petersburg: Marks, 1905, 1909). Plate 47, East Siberia, shows the boundary running southeast of the Lake Buir Nor and then south of the river Khalkhin Gol. Also G. V. Glinka, ed., *Atlas Aziatskoy Rossii* (*Atlas of Asiatic Russia*) (St. Petersburg: Emigration Department, 1914), Plate 6, which shows the boundary running through the lake (Buir Nor) and then nothing, implying that the border ran along the river. Therefore, even Imperial Russian sources do not all support the Soviet claim. The authors are grateful to Mr. Francis Herbert of the Royal Geographical Society for his cartographic help.

6. See *JSM*, Vol. XIII, *Study of Strategical and Tactical Peculiarities*, pp. 9, 13-14, 90-92, 95-109; also Vol. I, *Japanese Operational Planning*, pp. 99, 118.

7. *SVE*, Vol. 8, p. 353; Coox, I, pp. 189-91; Shishkin (Polish, p. 23) says that "reconnaissance engagements" occurred from 11 to 26 May, without giving details.

8. Shishkin, pp. 23-42; *JSM*, Vol. XI, part 3, B, pp. 305-19, fragmentary account of Lieutenant Colonel Kazuo Murasawa, confirms (p. 305) that this was "the only historical evidence of Japanese army river-crossing operations in combat against the Soviets."

9. Shishkin, *Khalkhin-Gol* (Polish), pp. 31-32, 47; Hayashi, p. 15; Coox, I, map, pp. 184-85, 568; *SVE*, Vol. 8, p. 353; *JSM*, Vol. XI, 3, C, p. 373. On *esprit*, see Coox, I, p. 87.

10. *SVE*, Vol. 8, pp. 353, 538; Coox, I, p. 489.

11. Zhukov, *Reminiscences and Reflections*, I, p. 179.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

13. Coox, I, p. 489.

14. Zhukov, *Reminiscences*, pp. 185-86; Shishkin, pp. 43-44; Coox, I, p. 580; *JSM*, Vol. XI, Part 3, C, Appendix F, Nomonhan Diary by Captain Sakae Kusaba, p. 521: "We had heard of the frightful Soviet artillery fire. . . but the intense, around-the-clock pounding we received from the Soviet artillery far surpassed our imagination. Although their lines of communication were four or five times longer than ours, the Russians seem to have stockpiled a stupendous amount of ammunition at Nomonhan by using over 10,000 trucks."

15. Zhukov, *Reminiscences*, pp. 186-87.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 189. On one occasion, the Russians opened fire on a black car which appeared to their front, and immediately afterwards reported the death of General Komatsubara, because they knew it was his car. *JSM*, Vol. XI, 3, C, p. 490. On radio traffic, see Coox, I, p. 574.

17. *JSM*, Vol. XI, 3, C, pp. 521-22.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 475-77.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 523-24; Coox, I, p. 583; *JSM*, Vol. XI, 3, C, pp. 381, 524.

20. *JSM*, Vol. XI, 3, C, p. 374.

21. Erickson, *The Soviet High Command*, p. 522.

22. Shishkin, pp. 54, 59, 62; Gorbunov, p. 206 and esp. map, p. 148; *JSM*, Vol. XI, 3, B, p. 209 (trans. of Shishkin in *JSM*, Vol. XI, 3, C, pp. 382, 611); Ogisu, *JSM*, Vol. XI, 3, C, p. 379. Significantly, the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* (Vol. 8, between pp. 320-21) omits the deep strike by Soviet aircraft west of Chiangchunmiao.

23. Shishkin, p. 61.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 62; *SVE*, Vol. 8, p. 353; *JSM*, Vol. XI, 3, C, pp. 393, 399, 401-02.

25. *JSM*, Vol. XI, C, pp. 412-17; Coox, II, pp. 842-78.

26. *JSM*, Vol. XI, C, p. 421.

27. *SVE*, Vol. 8, p. 354; *JSM*, Vol. XI, C, 3, pp. 460-61; Coox, II, pp. 914-15; A. V. Berezkun, et al., *Istoriya vneshnei politiki SSSR, 1917-1945* (*History of USSR Foreign Policy*), 2 vols. (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), I, p. 388.

28. Zhukov, *Reminiscences*, p. 198.

29. Attributed to Shtern by Major General A. Vorozheikin, cited in Coox, I, p. 572. Shtern was comparing it to Cannae.

30. *Pobeda na reke Khalkhin Gol*, p. 70.

31. *Ibid.*, and p. 63.

32. *JSM*, Vol. XI, 3, C, p. 393; *Pobeda . . .*, p. 63.

33. *Pobeda . . .*, p. 63.

34. John M. Goshko, "Kohl Offers Mild Assurance About Polish Border," *The New York Times*, 26 February 1990, pp. A1, A16.

35. Army General Dmitry T. Yazov, "Voyennaya doktrina Varshavskogo Dogovora-doktrina zashchity mira i sotsializma" ("The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact—Doctrine of the Defense of Peace and Socialism"), *Pravda*, 27 July 1987, col. 5, last para.

Whence the Big Battalions?

F. J. CHIAVENTONE

"I should very much like to deliver a dissertation on the American army and the possibilities of its extension. You see, it is such a beautiful little army, and the dear people don't quite understand what to do with it."

Rudyard Kipling
American Notes, 1930

God," Napoleon is reputed to have remarked, "is on the side of the big battalions!" He was referring to the massive conventional armies he had assembled at the end of the 18th century in his bid for dominance of the European continent. To the Emperor's chagrin, the combined battalions of the allied powers were bigger and ultimately more effective. The concept of armed coalitions which effectively undid Napoleon has, in the latter half of the 20th century, played a far more complex and delicate role in the maintenance of the European balance of power. For more than 40 years now, NATO and the Warsaw Pact have faced each other in a breathless and uneasy stand-off in a Europe much changed from the one Napoleon knew in an earlier century. These huge conventional armies of tanks, guns, and men are about to experience a change of monumental implications.

Valued as much for their deterrent as their warfighting capabilities, these armor-intensive big battalions have nonetheless been instrumental as guarantors of the prolonged period of peace which has characterized Europe in the postwar era. It is an era that is coming to a close in a remarkable and largely unanticipated wave of euphoria whose harbingers were an equally remarkable vocabulary of detente, *glasnost*, *perestroika*, and Gorbymania. In a world in which statesmanship, diplomacy, and economic necessity are increasingly successful in ameliorating tensions between the superpowers, have the big battalions, by their very success, rendered themselves obsolete? Or is this comforting perception simply a product of old-fashioned "linear"

thinking, due to be exposed and overturned by that "paradoxical logic of strategy" advanced recently by Edward Luttwak?¹

Our century has seen the dawn of the Nuclear Age. For a while thereafter, the big battalions were displaced by the big bang. The massed armies that traversed the Continent in two world wars were replaced by small groups of technicians, with unprecedented destructive power at their fingertips. But the specter of a nuclear Damoclean sword dangling above the whole of Western civilization proved too grim for even the most hardened of cold warriors. The strident rhetoric of massive retaliation was gradually replaced by the more measured tones of flexible response. Strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces were balanced by conventional forces (preeminently ground combat troops), and Europe settled into a protracted, albeit massively armed, peace.

While NATO has for years depended heavily on the threat of nuclear retaliation to offset its inferiorities in conventional force levels vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact, European leaders are today less willing to pay the political freight associated with a strategy that stakes the very existence of the Continent on a potential roll of the nuclear die. Thus in recent years NATO has come more and more to rely upon the presence of strong ground combat troops to maintain the balance of power, demonstrate its solidarity and resolve, and deter Warsaw Pact aggression. This evolving strategy appears to have worked—45 years of peace, however uneasy, are still 45 years of peace. Yet the economic costs have been high. Conventional forces, tanks, guns, and most especially men do not come cheaply. Now, Europe once again is changing. Frontier fences are coming down. East bloc economies and politics are thrashing about in the throes of internal chaos. Germans, West and East, have danced on the Berlin Wall and rent it asunder. The vaunted Soviet army has been described by the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee as essentially "dismembered."² The Warsaw Pact is disintegrating. The threat would appear to be evaporating before our very eyes.

As a result, influential players in the national security process are asking hard questions about the utility of current force structures. The primary question ought to be: How do we adjust our force structure to best account

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when to cut or even how much to cut.
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for the political changes transpiring on the world scene? But one no longer entertains real hopes that this question will be answered by any rational calculus. The bandwagon of force reductions is now careening downhill, and leaders from across the political spectrum are leaping aboard. The question is thus no longer whether to cut or when to cut or even how much to cut. The question indeed is whether to retain any big battalions at all.

To many in Europe and the United States, a whole new world of economic opportunities is opening up. These opportunities, however, will require an immense expenditure of capital. One can easily imagine a European Common Market where defense, weighed against the realities of market pressures, assumes significantly lower priority—or is given short shrift altogether. Much of the capital now devoted to defense will be seen as having more utility in people-oriented programs. The peace-dividend debate is not a uniquely American phenomenon.

What of the American heavy divisions now standing watch over borders which, to many Europeans, have all but lost their significance? How long will Congress and the American public willingly support the maintenance of some 220,000 American troops doing a job that the Europeans themselves have come to view as superfluous? It seems inevitable, as President Bush has publicly proclaimed, that the American presence in Europe will undergo a change—and that in the very near future.³ There is little doubt as to what that change will entail: a significant drawdown of our forward-based units in that theater.

In the face of troublesome trade and budget deficits and increasingly fierce economic competition in both Europe and Asia, the prospect of reduced military expenditures holds a hypnotically seductive appeal for many of our legislators. While procurement of large-ticket weapon systems would appear to provide a lucrative and likely target, appropriations earmarked for such items tend to be expended over long terms and dispersed widely over congressional constituencies. Thus, “perceived” savings there are relatively insignificant when viewed against the comparatively larger and quicker savings to

be had from immediate cuts in personnel payroll and force operating expenses. This means that the budget ax will fall on the most funding-intensive element of the Department of Defense—manpower. The Army, which has the largest manpower requirements, will be especially vulnerable.

For the Army, large-scale reductions are thus inevitable. But faced with a requirement to make drastic manpower cuts, what and whom will the Army choose to do without? What will the Army look like in ten years? Will it be a lean fighting tool, all teeth and claws? Or will it more closely resemble Germany's 100,000-man army of the years following World War I? The latter, while relatively small, was a finely-wrought cadre of that nation's finest military professionals, thinkers, and trainers, carefully chosen and nurtured to allow for rapid expansion. In time this cadre force formed the backbone of the fabled *Wehrmacht*, which came close to bringing Europe to its knees.

If we choose a cadre-style Army, in the German model, it would maintain a small, light, combat-ready corps capable of short-notice deployments to deal with low-intensity conflict situations such as the Dominican Republic, Grenada, or Panama, but would put the bulk of its resources into research and development, intelligence, reserve force enhancement, maintenance of mobilization base, sustainment functions, and the education, training, and development of commissioned and noncommissioned officers. With any luck at all this should give us the capability to deal adequately with brush fires while still maintaining the capacity to expand heavy forces both efficiently and effectively in time of true national peril.



Abrams tanks of the 167th Armored Bn., 2d Armored Division (FWD) cross the Lachte River in Hahnhorst, West Germany, during REFORGER '87. The Division is now to be "inactivated" by 30 September 1991.

A much more likely result will be to place our faith in a teeth-and-claws force with one primary and overriding focus—what the Army refers to as “warfighting.” Consisting essentially of combat units, it would be manned almost exclusively by young, aggressive, steely-eyed fighters. Their equipment would be the best that American technology could provide. The units themselves would be flexible, mobile, and capable of immediate response to any crisis. Tax dollars expended would go toward a purely combat-oriented force structure, mostly light, with lots of firepower and instantly available strategic airlift. In other words, we would have the expeditionary army advocated by Major Daniel Bolger in his recent and much-remarked *Parameters* article, “Two Armies.”⁴ Elegant in its simplicity, inexpensive in execution, such an Army is tailor-made for political campaign rhetoric. It is, in short, a concept that can be expected to do quite well in Congress.

But is a teeth-and-claws expeditionary Army concept based on anything more substantial than a general feeling of optimism about recent political developments (and assumed trends) in Eastern Europe and the consequent conclusion that all future wars will be limited to short-term, low-intensity conflict scenarios where fast and violent execution will inevitably preclude a need for long-term sustainability? Is not acceptance of such a concept actually a rosy proclamation that henceforth the United States will be exempted from the scourge of having to commit big battalions to the brutal business of prolonged conventional war? And will such a concept withstand the tests of time and historical reality? Certainly the concept is long on romantic and fiscal appeal. In his “Two Armies” essay, Major Bolger was clever to quote Frenchman Jean Larteguy on the virtues of expeditionary soldiers. Yet the more ominous pronouncements of an earlier Frenchman, Marshal Joseph Joffre, also warrant consideration. It was, after all, Joffre who trained and fielded the World War I army of “young enthusiasts” who, in his words, knew “no other law than that of the offensive.” It was Joffre who insisted that all attacks were to be “pushed to the extreme with the firm resolution to charge the enemy with the bayonet, in order to destroy him.” Joffre and his contemporaries assumed that their war too would be a short one, with sustenance obviated by the élan of the French soldier and the spirit of the bayonet.⁵

Leaders to fight our future wars are assuredly the most perishable of commodities. Tanks and guns, assuming that research and development and a viable industrial base are preserved, may with luck and time be regenerated. Military experience, however, is a far less readily renewable resource. Thus the gravest peril of the impending demise of the big battalions is not that of fading organizations, or equipment, or even facilities, but of brainpower. It is inevitable that as organizations evaporate, so too will a substantial part of the officer and noncommissioned officer corps. It is equally likely that among the many who are

managed out of existence as mere ciphers will be the latter-day counterparts of Dwight Eisenhower, George C. Marshall, and Omar Bradley—the architects of Allied victory in the Second World War. This is not to say that the work of these officers in the 1920s and 1930s was necessarily a prerequisite for their performance in the 1940s, but rather that preservation of the cadre and training system and the survival of these officers in it were essential factors. However great or urgent the need, no amount of industrial surge will produce the gifted theoreticians, strategists, and field commanders who are lost through the haste and neglect of a shortsighted drawdown.

While there is no shortage of those who now prophesy a future of sunshine and roses in Europe and the Eastern bloc, it would be well to remember the bleaker times a short two years ago. That which has so recently occurred in Europe and the Eastern bloc has, in fact, confounded all the so-called experts. Political developments unthinkable two years ago are now a reality. In times of such rapid and overwhelming change, who is to predict with certainty what the chaotic future may hold? A great many “experts,” politicians and editorialists particularly, are already proclaiming that war in Europe is impossible. We would do well to remember that many of these same pundits were gleefully proclaiming the end of the Chinese communist government right up to the moments before the horror of Tiananmen Square.

It may truly be time to bid farewell to the big battalions and the men who have shaped and led them. It may truly be that they are out of fashion. We should not, however, delude ourselves into thinking that whatever course we choose to pursue will be less problematic than the course we trod in the past, or less fraught with potentially catastrophic consequences. The decisions that are eventually made, whether they provide for an expeditionary army, a cadre army, or perhaps something in between, should not be made lightly, with unseemly exultation, untoward certitude, and unrealistic expectations. As peace breaks out in Europe, let our euphoria be tempered by sober reflection on the uncertain permutations of an unfathomable future. Should the impossible or the unthinkable occur, the nation may survive or perish based on the choices we are about to make. Let us all hope that those decisions are made with farseeing wisdom.

NOTES

1. Edward Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987).

2. Senator John Warner in an address to the American Defense Preparedness Association, quoted in *Defense Daily*, 21 March 1990, p. 444.

3. See, e.g., Ann Devroy, “Bush Calls for Major Review of NATO’s Policies,” *The Washington Post*, 4 May 1990, pp. A1, A23.

4. Daniel P. Bolger, “Two Armies,” *Parameters*, 19 (September 1989), 24-34.

5. John Ellis, *Eye Deep In Hell* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), p. 84.

Thinking About Small Wars

RICHARD SZAFRANSKI

This article is intended to be the intellectual and literary equivalent of a raid. It has a limited objective, its duration is expected to be short, and it resides on the lower end of the continuum of disputations (a spectrum running from single, great ideas all the way to tedious, encyclopedic arguments). Like its subject, it will be a low-intensity essay. Its objective? To focus thinking on armed interventions and small wars in a way unencumbered by current formal doctrinal debates.

We are entering an era when the likelihood for armed interventions to protect our nation's interests by affecting the affairs of other organized groups or states could increase. It matters little whether we call this class of armed intervention low-intensity conflict, or contingency and limited objective warfare, or some other name. What does matter is that our armed forces are prepared to fight.

Our forces fought well in Operation Just Cause, but it is unlikely that the unique circumstances of that Panamanian intervention will ever be repeated.¹ Thus any expectation that Just Cause will be the model for future operations may be ill-founded. Likewise, the belief that the long-awaited doctrine on low-intensity conflict may adequately prepare us for future interventions may also be incorrect.² We need to be prepared to fight even when engaged in civil-military operations and peacekeeping roles.

But, some may counter, an armed intervention comprising, for example, a mere show of force will not necessarily involve combat. To which I would reply that we do not and cannot control all the votes. Since we have only limited control over an adversary's response to our intervention, we may find ourselves in a small but violent clash. *Our* intervention may be transformed into *their* war. Unless we have given sufficient thought to fighting small wars, it is less likely that we will be prepared to fight them successfully.

If Clausewitz is correct, present in all military interventions are the two basic ingredients for war, or at least warfare: politically-organized opposed and hostile wills, and the capability to use armed forces to oppose or secure political objectives. Although violence is always a possibility in military interventions, sustained violent resistance may not always be encountered. For example, raids and force interpositions are more likely to be opposed (by at least defensive actions) than shows of force or demonstrations. But experience teaches that *any* military act might be opposed.

As we might have expected, the Libyan raid was opposed, as was the recent reinforcement and employment of forward-deployed forces in Panama. Certainly the Marines did not expect their peacekeeping interposition between belligerents in Beirut to have the tragic outcome that it did. And both the USS *Roberts* and the USS *Stark* suffered damage when even their presence in the Persian Gulf was contested.

The decision to oppose an armed intervention with armed regular or irregular forces is the *adversary's* to make, based on the adversary's political goals and calculations of risk and consequence. These calculations may be made by a logic incomprehensible to us and result in conclusions we might judge as ranging from sage to insane. Although in some cases everyone but the adversary might agree that resistance would be futile (if not plainly suicidal), the adversary may still decide to fight. Likewise, and at least initially, the adversary may have freedom to shape the battlefield by determining the timing, tempo, and form resistance will take. Should armed force be used to resist what we intended to be merely a small and limited military intervention, the result could be warfare or a small war.

Small wars, whatever their genesis, are likely to be wars fought against the forces of a lesser power, or against the proxies or surrogates of a greater power. They are fought, and will be fought, in those areas where we perceive our security or interests are imperiled. These interests are political, but within that broad domain may reside considerations of trade, resources, access and basing, protection of our citizens, elimination of criminal elements, maintenance of a regional balance of power, or sustaining a government favorable to our country or to the governments of our allies or friends. The most likely sites of conflict are the Caribbean, the Middle East, and the Pacific littoral.³

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Small wars are likely to be small for four reasons. First, the political objectives of our intervention are likely to be specific. Second, finite political objectives will tend to limit the military objectives. Third, limited military objectives and the political necessity to keep the scope of the conflict as nonthreatening to other states as possible will probably restrain us from bringing to bear all the force we have available. Last, they will be small because our likely enemies will be unable to engage in anything larger than a small war unless other countries sustain them. If other countries do sustain them, thus compelling an increase in our forces to secure our original objectives or new and larger ones, warfare may escalate from the small category into something else. Nonetheless, the size or site of the conflict may not always be a good preconflict indicator of its intensity.

Intensity is the product of many interactive variables, including the value placed on objectives, the strength of the opposed wills, and the armaments and training of the forces engaged. In his philosophy on warfighting, codified in Fleet Marine Forces Manual 1, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alfred M. Gray, asserts that intensity is determined by the "density of fighting forces or combat power on the battlefield."⁴ Although we can attempt to estimate the density of battlefield combat power or the intensity of a conflict in advance, the variables are so numerous and complex, and the consequences of a miscalculation so serious, that we ought to consider most armed interventions as having within them the seeds of small wars. The adversary, besides resisting, may resist with modern weapons.

It is no exaggeration to say that many Third World nations are armed to the teeth. The armed forces of the opposition may have rocket-powered grenades, shoulder-fired or mounted anti-aircraft missiles, anti-mortar radars, sensors, sophisticated mines, rotary-wing aircraft for rapid movement and ground attack, jet aircraft with air-to-air and air-to-ground attack capability, modern naval vessels (including submarines), tanks and mechanized infantry, long-range surface-to-surface missiles, binary chemical weapons, perhaps even a few deliverable nuclear weapons, and everything else that money, credit, or promises of affiliation can buy. These high-tech threats may be complemented by an effective capability to employ low-tech weapons in small-unit or guerrilla tactics, when necessary or advantageous.

In addition to being well-armed, the enemy is increasingly likely to be well-led. Many of the leaders of Third World governments and armed forces have been educated at universities in Asia, the Middle East, or the West. Their officers may have been trained in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Libya, Lebanon, or even at military colleges in the United States. It is unlikely that the enemy troops they lead will have the one-on-one competence of our own troops, but they will probably be more familiar with the terrain, have homes and families to protect, be infused with the national pride that adds an incalculable dimension to a

warrior's capability, and be able to seize the initiative if they find us weak or unprepared. They may also have had recent combat experience in the region. What may have been envisioned as a simple show of force could result in combat with a well-armed, well-led, and vicious enemy.

Pondering where conflict might occur suggests three other characteristics of these kinds of wars: (1) strategic warning of an imminent conflict will very often not be available, since intelligence collection assets may not be optimized for the areas where conflict is likely; (2) because the site of conflict may be in a lesser-developed country, we can expect at best only a modest infrastructure to support our operations; and (3) the most significant limiting factor may be the lack of runways to support air operations. These points deserve elaboration.

Besides being denied warning, we may also know little about the enemy's center of gravity or the disposition of his forces. Depending on the adversary's language or language groups, we may not have any or enough linguists. Being unfamiliar with the operational geography of an area, we may fail to appreciate how it can be used against us. We may lack accurate charts and maps, continuous navigation satellite coverage, assured communications connectivity, and a host of other amenities. We may know less than we would prefer about terrain, water sources, trafficability, and so forth. Worse, the horrendous logistics problem associated with great distances and budget-driven sustainability cuts may be seriously compounded by the lack of ports, paved roads, and airfields.



USAMHI

US soldiers conduct a house-to-house search during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada. The potential for combat in urban areas is an important characteristic of future small wars.

In lesser-developed nations, airfields are few and those existing are usually joint-use facilities shared with the civil side. A military presence at such airfields usually means troops, fortifications, and air defenses. Forced entry involving runway-seizure operations will almost inevitably require wresting fortified air bases from the enemy. Lacking airfields for sustainment is one problem, lacking bases for close air support is quite another, but lacking any easy lodgment at all may be the most serious.

These purely military inconveniences of small wars may be aggravated by the political characteristics of armed interventions. Because the quickest way to influence the will of a hostile government may be to confront the political center of gravity directly, it is likely that our forces will intervene in or near the seat of another state's government. The interventions in Libya, Lebanon, Grenada, the Dominican Republic, and Panama were all at least partially directed against capital cities. Since these are urban areas even in the Third World, should fighting erupt the likelihood of urban combat would be high. The potential for combat in urban areas, an environmental factor resulting from political considerations, is an important characteristic of future opposed interventions or small wars.

Other political constraints will affect military operations. It is national policy that we will fight only as a last resort.⁵ Thus, we could enter the fray at a tactical disadvantage. Even rapidly deployable deterrent-force modules may not be of much help if our adversary has had time to mobilize reserves, fortify high-value assets, and disperse forces.

Because of the sensitivity of interventions, we will always have precise and restrictive rules of engagement. Collateral damage of any kind may be prohibited, even in urban areas. Overflight of en route or contiguous countries may be denied. Some critical nodes in the adversary's logistical chain could be located in other countries. Ethnic, cultural, or religious considerations may cause unexpected coalitions to develop. Whatever rules of engagement we begin with may change rapidly unless we meet with quick success. The longer we are engaged, the more changeable and confusing the rules are likely to become. Likewise, other sources of pressure—from public opinion, the Congress, our own military leaders, and other actors in the world arena—will push for a war of limited objectives and limited duration.⁶ The *rapid restoration of peace* will always be a dominant goal.

These requirements, in turn, will condition the approach we take toward preparing for interventions that could become small wars. The foremost requirement ought to be fidelity to the principle that the military instrument of national power should be employed only when all other avenues of power and suasion have been exhausted, when political intercourse requires the addition of violence or the threat of violence to protect or secure our interests. Even before committing to a military solution, military leaders must have a clear understanding of the

political objective and the ways in which military force is envisioned to support it. The political objective and its importance will determine both the military objective and the level of effort required.

If military officers have any say in the matter, we should emphasize that our combatant forces are for combat—that is, the active neutralization and even physical destruction of the obstacles that impede the realization of our political goals. Except for military police and civil affairs teams, which remain the forces of choice at the low end of the conflict spectrum, our forces are not ideally structured or deliberately trained to be a presence or for policing. Our combat forces are trained and formed for, and should probably be employed only in, interventions that require the application of or the sincere threat of violent, lethal force. That is their principal purpose, and to use them otherwise is to misuse them.

That we should not intervene with military forces unless we intend, or are at least prepared, to employ violent force is not a profound insight, yet it may be a novel one to some involved in crisis-resolution planning. Thus, we need to ensure that everyone involved in crisis-resolution deliberations is aware of the two cardinal realities of military combat: First, if our intervening military force encounters resistance, and even if withdrawal or retreat are acceptable alternatives, there will very likely be destruction of property and loss of human life, including that of innocents. Second, in the fog and friction of combat, there will unavoidably be mistakes, misdirection, and even the potential for failure. Intervention begets violence, and violence is never subject to absolute control.

As the destruction of an Iranian airliner by the USS *Vincennes* illustrates, the death of noncombatants is an ever-present risk. The downing of a US Air Force reconnaissance jet by a missile fired from a US Navy fighter over the Mediterranean in 1988 showed that misdirection can occur whenever armed forces are in an even potentially hostile environment. The purpose of these illustrations is not to criticize our naval forces; rather, it is to question the notion that force can be applied so discriminately that it can always be precisely controlled. Although it is tempting to use adjectives like “flawless” and “surgical” to describe combat operations, these words are almost invariably inaccurate. And a military intervention planned as or unexpectedly transformed into a combat operation is as unlikely to be bloodless as it is to be flawlessly or surgically executed. All our citizens need to understand that.

They must also understand the ways in which the potentially negative effects of these realities can be minimized: (1) by refusing to mount a military intervention unless we must, (2) by ensuring that both our military forces and our citizens are prepared for the possibility that even our presence might be violently opposed, (3) by using the proper forces to intervene, (4) by ensuring superior force-on-force ratios at the critical points, and (5) should fighting erupt, by taking advantage of the combined-arms combat capabilities we

possess. By "proper forces" and "combined-arms" requirements I do not mean a collage of forces for the sake of what Jeffrey Record calls "gratuitous jointness." We have not done that recently, unless one considers Urgent Fury in Grenada (1983) a recent event.

To increase the probability that a military intervention will be successful even if opposed, we should intervene only with the forces best prepared for combat. A dilemma we face is that the forces *best* prepared for combat may be those *least* prepared for police work or civic action, or *least* capable of causing zero collateral damage. Since a rapid response may be required, we require a highly mobile and air-transportable force. If we believe that armed resistance to an intervention is more than just a possibility, we will need forces that are both conventional and unconventional, that can get in quickly, execute violently, fight continuously day and night, be largely self-sustaining, and secure their most critical objectives in a matter of hours or days. Said another way, our military forces need to have as much of the fighting done as possible before the press pool arrives.

Why? Because the press may exercise a decisive and possibly adverse role in future armed interventions and small wars. Dr. Grant Hammond of the Air War College faculty has suggested that in a democracy the small war's center of gravity may be public opinion, manifest not only in opinion polls, but also through the representative leadership of a democracy's citizens.⁷ If public opinion is indeed "the hub on which all power and movement depends" and "the most effective target for a blow"—Clausewitz's way of defining the center of gravity—then we require both a popular cause for armed intervention and the capability to reach a resolution rapidly, *before* the sight of blood and bodybags on evening TV begins to chill the national resolve.⁸ For the same reasons, we do not need American noncombatants taken hostage or American prisoners of war taken as a consequence of our intervention.

Thus, both the will and the means must be prepared as we contemplate the likelihood of future armed interventions. Once our minds and means are prepared, our leaders must carefully weigh in the balance the real gains that can be obtained through the use of lethal force—or the threat of it—with the potential costs of combat operations. This evaluation must be sensitive to our national values, and must not preclude the possibility that doing nothing may be a legitimate response to some crises. In fact, in an era of scarcity, it may be our only possible one. The conclusion that military force can best resolve a crisis must be made with great deliberation at the highest levels.

Analysis of US military fiascoes in the past decade or so—the Iranian hostage rescue attempt, the deaths of more than 200 Marines in Lebanon, and the failure of some of the specific tasks on Grenada—indicates common contributing factors.⁹ Among these were improvisational planning (Iran and Grenada), disintegrated planning (Iran, Beirut, and Grenada), questionable force

selections (Iran and Grenada), and self-induced command and control problems (Iran, Beirut, and Grenada). Present in each and contributing to the final outcomes were failures on the part of leaders—especially political leaders—to think their way through the problems associated with armed interventions.

Recalling that this essay is merely a raid, we should not classify the foregoing observations as direct attacks on leadership. If leadership takes a few hits, they fall into the category of collateral damage. The point is that all of us connected with national defense—military and civilian alike—need to ponder the many difficulties associated with armed interventions that could evolve into small wars. In the absence of such hard thought, the desired outcome of an armed intervention may not be attained, and, in the process of failing, our nation, our armed forces, and some of our citizens could be hurt.

Our raid is now over, save for the after-action report. In this case, that report is a compilation of imperatives which political and military leaders should consider before they sortie off to another nation's soil or into another nation's airspace or waters in furtherance of our country's interests in the future.

- *Clearly understand the political outcome desired.* Political leaders must precisely define and articulate the political objectives they intend to achieve by intervening with military force. Military leaders must select the courses of action that satisfy those requirements. Those of us in the trenches need not only to understand the commander's intent, we need also to understand the President's intent. In dynamic situations this understanding could predispose us to behave in ways that are more faithful to the larger design, even if explicit instructions are unavailable.

- *Envision the outcome before intervening.* Sir Isaac Newton taught us that to every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. How will the enemy react? Have we realistically visualized the action-reaction cycle that will surely be set in motion by our intervention, and are we prepared to call or up the ante as the action escalates? If the outcome appears to be either an interminable intervention or one not likely to be supported by the American people, it is not going to succeed. Certainly we can admire Edmund Burke's advice: "Do not despair, but if you must, work on in despair." But we are better advised to avoid situations entirely that will lead to despair.

- *Don't go anywhere mentally or physically unprepared for combat.* Preparation includes understanding the rules of engagement and having plans for a hasty and opposed withdrawal. The rules of engagement must be reasonable and, if force is required, must not constrain it to the degree that a successful military outcome is jeopardized.

If the rules of engagement are overly restrictive or too complex for the forces to understand, they will likely be unintentionally violated. When

the rules of engagement restrict reasonable military operations, require the troops to perform tasks for which they have not been trained, or require behaviors that contradict key elements of their training, something has gone wrong. Trained combatants are just that. To require or expect philanthropic behavior from them in a potentially hostile environment is foolhardy.

- *Pray for a nice, straight chain of command.* One responsible and accountable commander and a clearly defined chain of command are infinitely superior to the collage approach to interventions, where too much is left to the vagaries of cooperation and coordination. Joint task forces and coalition warfare are the wave of the future, but these make the need for a single authoritative commander only more pronounced.

A sovereign nation requesting the assistance of our combatant forces may be unwilling to subordinate its military forces to our theater commander-in-chief or joint task force commander. Likewise, it is difficult to envision our forces being placed under the operational control of foreign military leaders outside of NATO or the Combined Forces Command in Korea. Unless we have an understanding of the command relationships that might be expected by other nations with which we have bilateral security agreements, we may be victimized by our lack of foresight. It is easy to talk about coalition warfare, but effective coalition warfare will not be possible unless we conduct these delicate discussions in advance.

- *Things change over time.* Remain sensitive to changes and continuously evaluate the situation. Do not let the "intelligence preparation of the battlefield" formula and its internally coherent templates create complacency. Things can change rapidly.

If the intention of the intervention is to apply force, the general guidelines above must be supplemented. More specifically, if the decision to fight is made, it becomes axiomatic that we marshal the right resources in the right strength to ensure that the objectives can be secured quickly and with minimum losses to friendly forces. Following from that axiom are several corollaries:

- *Use elite forces first.* The enemy fears them most and should. Elite forces include not only the service components of the Special Operations Command, but also airborne units and Marine expeditionary forces. If among the rules of engagement is the requirement for no collateral damage, it will be necessary to use only the forces capable of meeting such stringent requirements. In all cases, plan for the forced entry to occur in darkness.

- *Plan and execute an overwhelming initial assault.* Although our sense of fair play may tend to make a graduated response appear more humane and civilized, the probability of success is compounded if the enemy archers are slain and his war chariots smashed all at once. If it is human to err, it is prudent to err initially on the side of "too many." Be prepared to explain to

critics why this is "proportional" and "humane." Plan adequate reserves. Plan to succeed.

- *Make it easy for the enemy to quit.* Resistance requires hostile will and hostile means. Psychological operations can attack and help subdue hostile will while physical attacks eliminate hostile means. While the intent of simultaneous attacks against the enemy's mind and muscle is to make surrender, capitulation, or withdrawal the only alternatives available to a reasonable enemy, do not count on any enemy being reasonable. Overtake and capture or destroy those withdrawing. Do not make it easy for the enemy to reconstitute his armed forces against you. If the enemy refuses to behave reasonably, destroy his forces until only reasonable men remain. Appreciate, however, that unless some national authority structure in the enemy state can be assembled after your initial objectives are met, your stay may be prolonged.

- *Talk to the enemy.* Take pains to remain in contact with the enemy's military leaders. Make sure they harbor no doubts regarding your capability or your will. Use the media to your maximum advantage. Let the enemy leaders and troops know that you are treating noncombatants, prisoners, and wounded with compassion. Give enemy leaders at least two alternative visions of their future and explain the advantages of being alive over being dead.

- *Restore the peace as rapidly as you can.* If you have destroyed the enemy's means and will to resist, garrison forces will not be required, at least not in large numbers. An intervention plan that lacks a vision of the post-conflict restoration—and fails to provide the people and instruments to implement it—is a poor plan.

We are well into the epoch of the small war and even lower-level military interventions. Although these may not represent the worst case, armed interventions and small wars are likely a "worse case."¹⁰ These are probably more difficult to win than any military operations or wars in our experience. A principal source of their difficulty is that they are fought in "peacetime," without a formal declaration of war by Congress. Consequently, they demand visionary statesmen; gifted generals; creative colonels; and well-trained, well-equipped troops.

Approaching this subject from the perspective of a raid, I have omitted much that is important, including some things that are extremely important. The logistical, medical, communications, command/control, and intelligence requirements for military interventions and small wars, for example, are as complex as they are critical, but their treatment belongs in a more general engagement than this.

Finally, if we are ever to become involved in large military interventions or small wars again—and we undoubtedly will—the understanding and support of our citizens will be crucial. Because warfighting is an activity that

engages the minds and hearts of the entire nation, it is our citizens and their elected representatives who ultimately will determine whether our military forces succeed or fail. It is for that reason the framers of the Constitution placed the responsibilities "to raise and support" our armed forces, "to provide for calling forth the militia," and "to declare war" squarely on the shoulders of the Congress, the representatives chosen by the people. In the final analysis, the role of military forces in a democracy is nothing more nor less than to fulfill the will of its citizens on the battlefield.

NOTES

1. Operation Just Cause in Panama entailed the reinforcement of treaty-protected forces and their subsequent employment in combat operations. Even air reserve components were available in the theater for immediate employment. The contingency plan was developed and matured over a long period of time. The logistical problems associated with great distances, bare bases, and lack of infrastructure did not exist. It is difficult to envision many other places in the world where our intervention forces would be given the advantages US forces in Panama had. See Douglas Waller et al., "Inside the Invasion," *Newsweek*, 25 June 1990, pp. 28-31.

2. The "Initial Draft" of Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-07, *Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, May 1989, is an ambitious work. However, it appears to be more policy than doctrine. Doctrine, for example, ought to assert the need to protect and defend existing US interests from reprisals once "peacemaking" or other coercive military operations are undertaken. Yet, a senior Marine officer (speaking under the promise of nonattribution), suggested that reinforcement of the Marine detachment at the US Embassy in Panama did not receive the priority it deserved during Just Cause planning. In sum, for doctrine to be authoritative, it must be sufficiently comprehensive and predispose us to behave in ways likely to ensure success.

3. Michael C. Desch, "The Keys that Lock Up the Third World: Identifying American Interests in the Periphery," *International Security*, 14 (Summer 1989), 86-122.

4. US Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Forces Manual 1, *Warfighting*, p. 21.

5. The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, July 1987, pp. 32-34, and US Congress, *Report of the Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci on the FY 1990/FY 1991 Biennial Budget and the FY 1990-94 Defense Programs*, pp. 43-45. The 1987 declaration of national security strategy stated that combat forces would be introduced "only as a last resort and when vital national interests cannot otherwise be adequately protected." The White House's most recent declaration declares: "To the degree possible, we will support allied and friendly efforts rather than introduce US forces." It adds the caveat, "Nonetheless, we must retain the capability to act either in concert with our allies or, if necessary, unilaterally where our vital interests are threatened" (The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, March 1990, p. 26).

6. Eliot A. Cohen, "Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars," *International Security*, 9 (Fall 1984), 151-81.

7. Grant Hammond, paper on low-intensity conflicts in *Journal of Small Wars* (forthcoming).

8. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 485-86, 595-96.

9. Richard Gabriel, *Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985); Daniel P. Bolger, *Americans at War, 1975-1986: An Era of Violent Peace* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988); and Arthur T. Hadley, *The Straw Giant: Triumph and Failure: America's Armed Forces* (New York: Random House, 1986).

10. As time goes on, more Third World nations will acquire chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles. The "worst case" may indeed be the need for raids or strikes to disarm such nations. It is likely the worst case because such operations would be large, probably violently opposed, and not necessarily successful. Even if one such raid or strike succeeded, other similarly armed Third World nations would probably strengthen their defenses, disperse their weapons, and, having secured their weapons and delivery means, use the threat of employing these weapons as an additional deterrent against preemptive, disarming attacks.

The Gap Between Leadership Policy and Practice: A Historical Perspective

FARIS R. KIRKLAND

In spite of the rapid socio-cultural evolution that has taken place in the United States since its birth as a nation, there has been consistency in US Army policy with respect to leadership. Modern research in the military and social sciences has confirmed the psychological and military validity of the leadership philosophy prescribed by current Army regulations as well as those dating back to the late 18th century. But military leaders have demonstrated a continuing propensity to behave in ways at variance both with policy and with the interests of the service.¹ My purposes in this article are to review the fundamental themes stated in US Army leadership policy since 1778, and to illustrate how practice has regularly, and destructively, departed from them. I will then discuss how military socialization processes have guided new NCOs and officers into behavioral patterns that do not conform to policy, and suggest some ways in which these processes might be changed to bring leadership practice more nearly into consonance with policy.

Leadership Policy, 1778-1990

The origin of leadership policy in the US Army was Baron von Steuben's advice to officers in 1778. Captains and lieutenants were to "gain the love of their men," treat them with "kindness and humanity," and attend to "everything that may contribute to their health and convenience."² Steuben, with his focus on trust, caring, and affection, defined the first of three themes in US Army leadership policy. The earliest regulations published by the War Department (1821) explicitly linked Steuben's concepts with discipline and performance in combat:

It is the intention of the government . . . that enlisted soldiers shall be treated with particular kindness and humanity; . . . that all in commission shall conduct, direct, and protect inferiors of every rank with the cares due men from whose patriotism, valour, and obedience they are to expect a part of their own reputation and glory. . . .

[E]very superior is strictly enjoined not to injure those under him, by abusive or unbecoming language, or by capricious or tyrannical conduct.

A spirit of good will, and even of brotherhood . . . [is] essential to the good of the service . . . [T]he most conciliatory of manners have been found perfectly compatible with the exercise of the strictest command.³

Between 1857 and 1915 these policies were condensed into two sentences on the first page of *Army Regulations*: "Military authority will be exercised with firmness, kindness, and justice. Superiors are forbidden to injure those under their authority by tyrannical or capricious conduct, or by abusive language."⁴

In 1915 policymakers in a change to *Army Regulations* reaffirmed the importance for military discipline of trust and affection across ranks:

Officers will keep in as close touch as possible with the men under their command and will strive to build up such relations of confidence and sympathy as will insure the free approach of their men to them for counsel and assistance. This relationship may be gained and maintained without relaxation of the bonds of discipline and with great credit to the service as a whole.⁵

With respect to duties of commanders, the US Army *Manual for Commanders of Large Units* (1930) declared: "His first object should be to secure the love of his men by his constant care for their well-being. The devotion that arises from that kind of attention knows no bounds and enables him to exact prodigies of valor on the day of battle."⁶

The second theme of leadership policy has been mutual respect for subordinates as a basis for discipline. Respect grew out of paternalistic concern for preserving soldiers' health and morale so they could fight. The 1841 edition of the *General Regulations* recognized soldiers' needs for social

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support in directing company commanders to keep members of squads together, and to transfer soldiers "for cogent reasons only."⁷ Respect for the soldier's off-duty time was reflected in the 1857 and 1889 *Regulations* with limitations on the length of the duty day.⁸

Early in the 20th century the concept of respect for soldiers as individuals began to appear in quasi-official publications. Moss, in his *Officers' Manual* (1907), reminded officers that soldiers "are members of your profession . . . they are men and should be treated as such. Never swear, because they can only bear it in humiliating silence."⁹ A military writer in 1918 pointed out a linkage between respect—downward—and discipline: "When you exact respect from soldiers, be sure you treat them with equal respect . . . Consideration, courtesy, and respect from officers toward enlisted men are . . . parts of our discipline."¹⁰ Official recognition that discipline has its roots in internal psychological processes came in 1928 in regulations that defined it as "that mental attitude and state of training which render obedience and proper conduct instinctive under all conditions."¹¹ The editors of *The Officer's Guide* in 1930 noted, "Good discipline results from mutual respect among good men."¹²

At the beginning of the Second World War, General George C. Marshall wrote in a directive to his army commanders: "In a spirit of mutual respect and cooperation, the Army of the United States must now proceed with its high purpose of melding from the elements of democracy a disciplined, seasoned fighting force."¹³ The editors of *The Officer's Guide* in 1941 made explicit the importance of trust as well as mutual respect and affection as a foundation of discipline: "Discipline carries with it the spirit of teamwork and perfect trust."¹⁴

During the First World War, a third leadership theme emerged: development in subordinates of the ability and confidence to act autonomously to further the fulfillment of the mission. Senior leaders praised the ability of American soldiers acting as individuals to achieve the objectives of their units. One said, "Their discipline during the [First] World War was largely a self-imposed code."¹⁵ Another added:

The discipline upon which a successful army is built . . . endures when every semblance of authority has vanished . . . and when the only driving power that remains is the . . . spirit of the troops. [The soldier] knows what his comrades can do, and he knows they will always do the right thing.¹⁶

The Second World War demonstrated that discipline based on trust and respect for competent junior leaders enabled small units to

act promptly and aggressively when separated from their main forces or on independent missions requiring long advances and isolated action. During the period of training we must develop resourceful leaders of small units who can

act alone. The platoon leader can only be in one spot at a time, and [the] men must be trained to act correctly on their own.¹⁷

Following the Second World War there developed some uncertainty over the relationship between leadership and discipline. Though policy remained relatively constant, its interpreters oscillated between discipline arising from the brotherhood of soldiers and discipline imposed by superiors requiring unquestioning obedience.¹⁸ In 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the line had become authoritarian: "Military orders must be obeyed"; "The leader must obtain compliance."¹⁹ Concurrently, the 1950 edition of AR 600-10 defined discipline as "the outward manifestation of a mental attitude . . . that made . . . proper conduct . . . instinctive."²⁰ Throughout the Korean War and the following decade, the emphasis was on outward manifestations—looking good in contrast to being good—and on demanding respectful and compliant behavior from subordinates. Language about respect and care for subordinates remained in regulations, but it was not emphasized or amplified.

AR 600-20, published in 1962, gave fresh impetus to the old tradition of respect for subordinates "Authority will impose its weight by the professional competence of leaders . . . rather than by the arbitrary methods of martinets."²¹ But the same regulation definitively relegated concern for subordinates to almost incidental status: "Every commander has two basic responsibilities in the following priority: accomplishment of his mission, and the care of his personnel and equipment. Normally, efficient accomplishment of the mission will help to satisfy the responsibility for personnel welfare."²²

Following the war in Vietnam, Army policy on leadership reflected confusion about how leaders should behave. In the early 1970s, service schools began to deemphasize training in leadership and focus on technical and tactical subjects. But in 1980 US Army Training and Doctrine Command inaugurated a decade of renewed interest in leadership by assigning the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth responsibility for developing doctrine and coordinating training in leadership throughout the Army.²³ Nonetheless, the 1980 edition of AR 600-20 continued to rank soldiers' welfare on the same level with maintenance of materiel. The paragraph enjoining leaders to build up "relations of confidence and sympathy" with their subordinates—which had been part of Army regulations since 1915—was dropped.²⁴ On the other hand, the 1980 regulation included passages that emphasized respect for subordinates: "Commanders should not rely on coercion when persuasive methods can effect the desired end;" and "Discipline can be seen in . . . mutual respect between senior and subordinate personnel."²⁵

In 1981 a particularized Army "leadership goal" was promulgated. It enjoined leaders to be "committed to mission accomplishment and the well-being of subordinates."²⁶ Though the goal gave greater visibility to

concern for soldiers, the language was vague, pallid, and non-specific compared to that in the regulations of 1915 and earlier. The 1983 edition of FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, is a 300-page potpourri in which the theories of many leadership constituencies are included. The Chief of Staff's White Paper on leadership (*Leadership Makes the Difference*, 1985) is more focused. Both emphasize concepts central to US Army leadership doctrine developed in the 160 years between Washington's encampment at Valley Forge and the beginning of the Second World War. FM 22-102, *Soldier Team Development* (1987), is more succinct than the former, more informative than the latter, and rigorously faithful to Steuben and the 19th-century concepts of leadership. These include competence on the part of leaders; command attention to subordinates' welfare; respect, honesty, and trust both up and down the hierarchy; development of subordinates; and discipline defined as the ability and readiness of junior personnel to use initiative and act correctly in the absence of orders or supervision.²⁷ FM 22-102 comes close to being an American expression of the German notion of *Auftragstaktik*, which refers to decentralized operations based on trust and respect between leader and follower and mutual confidence in each other's competence, judgment, and commitment.²⁸

But the complex nature of leader-follower relations has confused many executors of leadership policy. Leaders and followers can be allies or antagonists at different times and under varying circumstances. This complexity has too often tempted executors of leadership doctrine to seek a simple guiding principle. Regrettably, that principle has sometimes seemed to be that discipline can be achieved only through fear.

Leadership Practice, 1778-1990

During the 19th century, US Army officers writing about their enlisted men described them as "idle and improvident," "drunkards," "the refuse of mankind."²⁹ Many officers treated their men with casual violence, flogged them, and sometimes summarily executed them.³⁰ Though some officers were inspiring leaders who cared for their men in wartime, they were not rewarded for such behavior in peacetime.³¹ Flogging and executions disappeared in the late 19th century, but many officers used courts-martial as a substitute for leadership.³² They perceived rituals of subordination and punctilious enactment of senseless minutiae as manifestations of discipline.³³ Commanders often inspected destructively—criticizing minor discrepancies caustically and tearing up soldiers' displays of equipment.³⁴

Accounts by officers in the peacetime Army in the 19th and the first 40 years of the 20th centuries describe days filled mainly with recreation, sport, and social activities. Official duties occupied but two or three hours per day, and, with notable exceptions, there was little emphasis on study of

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leadership or other aspects of warmaking.³⁵ Of transcendent importance to an officer's career were compliance with administrative procedures and accountability for funds and property.³⁶ Patten's *Army Manual* of 1864 devoted only eight pages to the organization of the army, regiments, and companies, and to the duties of office, in peace and war. It included more than 200 pages describing and illustrating 154 forms required by the Subsistence, Quartermaster, and Adjutant General departments.³⁷ This tradition of according high priority to complex record-keeping has been a persistent distraction, even during combat, throughout the history of the Army.³⁸

Senior officers in wartime often treated subordinates with indifference amounting to brutality. A typical example from the First World War was an order by the commanding general of the 77th Infantry Division to the 1st Battalion, 308th Infantry, to "attack without regard for casualties" under circumstances that, as the battalion commander protested in vain, would lead to the battalion's encirclement and probable destruction for no purpose. The battalion attacked, was cut off, fought bravely for six days, and suffered 54 percent casualties while accomplishing nothing.³⁹ Another division fought well for a month and lost 500 men. Rather than congratulate his troops on their achievements, the commanding general ordered "enforcement of a stricter discipline."⁴⁰ This kind of distant, authoritarian, and even hostile attitude toward subordinates persisted into the Second World War. During the tense days in December 1941, just before the Japanese invaded the Philippines, senior officers routinely ordered their subordinates to accomplish such and such a task, adding "or it's your neck" or a similar threat.⁴¹

Following the Second World War, officers' behavior toward subordinates was the subject of a special investigative commission chaired by Lieutenant General James Doolittle. The commission found that most soldiers perceived that officers were not interested in their subordinates' needs, problems, or welfare; that officers did not give praise for good work; and that officers behaved in snobbish ways toward enlisted personnel.⁴² A more probing study was carried out by a group of social scientists organized by the Army to study soldiers' attitudes during the war. The scientists found that many soldiers perceived that their officers' disrespectful, arrogant, and arbitrary

treatment of them eroded morale, drove men to go AWOL, and destroyed teamwork.⁴³ One example of harassment unrelated to combat effectiveness was the practice of directing soldiers to set aside one set of equipment for inspections only, and never to use it.⁴⁴ On the other hand, in company-sized units in which officers were interested in their men, understood their needs, helped them, recognized their abilities, backed them up, and treated them fairly, morale was high, casualties were lower, and the units were more likely to be cohesive and effective.⁴⁵ Though such enlightened leadership behavior was congruent with doctrine, only a minority of officers had practiced it.

The doctrinal confusion over leadership during the interim between the Second World War and the Korean War was reflected in leaders' behavior. Some leaders believed in "imposing your will . . . even by the martinet method."⁴⁶ Others thought it was better to "keep rank and authority in the background; be informal genial, and friendly."⁴⁷ By the time the conflict began in Korea, authoritarianism was in the ascendant and the command climate was "one of apparent distrust for subordinates."⁴⁸ A participant in the war drew a portrait of many junior officers as unqualified, and of senior officers as self-seeking, incompetent, and indifferent to their men's welfare.⁴⁹ Senior commanders in Korea judged a large proportion of their officers in leadership positions to be "wholly unfitted for troop command."⁵⁰ That mistrust and incompetence among leaders should characterize the Army of 1950 is perhaps surprising given that most sergeants and most officers in the ranks of captain and above had had recent wartime experience. Those leaders who were successful during the Korean War followed doctrine: they trained their troops realistically, put priority on the combat mission and excluded trivia, took care of their subordinates, listened to them, and kept them informed.⁵¹

Studies conducted after the Korean War advocated leadership practices that had effectively been part of Army doctrine since 1820. The studies documented the importance of the leader's professional competence, his readiness to praise good work, his keeping the focus on the mission rather than on eyewash, and his ability to differentiate between failure resulting from ignorance and failure arising out of ill-will.⁵² During the war in Vietnam the leadership practices of an unusually large number of officers, particularly those in the field grades and higher, deviated from policy.⁵³ Lieutenant General William R. Peers, who had held divisional and corps level commands in Vietnam, sent a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, in which he pointed out that officers were shirking responsibility, lying, turning a blind eye to improper behavior by soldiers, commanding from a safe distance, ignoring their men's attitudes, and failing to enforce measures to ensure the troops' safety.⁵⁴ Though this type of behavior was not universal,⁵⁵ it was sufficiently widespread for General Westmoreland to ask the Army War College to investigate the issues of professionalism that General Peers had raised.

The War College's *Study on Military Professionalism* (1970) found that serving officers in all ranks perceived that if they were to achieve personal success they had to please their superiors rather than meet the legitimate needs of their troops or attend to the good of the service. They saw themselves as compelled to attain trivial short-term objectives through dishonest practices that injured the long-term fabric of the organization. The pressure to behave in this way seemed

to stem from a combination of self-oriented success-motivated actions, and a lack of professional skills on the part of middle and senior grade officers A scenario that was repeatedly described . . . [was] an ambitious, transitory commander—marginally skilled in the complexities of his duties—engulfed in producing statistical results, fearful of personal failure, too busy to talk or listen to his subordinates, and determined to submit acceptably optimistic reports which reflected faultless completion of a variety of tasks at the expense of the sweat and frustration of his subordinates.⁵⁶

The *Study on Military Professionalism* described the gap between the official values of the US Army and the actual practices of its officers as taught by powerful institutional socialization processes. The gap was not new; describing it without euphemism was. The study recommended a number of actions focused on strengthening officers' technical and tactical knowledge, stabilizing command tours, and encouraging initiative and learning by experience. It described as counterproductive judgmental leadership and the use of statistical indicators as bases for evaluating units and commanders. Some of these recommendations have been incorporated into policy. But research conducted over the past 15 years indicates that behavior at variance with leadership policy is still common.⁵⁷

Growing Effective Leaders

The *Study on Military Professionalism* revealed that Army officers hold ideals about how they should behave in their relationships with peers, superiors, and subordinates. Their ideals are the same as those embodied in policy. Pressures to behave differently come from socialization by an informal culture.⁵⁸ Leaders learn how to lead from those who lead them. They "quickly and simply determine right and wrong based on the values they observe in practice."⁵⁹ If we can reach an understanding of the processes that have led to the creation and perpetuation of informal cultural norms that are at variance with policy, and that are counterproductive, we can begin to devise a set of measures that would support leaders in behaving in ways congruent with policy.

Observations in contemporary US Army units indicate that the salient common characteristic of those few NCOs and officers whose behavior closely follows Army leadership policy is professional confidence.⁶⁰ The bases for

professional confidence in a military leader are knowledge of how to behave in a leadership role, knowledge of the technical aspects of the role, belief that he can trust his superiors to do their utmost to help him fulfill his role effectively, and the perception that his superiors trust him.⁶¹ Professional confidence is the product of interaction between the individual and systemic characteristics of a professional organization; it is not a personality trait. Men and women with a broad range of personalities enter upon leadership roles in the Army. How they behave, and whether they advance or retard the accomplishment of military missions, are largely functions of the socialization they experience in the service.

The socialization of junior leaders begins with their first contacts with the Army. Most new enlisted men and officers approach their time in uniform with foreboding because they are uncertain about whether they will be able to measure up. A traditional way of treating new arrivals in military institutions has been to compound their fears and doubts—e.g. shock treatment in basic training, beast barracks at West Point, derogation as an F.N.G. or “cherry” in Vietnam.⁶² Such approaches are contrary to announced policy, but they persist.⁶³

When a new leader, expecting to find guidance, structure, and support in his unit, encounters indifference, rebuff, and ridicule, his already shaky confidence dissolves. Not knowing what he is expected to know or do, and unsure about the bases and limits of his authority, he is likely to resort to authoritarian practices.⁶⁴ The authors of FM 22-100 cited many such practices as examples of improper leadership: concealing defects from an inspector, commanding through fear, punishing subordinates for the leader’s personal disappointments, making impossible demands.⁶⁵ Such instances are common in the US Army because it is pervaded with a culture of fear; subordinates perceive their superiors as punitive and malevolent, and superiors worry that their subordinates’ behavior will compromise their careers. In such a cultural climate professional confidence withers.

The question for the Army is how to grow the professionally confident leaders who can lead successfully in accordance with Army leadership policy. The behavior and backgrounds of officers and NCOs who have done so suggest two approaches—both of which are directed toward neutralizing the culture of fear and strengthening professional confidence. The first approach is to allow,

***Leaders learn how to lead from those
who lead them.***

and require, leaders to become expert in their fields. In practical terms, this means allowing leaders adequate time in the schoolhouse and in each assigned position to learn enough to feel competent. Learning by floundering embarrasses the leader and worries his subordinates. Lack of professional confidence is the primary reason why leaders behave arbitrarily and focus their attention on the next big event rather than on the long-term development of their personnel and their units. They feel too uncertain to define a long-term program and how to it in the face of their own ignorance and the unrelenting demands from insecure—and therefore unsupportive—superiors.

The schoolhouse is the place to role-play leadership situations to enable a new leader to approach his subordinates with confidence. School is where a leader can learn enough about how his equipment works not to have to fake motor stables, fear a maintenance inspection, or wonder whether his vehicle will function in combat. Field exercises during schooling afford opportunities for a new leader to discover what his weapons and equipment can and cannot do, and what effects terrain and weather have on them. He can continue to learn from his subordinates in his unit, but he will have some cognitive hooks on which to hang the new information, and he will have something to offer his subordinates as well. In peacetime there should be substantive incentives to learn, such as examinations that weigh significantly in determining eligibility for promotion.

The second approach to growing professionally confident leaders is to socialize them under supportive superiors. Supportive socialization is the foundation of *Auftragstaktik*. The commander develops his subordinate's professional competence and judgment so that it is feasible to repose trust in his initiative and grant him discretion in executing mission orders.⁶⁶ A supportive boss is not one who coddles his subordinates, overlooks slovenly performance, or praises mediocrity. He is one who takes the process of socializing his subordinates seriously, listens to them, talks army with them, encourages them to think creatively, and tells them when they are off on the wrong foot. He tries to teach them all he knows, tests them to see if they are getting it, and challenges them to improve on his ideas. He takes responsibility for setting priorities, establishing standards, warding off requirements that compromise unit capability, and creating an active-learning environment for his subordinate leaders. He gives them as much discretion as they can handle, takes the heat when they make mistakes, and works with them on how to do better. He accepts bad news with equanimity, keeps failures in perspective, sets the example in integrity and candor, and tolerates no lying. He respects and trusts his troops, knows and listens to his most junior subordinates, shares their hardships, and requires his subordinate leaders to do so also. He engages his subordinate leaders in addressing together the problems that face the unit, and keeps his and their focus on the outfit's long-term welfare. If a subordinate leader consistently or willfully fails to measure up to generally

accepted standards, the supportive boss quietly and without rancor eliminates him from the Army.⁶⁷

The principle that leaders should take care of their junior enlisted personnel has been acknowledged, if not always implemented, for two centuries. But it is too rarely understood in the US Army that if leaders are to take care of their troops, their commanders have to take care of them. This is the essence of *Auftragstaktik*, and it is an essence that most American military leaders do not acknowledge. For a boss to be supportive, he must have a supportive boss. Being supportive, at any level, entails risk, requires accessibility, and demands patience. It is time-consuming and exhausting. It is not possible to be a supportive boss if one is being harassed by an events-oriented superior, nit-picking inspectors, or higher-level staffs that view their roles as placing requirements on rather than assisting subordinate units.

Trust, respect, and affection across the ranks, taking care of the troops, and developing subordinates have been part of the leadership doctrine of the US Army for 212 years. We have known how to lead, but not enough commanders have done it effectively. Largely because they lacked professional confidence, our military leaders have clung to 18th-century authoritarianism. If the gap between leadership policy and praxis is to be narrowed, leaders need adequate professional preparation and they need supportive commanders. Supportive leadership has to start at the top and go all the way down; one professionally insecure leader in the chain will compromise the command climate for all below him.⁶⁸

NOTES

1. The bases for this assertion are documented in detail in the section on leadership practices that follows. Three typical references are Oscar W. Griswold "Practical Peacetime Leadership" (1931), in *The Infantry Journal Reader*, ed. J. I. Green (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1943), pp. 232-35 for the Army of the 1940s; David H. Hackworth, *About Face* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989) for the Army of the 1950s-1960s; and Faris R. Kirkland et al., *Unit Manning System Field Evaluation*, Technical Report Nr. 5 (ADA 207193) (Washington: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, September 1987) for the Army of the 1980s.

2. US Continental Congress, *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States, Part 1* (Philadelphia: Styner & Cist, 1779), pp. 138, 141.

3. US War Department, *General Regulations for the Army* (Philadelphia: M. Carey & Sons, 1821), pp. 13, 15, 20.

4. These two sentences were in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the War Department's *Army Regulations* published by Harper & Brothers in 1857 (p. 1); by George W. Childs in 1862 (p. 9); and by the Government Printing Office in 1881 (p. 9), 1889 (p. 1), 1902 (p. 1), 1904 (p. 9), 1908 (p. 9), 1910 (p. 9), 1913, (p. 11), and 1923 (p. 479). They were in AR 600-10 from 1925 until 1958. They were present in AR 600-20 thereafter in modified form.

5. US War Department, Change to Army Regulations No. 35, dated 5 November 1915, applied to *Regulations for the Army of the United States* (Washington: GPO, 1913), p. 11, par. 3. This language appeared in every regulation on discipline until 1980: AR 600-10, 30 June 1925, 16 October 1929, 6 December 1938, 2 June 1942, 8 July 1944 (all par. 3); 15 December 1953, 19 December 1958 (both par. 4); AR 600-20, 3 July 1962, 31 January 1967, (both par. 34e), and 28 April 1971 (par. 5-7e).

6. US War Department, *A Manual for Commanders of Large Units (Provisional)*, Vol. 1 Operations (Washington: GPO, 1930), par. 2.

7. US War Department, *General Regulations for the Army of the United States* (Washington: J. & G. S. Gideon, 1841), p. 11.
8. US War Department, *Regulations for the Army of the United States* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1857), p. 114; and (Washington: GPO, 1889), p. 18.
9. James A. Moss, *Officers' Manual* (Menasha, Wisc.: George Banta, 1907), pp. 22-23.
10. C. A. Bach, "Leadership" (1918), in *The Infantry Journal Reader*, ed. J. I. Green (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1943), p. 238.
11. US War Department, Training Regulation 10-5, 15 August 1928, par. 3a; AR 600-10, 2 June 1942, 8 July 1944, 10 November 1950, 15 December 1953, 19 December 1958 (all par. 1); AR 600-20, 3 July 1962 and 31 January 1967 (both par. 28). The wording is slightly changed and discipline is linked with "individual and group training" in AR 600-20, 28 April 1971 and 15 October 1980, par. 5-1.
12. *The Officer's Guide*, 1st ed. (Washington: National Service Publishing Co., 1930 [later editions cited herein published in Harrisburg, Pa., by the Military Service Publishing Co.]), p. 286.
13. US War Department, Mobilization Regulations 1-10, *Morale*, quoted in *The Officer's Guide*, 4th ed. (1941), pp. 47-48.
14. *The Officer's Guide*, 5th ed. (1941), pp. 156-57.
15. *The Officer's Guide*, 1st ed. (1930), p. 4.
16. *The Officer's Guide*, 2d ed. (1936), pp. 299-300.
17. *The Officer's Guide*, 10th ed. (1944), pp. 191-92.
18. *The Officer's Guide*, 12th ed. (1947), p. 240; 13th ed. (1948), p. 247; 14th ed. (1949), pp. 339, 349.
19. *The Officer's Guide*, 15th ed. (1950), pp. 315-17, 327.
20. AR 600-10, 10 November 1950, with change 1 dated 8 May 1951, par. 1.
21. AR 600-20, 3 July 1962, par. 34e.
22. *Ibid.*, par. 10.
23. Robert A. Fitton, "Leadership Doctrine and Training: A Status Report," *Military Review*, 65 (May 1985), 29-41.
24. AR 600-20, 15 October 1980, par. 5-7e.
25. AR 600-20, 28 April 1971, par. 5-7e; 15 October 1980, par. 5-1.
26. Fitton, p. 31.
27. US Department of the Army, *Military Leadership*, Field Manual 22-100 (Washington: GPO, 31 October 1983), pp. 16, 29, 32, 34-38, 42, 79, 142, 156, 193-94, 231, 238; *Leadership Makes the Difference*, DA Pamphlet 600-50 (Washington: GPO, 1985); *Soldier Team Development*, Field Manual 22-102 (Washington: GPO, March 1987), pp. v, 33, 36, 39, 47.
28. John T. Nelsen II, "Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle," *Parameters*, 17 (September 1987), 22-27; Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Auftragstaktik: In Its Proper Perspective," *Military Review*, 66 (October 1986), 50-56.
29. Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime 1784-1898* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 194-97; John R. Elting, *American Army Life* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1982), p. 55.
30. Coffman, p. 198; Elting, p. 55; William L. Wessels, *Born to Be a Soldier: The Military Career of William Wing Loring of St. Augustine, Florida* (Ft. Worth, Tex.: Texas Christian Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 9-10.
31. Allan R. Millett, *The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army 1881-1925* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975), pp. 100-06, 140-09.
32. Griswold, p. 235.
33. Thomas R. Phillips, "Leader and Led" (1939), in Green, p. 290.
34. Griswold, pp. 232-33.
35. Coffman, pp. 61-63, 185; Elting, p. 84; Millett, pp. 61, 74-75; William Wallace Ford, *Wagon Soldier* (North Adams, Mass.: Excelsior Printing, 1980), p. 75.
36. Ford, p. 64; Millett, pp. 49-50, 147, 149.
37. George Patten, *Patten's Army Manual Containing Instructions for Officers* (New York: J. W. Fortune, 1864); William H. Powell, *The Army Officer's Examiner* (New York: John Wiley, 1894).
38. For example, on the Philippine Insurrection see Millett, pp. 147, 149; and on the Korean War, see Hackworth, pp. 253, 327.
39. David R. Campbell, *Fighting Encircled: A Study in Leadership* (Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1987), pp. 9-10, 21.
40. Phillips, p. 297.
41. Richard D. Mallonee II, *The Naked Flagpole: Battle for Bataan* (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1980), pp. 16, 29.

42. US War Department, Bureau of Public Relations, *Report of the Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships*, May 1946.
43. Samuel A. Stouffer, et al., *The American Soldier. Vol. I: Adjustment During Army Life* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1949), pp. 74, 85-87.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 386-87; Samuel A. Stouffer et al., *The American Soldier. Vol. II: Combat and Its Aftermath* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1949), pp. 49-51, 97, 112-21.
46. *The Officer's Guide*, 12th ed. (1947), p. 240.
47. *The Officer's Guide*, 13th ed. (1948), p. 247.
48. Campbell, p. 92.
49. Hackworth, pp. 46, 56, 58, 142, 228-32, 256, 259-60, 264-65, 283-84.
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52. Carl J. Lange et al., *A Study of Leadership in Army Infantry Platoons* (GWU HRRP RR1) (Presidio of Monterey, Calif.: US Army Leadership Research Unit, November 1958), pp. 33-34; Carl J. Lange and T. O. Jacobs, *Leadership in Army Infantry Platoons*, Study II (GWU HRRP RR5) (Presidio of Monterey, Calif.: US Army Leadership Research Unit, July 1960), pp. 37-38.
53. Cincinnatus [pseud.], *Self-Destruction* (New York: Norton, 1981), pp. 65-70, 109-10, 151-52; Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, *Crisis in Command* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1978), pp. 43-46, 56, 71-72, 80-86; William L. Hauser, *America's Army in Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 69, 96-108.
54. William R. Peers, "Leadership Requirements in a Counterinsurgency Environment," enclosure to memorandum for Chief of Staff, US Army, subject: The Son My Incident, dated 18 March 1970. Quoted in Cincinnatus, pp. 195-8.
55. James Jay Carafano, "Officership 1966-1971," *Military Review*, 69 (January 1989), 45-52.
56. US Department of the Army, *Study on Military Professionalism* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, 1970), pp. iii-iv.
57. Larry H. Ingraham, *The Boys in the Barracks* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1983); Faris R. Kirkland et al.; David H. Marlowe, *New Manning System Field Evaluation*, Technical Report Nr. 1 (ADA 162087) (Washington: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 1 November 1985); J.A. Simonsen et al., "Excellence in the Combat Arms," *Military Review*, 65 (June 1985), 19-29.
58. The strength of the culture is evident in the fact that the *Study on Military Professionalism* was kept under wraps—away from the eyes of military officers as well as the public—for 13 years.
59. John C. Krysa, "Values: The Key to Unlocking Combat Power," *Military Review*, 67 (December 1987), 27.
60. The assertion that few leaders follow leadership policy is based on eight years of observation and interviewing in more than 100 battalions by the staff of the Department of Military Psychiatry of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research in response to taskings from the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and Commanding General of Training and Doctrine Command. See note 57 for representative reports.
61. Faris R. Kirkland, *Leading in COHORT Companies*. Report NP-88-13 (Washington: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 21 December 1987). See also FM 22-102. Trust is portrayed therein as the central theme of team-building, but it is discussed as an aspect of the relationship between leaders and private soldiers; it is equally important between leaders and their superiors.
62. For a description of "shock treatment" and the attitudes it embodies, see George C. Wilson, *Mud Soldiers* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989), pp. 43-47, 92-102, 127-30, 172-73, 196-97.
63. FM 22-102, pp. 16-18, 24.
64. Norman F. Dixon, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976), pp. 256-75.
65. FM 22-100 (1983), pp. 20-21, 74-75, 97, 100-03, 186-87.
66. Nelsen, pp. 24-26.
67. Compare this set of behavior with Nelsen's exposition of the evolution and purpose of *Auftragstaktik*, and with Echavarria's quotations from German practitioners.
68. Millett develops in superb detail in his biography of Bullard how General Pershing, anxious about the opinion French and British generals would have of American officers, initiated from the top a climate of fear that made supportive leadership almost impossible in the AEF.

Junior Officer Development: Reflections of an Old Fud

MARK R. HAMILTON

Soldiers are fond of recalling how things used to be. Part of this is a healthy, deeply felt affection for the common heritage which bonds the members of our profession so closely. If we can refrain from the temptation to romanticize our experience or gloss over negative aspects of the past, such a look back can serve usefully as a kind of long-term after-action review. A review of this nature will show a marked disjunct between the career experience patterns of today's senior officers (principally senior lieutenant colonels through generals), on one hand, and those of the officers coming up behind them, on the other. To put it another way, the commonality of formative approach, method, and convention that prevailed across all the ranks when I was a young officer seems to be disappearing. The continuities are simply no longer there, so that very soon a rather wide experiential gulf will exist between the senior generation and the one that follows it.

The gulf has developed so gradually and imperceptibly, however, that today we seniors think we have something we do not. We think we have an officer corps whose junior officers know what we knew at their career juncture and who have had the experiences we had as junior officers. Our misapprehension comes from a failure to reflect on officer development opportunities existing then and now.

Our junior officers today are as eager and capable as ever. I would rather go to war with the units I have served in over the last ten years than the units I served in for the first ten years. Still, I think that conditions have produced a very different junior officer, and it's not all good news.

Believe me, there is a lot of good news. I believe that the desirability of being an officer today is higher than in the fabled good old days. I believe the competition to earn a commission is tougher. I believe that the formal training programs are better, more professional, more thorough—from ROTC summer camp to the officer basic course. I don't believe that Ranger School

could have become any tougher, but then my recollections there are near ancient history and shouldn't be trusted. Thus there is lots of good news! The other news begins when these junior officers come to you and me, to the commanders in the field. There, the experience of junior officers is remarkably different from that shared by all of those officers now in brigade command and higher, and even from that shared by many of our serving battalion commanders. In order to explain, I am forced to several generalizations, recognizing of course that the Army experiences change at different rates between Korea and Germany, or even among stateside posts.

In the middle to late 1960s the experience of a junior officer was very much an apprenticeship. It was rich and varied, and it was very different from the experience of a junior officer today. First, that junior officer of yesteryear was a teacher. He was expected to gather the references, prepare a detailed lesson plan (to be placed in a neat and visible stack at the back of the classroom for the inevitable inspection of the class), and serve as the subject-matter expert for each of the several classes he was assigned to teach in a given week of training. I don't exalt the technique. It was for the most part centralized classroom training that has now been replaced—thankfully—with far more productive hands-on, small-group, performance-oriented training. But however bad the pedagogical technique may have been for the soldier, it was great training for the junior officer. He was exposed to the requirement to become intimately familiar with a variety of subjects and made to demonstrate his proficiency in front of class inspectors. That opportunity no longer exists to anywhere near the extent or variety it once did. Much of the teaching now rests firmly in the capable hands of our noncommissioned officers, who do it superbly. Still, there is the loss of opportunity for junior officers. Further, in pursuit of the old-time centralized classroom training sessions, the unit was marched from place to place. The man in charge of the close order drill associated with that marching was a junior officer. Other junior officers (officers were required to attend most of the training classes) fell in at the back of the formation and marched as well. So, through teaching, attending, doing, and directing the close order drill, the junior officer gained experiences that are seldom replicated today.

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Next, he was an inspector, or at least an assistant inspector or close witness to the in-ranks inspections, room inspections, and equipment layouts. This was a WEEKLY event. It happened on Saturday mornings. He inspected rifles and uniforms, rooms and equipment. He met the soldiers eye to eye, exacted standards, recorded shortfalls, rewarded excellence. After the inspections came officers call. It was common for officers call to occur once or twice a week during the week as well. Today we might call these after-action reviews, although they were not so well run as I recall. Typically, these took place in a mess hall over coffee and doughnuts. It never occurred to me who paid for these repasts, and I know we never signed a meal count. I think the mess sergeant must have had a freer rein than he does today. At these events, we would review what had taken place during the past several days, put out the directives for the days to follow, and recall with great levity the foibles of some poor lieutenant who had managed to make himself famous recently. I now know that what was going on is called "bonding." Then I only knew that I felt part of a brotherhood that was somehow separate and different and important. Officers today can still be inspectors, but the formal, weekly opportunity to do so is not present in the training scheme of most units.

Next, the junior officer of those days filled a variety of additional-duty jobs which were far more nearly his real duty than the TOE position to which he was nominally assigned. The lists of these additional duties were legendary for both their length and, to some extent, their absurd variety. True, a number of these duties were of the eyewash variety, of value only to prove to various inspection agencies that there was indeed an officer assigned, on orders, as the unit rodent control officer, or some such thing. But others of these duties confronted the designated officer with the requirement to become familiar with seemingly mundane but actually important aspects of military responsibility. Two of the more common and beneficial of these duties were those of safety officer and pay officer. As a safety officer in the artillery, for example, he was uniquely responsible for the accurate lay of the unit and each quadrant, deflection, and charge that was fired. His duties were specific and exacting. His expertise and authority were real and unchallenged.

Am I suggesting that we return to the age of safety officers? No. That is not training as we will fight. It is important for us to realize, however, that there was a great deal of hands-on training involved in that particular role. There was a degree of authority felt and exercised. There was an involvement in the specific details and mechanics of fundamental soldier skills, regardless of the TOE position to which that officer might have been assigned. Most senior officers would agree that some of the finest duty they have had is in serving as the evaluator for another unit's ARTEP exercise or the like. The opportunity to observe the operations of a unit for which one is not directly responsible allows objective distance and unencumbered time to make notes and comparisons which may be applied to one's own unit. Safety officers had such opportunities in every unit and on every range they worked.

Duty as the unit pay officer afforded the officer a face-to-face meeting with virtually every enlisted man in the command, revealed pay problems firsthand, and familiarized him with the marital status, leave status, dependent status, and morale of the soldiers. Over the course of several years, this duty shifted from platoon leader to company executive officer to company commander; thus some of us had the chance to reap the benefits of this practice over a long period. Sure, in this age of computerized efficiency, check-to-bank is the way to go, but let us not forget that there were very real leader-development benefits in the old system. As teacher, as inspector, as safety officer, as pay officer, the junior officer practiced the role of an authority and expert. These now-lost experiences helped to shape the way he felt about himself and his role as a commissioned officer.

Other opportunities have been lost as well. A large portion of the Army today has gone "light," and may go lighter still. These units offer the extreme examples of the lost opportunities afforded today's junior officers. Similar losses are evident across the entire force, but not quite as acute as in the light divisions. Our junior officers cannot be company-level supply officers in the light divisions; there is no such position. They cannot be company-level motor officers; that position does not exist either. That is just as well in one sense, since there is only one mechanic. There is no TOE position for maintenance management or repair part management. In fact there is no battalion-level motor officer. Nor is there an assistant S-1 or assistant S-4 at brigade level.

It is not my purpose here to second-guess the TOE of the light division. It was put together by great soldiers who were working under remarkable constraints. I simply am highlighting the loss of opportunity for the professional development of our junior officers. Obviously, it is not necessary for every officer to have served in all of these subsidiary roles if Western civilization is to be saved. However, I remain uncomfortable with the

prospect that soon we will be forming battalion staffs composed of officers *not a single one of whom* has ever previously served in a subaltern position on a battalion or brigade staff. Such a situation was virtually impossible in the heavy force of the past.

Apprentice positions used to exist and were filled by junior officers. Many positions that really didn't exist (assistant S-1 at battalion, assistant assistant S-3, etc.) were also filled by junior officers. How was this possible? Well, first of all, liaison officers didn't do much liaising and were thus available for other tasks. The comparison between the old Forward Observer and the current Fire Support Team (FIST) lieutenant is not even close. Today's battalion FIST officer (also true of air defense, engineer, and others) is a full-time representative with the supported force or is directly, fully involved in the training of his team. These officers used to be "extras" who were primarily used in the kinds of duty positions outlined above. I'm glad that has changed. We do have to realize, however, that there has been such a change.

In general, organizational evolution has been characterized by consolidation of staff functions at higher echelons, shift of heavier weapon systems to higher echelons, and the elimination of positions due to equipment modernization (recon and survey officer as an example). We cannot be satisfied with the false dilemma which asks, "Would you rather have an officer who knows supply procedures or one who can properly advise a maneuver commander on the use of his engineer assets?" Clearly, we need both skills. We need several skills within the same officer. Yesterday's junior officers were not supermen. They were simply officers who had (in some cases for the wrong reasons) a great variety of experiences during their junior officer years.

Pick half a dozen officers at the Army War College and you will be amazed at the enormously wide spectrum of their collective experiences. One or two will have been motor officers, perhaps at company and battalion levels; one or two will have been supply officers; all will have been safety officers and pay officers; all will have taught a multitude of classes in a formal classroom environment. Such breadth of experience is not a function of their having been in the service longer. They will have had these experiences as company grade officers. It is ironic that these officers will have served far fewer years in the rank of lieutenant, where such experience is to be gained, than today's junior officer (total years as a company grade are similar). Typically, they will have moved around a great deal compared with 'nose of today. Many of these seniors will have reached the rank of lieutenant colonel before they had more years in the Army than PCSs. They will have held several apprentice duties, but for short periods of time.

This kind of jumping about from job to job has been roundly criticized, perhaps justifiably so. Still, it is interesting to note that such rotation is precisely the technique used in training a doctor during his residency. With

longer tours and more stability come great benefits in terms of force management economies, job realization, and family contentment. A price to be paid is an officer who has served in fewer duty positions, worked for fewer bosses, been at fewer posts. It is now altogether possible that an officer with ten years of service has been to only two Army posts (except for branch schooling) and only one type of division. Is that good or bad? It certainly is different from past patterns, and the differences inevitably produce differences in officer development.

In case you haven't asked yet—so what? I believe there is a so what. Accurate and efficient communications depend to a great extent on a shared repository of experience. This common repository provides the content and the metaphors of idea exchange. In no profession is the accuracy of that exchange more important than in the profession of arms. For many years the military changed sufficiently slowly that we could assume our subordinates had had about the same experiences as we. But we can no longer make such an assumption. When most serving brigade commanders first encountered the military, at West Point or in ROTC, the Second World War had been over for 18 years. The end of the Vietnam War now lies some 17 years in the past. Yet these two periods, almost the same in terms of length, are quite different in terms of the degree of institutional change they engendered. The subject of cultural change has been explored in numerous recent works. A particularly provocative example is the book *Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know* (Houghton Mifflin, 1987) by E. D. Hirsch, Jr. Here, the author outlines the very real difficulties faced by a culture which no longer shares a common body of experience and knowledge. Today, a division commander, giving guidance to a brigade commander who passes it to a battalion commander, may proceed on the reasonable assumption that each officer in that chain of command has had very similar developmental experiences. In just a few years that will not be the case.

I'm not going to bemoan the passing of Vietnam-era officers, although that will occur. Honestly, I think that Vietnam War experiences, by

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... But no longer.***

virtue of the infinite variety of the geography and of the evolutions of the struggle itself, were so diverse that participation in the war is not the most important of common professional bonds. But there is no denying that these officers form a highly bonded group. They are bonded by the common junior officer experiences recounted earlier. They are bonded by the extraordinary trials they faced during the early 1970s, when large groups of American society challenged their professional legitimacy, when command, control, and discipline of troops were extremely tenuous, when time-in-grade lengthened and reductions in force were de rigueur. They looked such trials full in the eye and said, "I'll stay." These officers, collectively, are a national treasure. Their common bond is, in my opinion, the unspoken foundation for the magnificent command climate that permeates our Army today.

Those who follow, though later, are not lesser. As a group, their grasp of tactics and techniques, understanding of the combined arms team, familiarity with military history, and state of physical conditioning and health habits exceed my own at their rank, and probably that of most of my contemporaries as well. Still, I feel that they are being shortchanged in acquiring the breadth of developmental experience we need in our corps of officers. These shortchanges have combined to alter, not all that subtly, the makeup of today's junior officer. With no chance, or at least far fewer chances, to be a motor officer, mess officer, supply officer, inspector in ranks, property book officer, and on and on, today's junior officer simply has more areas with which he has no familiarity. And I think we all tend to avoid involvement in areas we are less familiar with.

Well, what do we do about it? First, we must recognize that there is a difference. I would hope the foregoing discussion has established the existence of such a difference to some degree. Second, we must think creatively, remaining alert to situations where we can contrive opportunities for offering comparable formative experience even though there are no longer formal institutional occasions. Third, we must build on the unique expertise and experience of today's junior officers that sets them apart from their seniors.

The purpose of generating developmental opportunities is to provide the essential familiarity and competence that lead to confidence. We need to establish in our units (this is not a job for TRADOC) specific programs aimed at giving junior officers experience and expertise in maintenance management, repair parts management, and the detailed inspection of key pieces of equipment. This process has to go beyond the preventive maintenance checks and services expected of our drivers; it should include troubleshooting and basic-to-intermediate maintenance standards familiarity: What is the part called? How do you know it's broken? What will happen if it isn't fixed? We

need to create the opportunities for young officers to learn to conduct the inspections of rifles, individual equipment, and vehicles. I don't want to take this function away from the capable hands of NCOs, but neither do I want a generation of officers who have never done these things themselves. Show them messhall operations. You may have to go to brigade level to find a messhall, but it is worth the trip. Take them behind the counters, show them the paper work. This is not a tourist visit. They are going to have to spend several hours to get even a feel. Take them to a court-martial room. The last time any officer other than a JAG officer was a trial counsel or assistant defense counsel was 1968. It is still theoretically possible, but no one does it because of possible challenges. A little thought will reveal other areas of needed junior officer competency formerly acquired pro forma, but now denied by changes in the institutional culture. It is surprising how many of the areas once deemed minimum-essential officer experience are no longer common experience, even among field grades.

Further, we need to capitalize upon those areas of junior officer experience that *have* become common. Junior officers are fully involved in tactics, field techniques, military history, and training the force. Seniors can learn from and participate with them, thus extending the areas of commonality that bridge the generations. I said earlier that I would rather go to war with the units of today than with those I grew up with. The units of today are better at higher-level collective skills. They will fight better for the first ten days of the next war. But I have nagging doubts about the longer term, the time when, as Clausewitz says, "The machine itself will begin to resist." During the inevitably degraded mode which characterizes long-term combat, knowledge of the thousand details becomes the currency of success. Then, the classes we once taught on headspacing and timing of the .50 caliber machine gun let us see, fix, or at least appreciate immediate problems with organic fire support. Knowledge of the TOE from long days in supply or as property book officer equips us with the principles to guide our unit reconstitution efforts. At crucial moments of life or death, of mission success or mission failure, the question directed at the leader will no longer be, "How's it going today, 'L.T.'?" The question will be: "Sir, what should we do?" The right answer will come from leaders who do not see themselves simply as cogs within a specialized team, but rather as teachers and authorities, with experience and competencies that extend far down from the generalized perspective of their current command echelon. The enviable success of German forces during World War II in reconstituting shattered forces and fighting well another day stemmed, in large part, from the cultural and professional reality (and perception) that the German officer from top to bottom was an authority and expert. If that is the sort of officer we need in our own army today, we simply cannot afford to labor under the misapprehension we are producing him when in fact we are not. □

Germany, France, and the Future of Western European Security

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG
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Recent events in central Europe and the Soviet Union have brought to the fore once again the need to address the "German question." Doing so has become increasingly complex because it now concerns both the issue of German reunification and a trend in Germany to explore building a European defense system in cooperation with France. The specter of a reunified Germany has caused the leaders of some Western democracies, the Soviet Union, and Poland to express deep reservations about the ten-point proposal for unification of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), initiated by Chancellor Kohl on 29 November 1989. Indeed, ambassadors from the Four Powers on Berlin met in December 1989 to discuss such questions.¹ Despite expressed concerns, West German political parties and governmental bureaus are already actively cooperating with their East German counterparts. On 18 May of this year, the two Germanys signed a treaty formally dissolving East Germany's communist system and creating a single free-market economy which took effect on the 2d of July.² It is certain the process will continue, regardless of objections from countries worried about a resurgent Germany. As noted by President Bush, it would hardly be consistent for the Western democracies to support national self-determination in Eastern Europe and then oppose it for one of the strongest supporters of the Western alliance.³

From a US perspective, a greater concern is the widespread perception in the FRG that the Soviet Union no longer presents an immediate threat to that country's security. Adding to this attitudinal change is the uneasiness

among some Germans about the dependability of the US defense commitment to Europe and the subsequent tendency by Bonn to explore defense arrangements outside NATO. The changing political situation in Germany, the growing Franco-German rapprochement, and the implications for the United States form the subject of this article.

The Changing Face of Europe

The difficulty before the Western nations is not so much opposing the unification of West and East Germany; if history and current events are any guide, this political force is clearly one that ultimately defies suppression, unless foreign military formations remain in country to oppose any such move. Rather, the challenge for the Western alliance is how best to deal with this politically delicate issue, given the fact that the FRG is a democracy and is active in its support of the Western security alliance and European economic and political integration. It is therefore not surprising that while Western leaders have expressed their anxiety about a unified Germany, they have also stated that such a result is inevitable. The Western democracies are faced with the complication of having to decide both at which point in the ongoing unification process their interests are threatened, and once that particular point has been reached, how they are to deal with it. How can the Western alliance influence the process of reunification so that: European security is preserved; the FRG, kept mindful of the many advantages which accrue to it by remaining in the Western fold, is restrained from acting precipitously; and Western attempts to influence the terms of reunification do not so alienate the FRG that they encourage the very independent actions they seek to avoid. There would appear to be no serious disagreement with the proposition that a neutralized, unified Germany, as suggested by Stalin in 1952, or an FRG pursuing an extreme form of *Ostpolitik* at the expense of its Western orientation, would not be in the best interests of Western Europe or the United States.⁴

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Since a unified Germany would not likely remain neutral, it would also not be in the Soviet interest.

In brief, the last thing the West wants the FRG to do is to reconsider its position in the West. In order to prevent this eventuality, a convincing case must be made to Bonn of the continuing utility of some form of Western security alignment in its defense needs. For instance, while the immediacy of the Soviet threat has diminished, the threat is likely to remain present in some form. Additionally, in spite of the tumultuous positive changes which have taken place in Eastern Europe in the past year, the potential for instability remains high indeed. Considering the politically stabilizing role NATO can play in European security, a NATO structure altered to reflect the changes taking place in Europe may remain relevant to its members. Regrettably, the credibility of the principal member of NATO—the United States—has suffered in recent years in the eyes of many West Germans. Indeed, the US presence is perceived as becoming increasingly irrelevant to Bonn's security requirements as Gorbachev's concept of a "common European home" gains currency.

The autumn 1986 Reykjavik summit, where the United States seriously considered the Soviet proposal to dismantle their respective intercontinental ballistic missile forces without first consulting its NATO allies,⁵ and the 8 December 1987 Treaty on Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF)⁶ were widely perceived by many officials in the FRG as concrete moves by Washington to abrogate its nuclear guarantee to their country. Complicating this situation, of course, has been the subsequent diminution of the Soviet threat to West Germany. This has had the additional effect of making the US security commitment to the FRG less relevant to the domestic West German security debate than in previous years and increasing Bonn's already ambiguous security future.

One means by which Bonn's European Community allies have responded to West Germany's security disquietude has been through reviving (at France's insistence) the defense mechanisms of the Western European Union.⁷ While it is evident that a more formalized Western European defense community, or the "European Pillar" as it is often called, must overcome numerous political obstacles before it becomes reality, trends point toward greater European defense cooperation outside the NATO framework. The European Pillar may also attain added relevance by the end of 1992, at which time the European Community's Single Economic Act is scheduled to be implemented. Indeed, while not widely recognized, the Single European Act has provisions for defense cooperation among the European Community Twelve. Moreover, as argued by French President François Mitterrand, "If we succeed in realizing the internal European market by 1992/93 . . . then present conditions will change entirely, including those for the joint defense of Europe. It will then be understood that Europe cannot exist [as a unified body] without ensuring its own defense."⁸

Despite the evident potential of the European Pillar to ameliorate Bonn's security anxieties (and those of its allies), as well as to anchor a unified Germany in Western Europe, a short-term solution to the concerns of both Germany and its allies remains continued success in effecting a closer Franco-German defense relationship. While initiated in the early 1960s only to become dormant quickly thereafter, Franco-German defense cooperation experienced a period of revitalization beginning in the early 1980s and continuing throughout the decade.

One can legitimately question how France, which since 1967 has claimed to base its national security on strict adherence to nuclear deterrence and rejection of the NATO strategy of flexible response, would allow itself to become progressively entangled in the defense of the FRG.⁹ The simple answer is that given the fundamental import France places on the FRG's remaining aligned to the West, particularly as a bulwark between France and Eastern Europe, Paris has had no other choice than to move to assuage Bonn's anxieties. When assessed in light of the dramatic ongoing transformation of the Warsaw Pact and the move toward the creation of a European Pillar, Franco-German defense cooperation is highly relevant to contemporary Western European security.

In consequence, given the fundamental changes that have transpired in central Europe, the future vitality of the Paris-Bonn security concord has become one of the crucial elements in maintaining Germany's alignment to the West. One should not infer from this that the role of the United States has perforce been depreciated. Yet, if US forward-deployed forces in central Europe are reduced to 195,000, as announced by President Bush in January 1990,¹⁰ and if US strategic forces are significantly reduced through a Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreement with the Soviet Union,¹¹ then France's defense commitment to the FRG becomes more important in relative terms to Bonn. Under such a scenario France might be willing to change its long-standing nuclear policy and publicly commit its nuclear deterrent force to the defense of Germany as part of the European Pillar, particularly if that is the price to be paid for a Western-aligned German nation.

In essence, the objective of the United States and its principal European allies should be to make it increasingly attractive to the FRG to remain within some form of Western alliance. The European Community under the leadership of Jacques Delors, as President of the European Commission, is close to accomplishing this goal economically with the Single European Act.¹² As a result of the sheer size of its economy, the FRG will dominate this grouping of states—not an inconsequential inducement to Bonn. Apropos of security considerations, the key to achieving the same degree of European cooperation through the Western European Union and the creation of a European Pillar is the continued vitality of the Paris-Bonn security connection.

French National Security Objectives

Notwithstanding the existence of a sizable French nuclear force, Gaullist defense policy is based on the condition that the Federal Republic of Germany remain a strong and acquiescing buffer state against the Warsaw Pact. This has required that Bonn continue to host sizable NATO conventional and, until recently, large numbers of nuclear forces in West Germany, in addition to maintaining a large and modern conventional force of its own.¹³ France's religious commitment to the strategy of nuclear deterrence would be seriously challenged if the West German shield were degraded in any way. Hence, Gaullist strategy has been predicated upon NATO's (read: the United States) maintaining its military presence in the Federal Republic, and on Bonn's remaining satisfied with this arrangement. Therefore, in addition to the periodic threats from some US quarters that the United States would withdraw or drastically reduce its forces in Europe for financial and political reasons, Paris also has had to monitor attentively the three disquieting German "isms" that could significantly alter Bonn's status in the Western alliance: neutralism, nationalism, and pacifism.¹⁴ All three of these "isms" are observable, to varying degrees, in the current domestic political debate in the FRG.

France's concern over the changing security environment in Europe during the latter 1970s and early 1980s induced a number of trends which significantly changed the orientation of French defense policy by the mid-1980s. First, as a result of a perceived diminution of the US commitment to European and, indeed, global security interests, Paris moved to modernize its conventional forces for European and out-of-region contingencies.¹⁵ This was an important development since Paris was loath to give the perception that it would contemplate engaging in a conventional conflict in Europe, a perception which would depreciate the value of its nuclear deterrent strategy. But as poignantly observed by François Heisbourg, "In the era of smart weapons capable of striking in depth and the age of Soviet operational maneuver groups, the notions of 'first' and 'second' line states lose a good part of their justification."¹⁶

Paris was not alone in its assessment of the changing European security environment. Officials in Bonn were also attempting to formulate new strategies to ameliorate their position vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact, which included urging their French ally to increase its public commitment to the conventional defense of the Federal Republic. In breaking with long-standing Gaullist defense policy, President Mitterrand responded to Bonn's anxieties in February 1982 at a Franco-German summit meeting by agreeing to intensify bilateral defense cooperation.¹⁷ In the short term, two important changes in French defense policy were effected, with the result of enlarging France's national sanctuary to all but encompass the FRG.

First, at the conventional level, in the 1984-88 Defense Program Law of 1983, Paris established the *Force d'Action Rapide* (Rapid Action Force).¹⁸

This formation of 47,000 troops is designed to provide Paris with a capability to deploy a hard-hitting, air-transportable, conventional force 250 kilometers forward along the central front in the FRG as an important supplement to the First French Army, or to project military power into the Third World.¹⁹ While overall force improvements involved in the creation of the *Force d'Action Rapide* are modest at best, its creation manifested a significant attitudinal shift in French defense thinking.

The second French response to its increased apprehension over the Soviet threat to Europe during the early to mid-1980s was the modernization of its force of tactical nuclear weapons. One of the most important programs in this modernization is the current move to replace the Pluton short-range ballistic missile force with the Hadès system.²¹ The Hadès was originally configured to have a range of 350 kilometers, but a 1988 French defense white paper announced that the system's range was being increased to 500 kilometers.²² This adjustment was obviously made out of consideration for German sensitivity to the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons on German soil—East or West. The role of tactical nuclear weapons in French strategy is to provide Paris with the capability to launch a tactical nuclear warning shot to demonstrate to an opponent France's willingness to move a conflict to the strategic plane.²³ The term for this force—*armes pré-stratégique* (prestrategic weapons)—was adopted in 1984 to emphasize the strong link between a tactical and a strategic nuclear response. Moreover, Mitterrand has stated that the use of prestrategic forces, the *ultime avertissement* (final warning), would not occur on West German soil.²⁴

In essence, these developments in French defense policy under the Socialist government of François Mitterrand were calculated to assuage anxieties in Bonn. In effect, the previous Gaullist policy of defense independence has all but given way to a stronger de facto commitment to defend the FRG.²⁵ As the political landscape of central Europe continues to evolve and the Federal Republic expands its diplomatic overtures to the East, one can predict a continuation of the evolution of French defense policy toward establishing closer links to Germany. However, in the future the rationale for France's own *Ostpolitik* across the Rhine will not primarily be to reassure German anxieties in the new European security calculus, but rather to tie the new Germany to Western Europe and thereby continue to provide a shield against the East.

West German Angst

From the perspective of Bonn, its postwar strategy has been dependent on US nuclear deterrence (extended to cover Germany) as a necessary element for its national security. In recent years the importance to the Germans of this close US tie and the value of an extended umbrella of nuclear deterrence has not been fully appreciated by many US policymakers. Equally misunderstood are

German perspectives on the use of nuclear weapons. For the Germans, the extended US umbrella has served as a political weapon. Its value is in deterrence, *not* its warfighting capabilities. If in its defense doctrine the United States appears to emphasize short-range nuclear weapons or battlefield nuclear devices, the Germans become extremely uneasy (as with the recent dispute between Bonn and Washington over Lance SRBM modernization).²⁷

Consequently, one of the first contemporary disconnects in US-German security policies occurred in the early 1960s when the Kennedy Administration initiated the doctrine of flexible response. To German officials, flexible response did two things. First, it implied a slight decoupling of the United States from its policy of extended nuclear deterrence; second, it appeared to permit Germany to become a potential battleground for a war, conventional and nuclear. Ultimately the FRG accepted this doctrinal change, but the belief has lingered that flexible response implied a full-scale nuclear war, with nuclear weapons thus being valued for warfighting rather than deterrence. Despite the philosophical difference on the actual application of nuclear weapons and the usual irritants that develop within a multilateral alliance, no crisis shook the foundations of West German security policy—NATO and the United States with its umbrella of extended nuclear deterrence—until the last ten years.

Beginning with the Carter era, US administrations began to take positions that threatened Bonn's external policy interests and aspirations. Since the beginning of detente, the Germans had proceeded to improve relations with the East bloc, and by the late 1970s this initiative had achieved broad consensus, even within the conservative Christian Democratic Union and affiliated Christian Social Union parties. However, the Carter Administration ultimately came to perceive the Soviets as gross violators of human rights and thus conditioned its interest in detente on an improved Soviet record in that area.²⁸ Nor did the situation improve with the arrival of the Reagan Administration, which further shook German confidence by three initiatives which, in German eyes, weakened a key element of German security.²⁹ First, in a highly publicized move, President Reagan announced plans for the Strategic Defense Initiative, which was perceived by many Germans either as an attempt by Washington to develop an alternative to extended nuclear deterrence or as an acceleration of the arms race.³⁰ Second, as noted earlier, at the Reykjavik summit President Reagan seemed willing to dissolve the US ICBM force, which provided the Germans with a large part of their strategic nuclear umbrella.³¹ Third, the agreement on intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear forces caused another wave of uncertainty in the Federal Republic because it seemed to be a further attempt by the United States to decouple its strategic nuclear forces from Europe.³² Thus, the activities of two successive US administrations contributed to significant changes in the foreign policy orientation of the FRG.³³

A new variable in Bonn's national security calculus is the growing perception of a reduced threat emanating from the Soviet Union and an increasingly chaotic Warsaw Pact. Underscoring this shift in German attitudes was the FRG's December 1989 announcement to cut the *Bundeswehr* by 20 percent (from 495,000 to 400,000) by the mid-1990s.³⁴ Further, the US security commitment to Bonn will doubtless become less urgent as the Soviet Union disengages itself militarily from central Europe, and as European members of the Warsaw Pact undergo a phase of defense reorganization and even security reorientation in some cases. Thus, the United States faces the prospect of a Germany that doubts the US security commitment, even as this very commitment is seen by Bonn as of diminishing relevance to its security. Still, though the Germans are now less concerned about a Soviet incursion into Western Europe, one can anticipate that the experiences of the last 50 years will lead Germany to seek security guarantees from its allies in the West.

Franco-German Security Initiatives

While postwar Franco-German defense cooperation traces its antecedents to the stillborn Elysée Treaty of 1963, the current phase of intensified Franco-German defense cooperation commenced in February 1982 when French President Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt agreed to conduct "thorough exchanges of views on security problems."³⁵ This decision came in the wake of Schmidt's dissatisfaction with the security policies and foreign policy priorities of both the Carter and Reagan administrations. Admittedly, the overall German effort has been to draw France into the cooperative defense of Western Europe, rather than to totally supplant the United States.³⁶ The 1982 agreement between Mitterrand and Schmidt has since been augmented by additional agreements between Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, including their October 1982 decision to implement the defense clauses of the 1963 Elysée Treaty, especially the provisions that led both countries to reach "Common Conceptions" in defense issues.³⁷

A second area of cooperation can be seen in the armament industry.³⁸ As early as the 1950s the two nations showed interest in joint weapon development, and in 1958 the Franco-German Institute of St. Louis was established in Alsace for the purpose of fostering scientific research and weapon development. Indeed, the French have seen defense industrial collaboration as a primary area of security cooperation with the FRG. Despite the interest of both countries, Franco-German projects have met with mixed success. For example, President Giscard d'Estaing and Chancellor Schmidt announced in February 1980 the intent of the two nations to build a Franco-German tank.³⁹ While both nations had substantial enthusiasm for the project at the onset, by 1982 this project had been virtually abandoned.⁴⁰

A third area of cooperation, and perhaps the best reported, is in conventional force planning. An important reason for developing the French *Force d'Action Rapide*, whose creation was strongly supported by Mitterrand, was to reassure the West Germans of the French commitment to assist in West Germany's conventional defense, even though French troops remain outside NATO's military structure.⁴¹ Ever mindful of maintaining national freedom of action, the French government explained the creation of the *Force d'Action Rapide* to the French public more as an effort to reassure anxious Germans than as an expression of national concern over French security.

The latest initiative in the conventional arms arena has been the creation of the Franco-German Brigade, which is to be in place by October 1990. First suggested as a symbol of cooperation by Helmut Kohl in June 1987,⁴² the concept was enthusiastically received by the French. As structured, the brigade will consist of some 3000 to 4000 soldiers; their first commander is to be a French brigadier, who will in turn be replaced by a German commander on a two-year rotation.⁴³

While these efforts in conventional force planning and in armament research and production indicate a Franco-German desire to cooperate in defense planning, cooperative policies remain elusive in one key area: short-range tactical nuclear weapons and the question of whether the French strategic nuclear force will cover Germany automatically in the event of an attack by an aggressor. This problem relates directly to how the citizens of each country perceive nuclear weapons. For the French, the possession of an independent nuclear force outside NATO is a positive factor for Western security. The Germans, however, have a decidedly schizophrenic view of nuclear weapons: they value nuclear weapons for their deterrent value, but do not want them used for warfighting on German soil.⁴⁴ Although reduced tensions between the Eastern and Western blocs will depreciate the value of conventional forces to the Federal Republic, the utility of nuclear deterrence likely will remain high as long as Bonn remains aligned with the Western alliance.

Thus, what the Germans have been wanting from the French is some type of guarantee that the French nuclear umbrella will be extended to cover them. However, formal guarantees by France have been elusive. In February 1986, President Mitterrand did publicly commit France to "consult" (circumstances allowing) with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic before employing prestrategic weapons on German territory.⁴⁵ He also suggested in December 1987 that France would not use its Pluton missiles, with their 120-kilometer range, against enemy forces on West German territory.⁴⁶

Despite these significant, if carefully worded, statements, the French have been hesitant to share their nuclear prerogatives with the Germans and unwilling publicly to assure nuclear coverage to the Federal Republic. Yet the French have clearly stated their intent to aid their allies in the event of an attack.⁴⁷

Further, Paris is not insensitive to the problems its nuclear forces pose to greater security cooperation with Bonn. Robbin Laird writes that this very issue of security relations with Germany has made President Mitterrand increasingly uncomfortable with the role of French battlefield nuclear weapons and keenly aware of the problems these weapons pose for Franco-German defense cooperation.⁴⁸ Given the rapid changes taking place in the East-West military balance in Europe and France's strongly felt objective of cementing Bonn in the Western alliance, it would not be out of character to see a substantial review of the French tactical nuclear modernization program and its declared purpose.

Implications for US Security

France and Germany have come to a new understanding concerning a growing commonality in their security interests and objectives—of that there can be little doubt. Yet fundamental impediments (e.g. the final outcome of German reunification and German involvement in French nuclear planning) have heretofore prevented the emergence of a solidified Paris-Bonn defense axis. There is good reason to believe that these impediments will be moved aside in the near future. What is more, it will be in Washington's interest to be supportive. A more intimate and expanded Franco-German security condominium, even if it leads (which is likely) to the establishment of an independent European Pillar, will help to ensure that the Federal Republic avoids drifting eastward and into a form of reunification inimical to Western objectives.

In the early 1960s, at the time of the negotiation of the Elysée Treaty, the United States opposed the creation of a Franco-German security axis. Washington and many of its NATO allies saw Germany's association with a growingly independent France as an unwanted form of "particularism."⁴⁹ Over time, however, as France reconciled its differences with NATO and created its own *modus vivendi* with the alliance, Washington came to assess this and other forms of interallied defense cooperation in a favorable light. Indeed, Franco-German defense cooperation and coordination came to be particularly welcomed, because it had the desirable effect of drawing France back into NATO by its expression of a greater military commitment to the Central Front. That such cooperation might inevitably work against American objectives by reducing US influence in the Federal Republic was either not recognized by Washington or, more likely, judged of less importance compared to the aim of drawing France closer to the Western alliance.

Also problematic is the fear, held by many in NATO, that recent events will lead Bonn to leave the Western fold and adopt neutrality if that is the price it must pay for unification with the German Democratic Republic.⁵⁰ Fortunately for the Western alliance, many considerations militate against this eventuality, including the dominant economic and political roles Bonn will

play in the European Community after 1992, assuming that act of integration comes to fruition.⁵¹

While these aspects of European integration will require close watching, the emergence of a strengthened European Pillar to which the Federal Republic is firmly attached is clearly in the West's interest. The best means of initiating this process, from the perspective of the United States, is to encourage a closer Bonn-Paris security axis, perhaps even including the explicit extension of France's nuclear umbrella to encompass the Federal Republic. Additional areas of cooperation are also worth pursuing. For example, the idea of a French nuclear deterrent in the form of a force of neutron weapons stationed in the Federal Republic under joint French-German control has been publicly advocated by two former French defense officials, to the obvious dissatisfaction of the Soviet military.⁵² With the likely reduction of conventional forces in Europe in the face of a less-threatening Warsaw Pact, the deterrence offered by such a French nuclear option might have considerable attraction to Bonn.

Some American officials have shown uneasiness about the development of French-German defense cooperation, but the overall desirability of this entente should be readily apparent. Indeed, such a course is desirable even if it does result in a relative decline in America's influence in Western Europe as the security independence of that grouping of states grows. Further, it would not amount to a total reversal in US-French security relations, since contacts between the United States and France have been far more intimate than commonly known, as recently acknowledged by the US government (e.g. cooperation in nuclear research and development).⁵³

From the perspective of the Federal Republic, increased security cooperation with France holds ample attractions. Since France is a European power and a country that strongly values nuclear deterrence, it will remain intimately involved in European regional security, even if, diplomatically speaking, from a distance. To refrain from alienating Bonn on nuclear issues, Paris took a less forceful position on a force nuclear modernization in early 1989 than it otherwise might have, clearly a manifestation of the increasingly important position Germany plays in French external policy.⁵⁴ And the French strategy of stressing nuclear (and increasingly conventional) deterrence, as opposed to warfighting, is and will remain highly attractive to officials in Bonn. If we are to believe Georges-Henri Soutou, a growing common understanding regarding nuclear weapons has extended to embrace German suggestions (made in private) that the French should not build the \$2.4 billion Hadès SRBM system in its currently planned configuration, but rather as an intermediate-range nuclear missile capable of striking deep into Soviet territory.⁵⁵ Moreover, in view of the decreasing perception of a Warsaw Pact threat to the FRG and if a superpower START agreement is reached, the relatively small French nuclear force will then grow in relative stature, thus gaining increased potential for providing declaratory

extended deterrence to the Federal Republic should bilateral cooperation extend that far.

The key, however, to making expanded Franco-German defense cooperation a success and ensuring the continuation of stability in central Europe during this period of post-cold war adjustment lies in an independent European Pillar. To the United States, the issue is not only the satisfactory resolution of German reunification, but also the perceived necessity to influence, in a positive sense, the evolution of the new security balance emerging in central Europe. Thus, the Franco-German security concord is but a part, albeit an important one, of the means to a new security calculus now governing the European continent. Moreover, given the historical animosities among even Western European countries, which continue to plague European diplomacy, European regional security problems can be adequately addressed only within a multilateral body, such as the Western European Union. Security cooperation within the WEU would provide a solution to the nettlesome problem raised by the existence of Article 24 of the Federal Republic's Basic Law, which stipulates that the command and control over *Bundeswehr* units can be exercised only by a multinational organization.⁵⁶ This would preclude the impulse to create a unified German high command and the consequent fears such a body would produce in Europe. In view of the WEU's continued insistence that its security objectives are complementary to those of NATO, one can scarcely conclude that a WEU-sponsored higher command authority would be inimical to US interests.⁵⁷

At the same time, an independent European Pillar would not be cost-free to the United States. As the principal security guarantor to Western Europe during the postwar era, the United States has been able to command considerable diplomatic influence and prestige in a region that continues to be judged as essential to US defense and political interests. The question Washington now faces is how to maintain its influence and prestige in a Western Europe adapting to the new security environment. At the same time, Washington needs to adopt a forward-thinking vision for European security which will fulfill both its own and its allies' vital interests. Such interests certainly include continued stability in Europe, the peaceful reunification of Germany on terms acceptable to the members of the Western alliance, and a reduction in the Soviet Union's diplomatic influence in the region. Given these objectives and constraints, US options would appear to be few indeed.

In the era of "Gorbymania," the growing democratization of most of the European members of the Warsaw Pact and serious discussions concerning confederation or reunification of Germany all point to the evident "victory" of the West over Soviet-inspired communism. However, with the opportunities of the new decade have come also substantial challenges for the Western alliance. A more intimate Franco-German security relationship can

assuage any lingering West German anxieties over an Eastern threat, as well as European fears of a resurgent unified Germany. It will not in itself provide the major solution to Western Europe's emerging security problems. But if the traditional Western alliance is to survive the new phase of peace following its "victory" in the Cold War against the Soviet bloc, the Paris-Bonn axis, notwithstanding its limitations, will be at the heart of a successful Western concept establishing a new security balance in Europe.

NOTES

1. John M. Goshko, "Allies See Kohl Moving too Fast on Reunification," *The Washington Post*, 8 December 1989, p. A21.
2. Marc Fisher, "West Germany's Political Parties Move Quickly to Carve Out Role in the East," *The Washington Post*, 14 December 1989, pp. A41, A49; and Marc Fisher, "Germans Sign Act Limiting Economies," *The Washington Post*, 19 May 1990, p. A1.
3. See extracts and editorial comments which appeared in Germany's largest newspaper *Bild* complaining of its allies' cautious policies toward unification, in Fisher, "West Germany's Political Parties Move Quickly," pp. A41, A49.
4. Jim Hoagland, "Germans and French," *The Washington Post*, 14 December 1989, p. A31.
5. For extensive documentation of this subject see *Survival*, 29 (March-April 1987), 166-88.
6. *Survival*, 30 (March-April 1988), 163-80.
7. Daniel Colard, "L'UEO et la sécurité européenne," *Défense nationale* (March 1988), pp. 75-89.
8. Reported in *Die Welt* (Bonn), 10 November 1988.
9. David Yost, *France and Conventional Defense of Europe* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985).
10. "Documentation—Conventional Arms Control," *Survival*, 31 (May-June 1989), 269-81.
11. *Strategic Survey 1988-1989* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), pp. 42-49.
12. Stanley Hoffman, "The European Community and 1992," *Foreign Affairs*, 28 (Fall 1989), 27-42.
13. Robert Grant, "French Defense Policy and European Security," in *French Security Policy: From Independence to Interdependence*, ed. Robbin F. Laird (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986), pp. 9-27.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-15.
15. N. Waites, "Defence Policy: The Historical Context," in *Defence and Dissent in Contemporary France*, ed. Jolyon Howorth and Patricia Chilton (New York: St. Martin's, 1984), p. 40.
16. François Heisbourg, "French Security Policy Under Mitterrand," in *French Security Policy*, p. 42.
17. Peter Schmidt, "The Franco-German Defence and Security Council," *Aussenpolitik*, 40 (No. 4, 1989), 363.
18. Diego Ruiz Palmer, "Countering Soviet Encirclement Operations: Emerging NATO Concepts," *International Defense Review*, 21 (No. 11, 1988), 1413-18; and Gérard Turbé, "France's Rapid Deployment Force," *International Defense Review*, 20 (No. 8, 1987), 1023-26.
19. Dominique David, *La Force d'action rapide en Europe: Le dire des armes* (Paris: Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense nationale, 1984).
20. For an excellent study of the *Force d'Action Rapide*, see Yost, pp. 29-30; 87-103; and Diego Ruiz Palmer, "France," in *NATO-Warsaw Pact Mobilization*, ed. Jeffrey Simon (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 300-04.
21. For an excellent assessment of the French nuclear modernization program, see François Heisbourg, "The British and French Nuclear Forces: Current Roles and New Challenges," *Survival*, 31 (July-August 1985), 301-20.
22. Ministère de la défense, *La défense de la France* (Paris 1988), p. 101.
23. Jeannou Lacaze, "The Future of French Defense," in *French Security Policy*, pp. 57-58.
24. *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 18 December 1987.
25. Grant, p. 16.
26. Wallace J. Thies, "On NATO Strategy: Escalation and the Nuclear Allergy," *Parameters*, 18 (September 1988), 18-33.
27. Hans Binnendijk, "NATO's Nuclear Modernization Dilemma," *Survival*, 31 (March-April 1989), 137-55.

28. An excellent discussion of the effect of the Carter years is contained in Alex Vardamis, "German-American Military Fissures," *Foreign Policy*, 34 (Spring 1979), 86-89.
29. Both the Carter and Reagan administrations sought to use embargoes or sanctions against the Soviets without adequately considering European interests. It was the Reagan policies, however, that so polarized the Social Democratic Party. See Ron Asmus, "West Germany Faces Nuclear Modernization," *Survival*, 30 (November-December 1988), 500-03.
30. Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Star Wars Controversy in West Germany," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 43 (July-August 1987), 50.
31. Michael Howard, "A European Perspective on the Reagan Years," *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World edition, 66 (No. 3, 1987-88), 478-80.
32. The deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Germany was a highly contentious issue which cost Helmut Schmidt, among others, dearly. Note especially Howard, pp. 480-82.
33. Bonn has also attempted to effect closer defense ties with the United Kingdom. See Charles Miller, "British, Germans to Form Joint Air Defense Unit," *Defense News* (Washington), 25 September 1989, p. 1.
34. Marc Fisher, "W. German Cabinet Approves 20% Troop Cut," *The Washington Post*, 7 December 1989, p. A29.
35. David Yost, "Franco-German Defense Cooperation," *Washington Quarterly*, 11 (Spring 1988), 173.
36. Schmidt, p. 366.
37. James M. Markham, "French Fall in Step under a German," *The New York Times*, 24 September 1987, sec. A, p. 6.
38. Christopher Layton, "The High Tech Triangle," in *Partner and Rivals in Western Europe*, ed. Roger Morgan and Caroline Bray (Brookfield, Vt.: Gower Publishing, 1986), pp. 184-204.
39. William Wallace, "Defence: The Defence of Sovereignty, or the Defence of Germany," in *Partners and Rivals—Western Europe*, p. 242.
40. Ibid.
41. Robbin F. Laird, "Mitterrand's New Strategic Vision," *Defense and Foreign Affairs*, 16 (October-November 1988), 9.
42. Markham, p. 6.
43. Ian Gambles, "Prospects for West European Security Cooperation," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 244 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985), p. 49.
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45. *Le Monde* (Paris), 28 February 1986.
46. Robert J. McCartney, "Mitterrand Ending Visit to Bonn, Seeks to Calm German Fears About French Missiles," *The Washington Post*, 23 October 1987, p. A26.
47. Edward Cody, "Paris, Bonn Broaden Military Cooperation," *The Washington Post*, 13 January 1988, pp. A15, A16.
48. Laird, "Mitterrand's New Strategic Vision," p. 9.
49. Gambles, p. 47.
50. Marc Fisher, "Bonn's Balancing Act: Allies' Fears on Unity vs. More Refugees," *The Washington Post*, 20 January 1990, p. A15.
51. Marc Fisher, "Bonn Takes Steps Toward Reunification," *The Washington Post*, 8 February 1990, p. A1.
52. See the article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanrou in *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), 24 September 1987.
53. See the Bush Administration's comments on this subject in "US Confirms Giving Arms Secrets to France," *The Washington Post*, 29 May 1989, p. A21.
54. Edward Cody, "France Moves to Modernize Missiles," *The Washington Post*, 10 March 1989, p. A36.
55. Georges-Henri Soutou, "L'Accord INF, le Problème Stratégique Allemand et la France," *Défense nationale* (June 1988), p. 43.
56. Matthew A. Weiller, "SPD Security Policy," *Survival*, 30 (November-December 1988), 522.
57. Western European military defense cooperation is not without its critics in the Soviet Union and the European political far left. See the article by Colonel S. Leonidou concerning the threat posed to the Warsaw Pact by the *Force d'Action Rapide* and other Western rapid deployment forces in *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Second Edition, 19 May 1988; and the French Communist Party's view on European defense integration by Yves Cholière, "Europe: Military Integration or Cooperation in Disarmament?" *World Marxist Review*, 32 (November 1989), 34-36.

On War: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant?

JOHN E. SHEPHARD, JR.

Carl von Clausewitz occupies a position of well-deserved prominence in the small pantheon of Western military theorists. He bequeathed to us, in his unfinished masterpiece *Vom Kriege*,¹ a trove of provocative ideas, many of which retain remarkable contemporary value. Studying those ideas today is a challenge well rewarded: though we must cull through dusty examples and outdated technical elaborations, we still discover abundant pearls of wisdom that have retained their sheen for more than a century and a half.

But modern soldiers and statesmen cannot redeem the full value of Clausewitz's legacy if they fail to subject his propositions to serious debate. Unfortunately, Clausewitz is more often quoted than read, more venerated than understood. Many of his ideas on the purposes, nature, and conduct of war have been reduced to mere aphorisms to decorate the pages of field manuals. Clausewitz would hardly be pleased by this sort of idolatry. As an empiricist who tried to develop his theory scientifically, he was acutely aware of the need to test his hypotheses against reality. When the realities of warfare change over time, then old, previously accepted hypotheses need retesting and, if necessary, modification.

One facet of Clausewitzian theory that warrants revisiting is his very concept of war. Is it sufficiently comprehensive for modern American warriors and statesmen? I think not. For example, his singular concern for ground warfare was restrictive in its own time, let alone today when huge navies and air forces allow nations to project power far beyond the limits he could have imagined.

This article will focus specifically on three important developments that defy neat inclusion in Clausewitz's construct. The first of these, modern nuclear weaponry, is only the most dramatic of a series of technological achievements that make possible methods of warfare radically different from

what Clausewitz could conceive. The second development I will call *transnational constabulary warfare*.² Combating modern terrorism or large drug-dealing enterprises may require nations to mount warlike efforts against amorphous and shadowy transnational networks—an idea rather far removed from the Clausewitzian concept of war between states obliging the clash of opposing field armies. The third development is in the area of modern statecraft, which differs from the kind with which Clausewitz was familiar.

First, however, let us begin by briefly recounting how Clausewitz conceptualized war.

Clausewitz's Concept of War

First-time readers of Clausewitz typically find his style obtuse and are confused by what seems to be a profusion of definitions of war. In his first chapter alone, he alternatively describes war as “nothing but a duel on a larger scale,”³ “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,”⁴ and “a continuation of political activity by other means.”⁵ Consequently, critics are often tempted either to choose one of these assertions and demonstrate its obvious flaws or, in Napoleonic fashion, to destroy each in turn. Such straw-man approaches, however, do injustice to the subtlety of Clausewitz’s attempt to define war in a more meaningful way.

Clausewitz tried to reach a fuller understanding of the nature of war by exploring his subject dialectically, an approach popular among 19th-century German philosophers.⁶ First, he assumes that the object of war is political—to impose one’s will on the enemy. He then logically constructs a thesis regarding “absolute” war—that is, war as a pure act of physical force abstracted from other variables (such as international law or scarce resources) that might limit it but are theoretically external to the concept of war itself. In this abstract sense, the aim of warfare is purely military—to disarm the enemy, rendering him powerless to resist the victor’s will. The “pure,” unencumbered interaction of military forces, Clausewitz deduces, leads inevitably through escalation to extremes of will and effort.

Into this “logical fantasy,” however, steps reality.⁷ War neither breaks out nor proceeds in isolation from external variables. For example, necessary

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resources (forces, materiel, etc.) may be unavailable or take excessive time to mobilize or develop. Allies may not cooperate. Physical barriers (vast distances, mountains, seas, etc.) may impede efforts to concentrate military power in space and time. "Culminating points" may be reached and action suspended.⁸ Information and intelligence may be deficient or misused. Resolve and morale may be weak. Leaders may be daring, indecisive, or foolhardy. Chance interferes. "Friction" complicates planning and retards action.⁹ Treaties, international law, or custom may circumscribe options. All of these and other variables act to limit the conduct of warfare, which creates an antithesis to the theoretical gravitation of war toward absolute violence.


Thus, according to Clausewitz, war has a dual nature and is pulled by opposing tendencies toward escalation and limitation. Given this duality, the degree of effort that should be made in war becomes a matter of judgment that requires a constant assessment of the probabilities of success in the light of known circumstances. Since success or failure can be measured only with respect to the *political object*—the original motive for war—political policy must be the state's supreme consideration in judging what military objective to pursue and what level of effort to mount for its achievement. This leads logically to Clausewitz's famous dictum that war is "a true *political instrument*, a continuation of political activity by other means."¹⁰

With the addition of this third dimension—the subordination of war to policy—to his earlier construct of a duality of war, Clausewitz refines his concept by concluding that "as a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a remarkable trinity."¹¹ The first tendency of war—its intrinsic tendency—is toward unlimited violence and enmity. The second is the play of chance that real individuals and circumstances interject (the uncertainty so generated must be managed by the commander and his army in the planning and conduct of battle). The third is the subjection of war to rational direction by the political leadership of the governments engaged. Each war finds some point of balance among these variable tendencies, "like an object suspended between three magnets."¹²

Clausewitz in the Nuclear Age

How does Clausewitz's elaborate concept accommodate the vast evolution in the ways and means of waging war that has occurred over the past century or so? The answer, I believe, is surprisingly well, considering the immensity of developments in such areas as science, ideology, and organization that affect (or can affect) modern strategy and warfare.

However, one struggles vainly trying to fit some of these changes into the Clausewitzian model. Take, for example, the current and future possession by several nations of nuclear weapons that can be delivered over great distances.



"Nuclear weapons make possible a kind of war that simply obliterates key postulates underlying Clausewitz's concept of war."

In deriving his concept of war, Clausewitz assumed that war "never breaks out wholly unexpectedly, nor can it be spread instantaneously,"¹³ and that "the very nature of war impedes the simultaneous concentration of all forces."¹⁴ But these propositions would clearly lose validity in the context of a nuclear war.

Nuclear weapons vastly reduce the limitations that moderate conventional warfare. They make "absolute war," which Clausewitz considered as only a theoretical paradigm, far more realizable.¹⁵ This argument is admittedly facile, but only because nuclear weapons make possible a kind of war that simply obliterates key postulates underlying Clausewitz's concept of war. To explore this point more deeply, consider three possible cases: (1) war between two belligerents,¹⁶ only one of which possesses nuclear weapons; (2) war between two nuclear powers, neither of which possesses a first-strike capability¹⁷; and (3) war between two nuclear powers, one or both of which possess a first-strike capability.

Case 1: Assume that A is a nuclear power capable of achieving the assured destruction of B, which possesses only conventional military capabilities.¹⁸ One can hardly imagine war under these conditions ever to be in B's interest,¹⁹ except: if B can achieve strategic surprise and quickly capture or neutralize A's nuclear weapons; or if B's war objective does not threaten A's vital interests and A chooses to exercise self-restraint; or if A is restrained

from using its nuclear weapons for other reasons (e.g. pressure from allies, fear of inciting third parties, or the need to maintain an adequate nuclear reserve). Under such exceptional circumstances, a conventional war may ensue between A and B (as in Vietnam), for which a liberal interpretation of Clausewitz could account.

But if A, at any point before its imminent defeat, resolves to use its nuclear arsenal, B's surrender or defeat is assured.²⁰ The war then would lose virtually all elements of chance, which Clausewitz considered to be a continuous and universal element of war.²¹ The courage, skill, and character of the military commanders and their armies would become largely irrelevant. Decisions taken would depend solely upon cold calculations by the political leaders: A's leaders would determine what increment of destruction to impose, and B's would determine how much destruction could be absorbed before capitulating. Such a situation essentially prevailed between the United States and Japan in August 1945.

Case 2: If A and C each can launch nuclear attacks that achieve the assured destruction of the other, yet neither can disarm the other with a preemptive first strike,²² one can conceive of a war that results in the defeat of both sides. If A expects that C will respond in kind, then a massive nuclear attack by A on C would defy logic, since it would likely result not only in C's defeat, but in A's as well. Nations pursue war, according to Clausewitz, to achieve a political objective, and a *rational* political objective cannot include destruction of one's own nation.

Moreover, the enemy's possession of nuclear weapons would surely exacerbate the quandaries and insecurities that face decisionmakers during war, since such weapons can be delivered very quickly and their destructive potential is so massive. Political and military decisions which in Clausewitz's day could take hours, days, or even months may have to be made in minutes or seconds if a nuclear attack is believed to be imminent or underway. The fog of war in such pressured circumstances could be virtually impenetrable. Uncertainty would prevail, especially if an early attack isolated one or more key leaders by cutting communications. Enemy intentions would be unclear. Even a very limited nuclear attack by one side could be misinterpreted (is it a prelude to a massive attack?) and would at least cause the other to have to guess whether to respond tit-for-tat or to up the ante. Is extreme caution required, or must resoluteness be demonstrated? Miscalculation on either side could have devastating consequences. If, as Clausewitz claims, "war most closely resembles a game of cards,"²³ any nuclear exchange could quickly resemble fifty-two pick-up.

The key point here is that, in such an interaction, events could take place so rapidly amid so much confusion that political leaders could easily lose even minimal control over escalation (many find compelling the analogy to Europe in August 1914). Policy, then, could no longer have the continuous

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influence over military operations that the Clausewitzian model assumes.²⁴ Clausewitz's postulate that war "always lasts long enough for influence to be exerted on the goal and for its own course to be changed in one way or another—long enough, in other words, to remain subject to the action of a superior intelligence"²⁵—would not necessarily hold.

Fear of such uncontrollable escalation gripped political leaders on both sides during the Cuban missile crisis, when the United States and Soviet Union stepped to the brink of nuclear war. Near the climax of the crisis, Nikita Khrushchev sent a message to President Kennedy warning that "contact of our ships . . . can spark off the fire of military conflict after which any talks would be superfluous because other forces and other laws would begin to operate—the laws of war."²⁶ Kennedy apparently agreed. He later replied to Khrushchev that developments were "approaching a point where events could have become unmanageable."²⁷ Robert Kennedy's memoir captures the President's agony over his belief that he "had initiated the course of events, . . . [but] he no longer had control over them."²⁸

Clearly, at the height of the Cold War, Kennedy and Khrushchev did not share Clausewitz's high degree of confidence in the ability of political leaders to apply rational control to war—at least between nuclear powers.²⁹ Indeed, they apparently believed that nuclear weapons had created conditions in which war could "of its own independent will usurp the place of policy the moment policy had brought it into being; it would then drive policy out of office and rule by the laws of its own nature, very much like a mine that can explode only in the manner or direction predetermined by the setting."³⁰

Quite naturally, Clausewitz dismissed such conditions as fantastic.

Case 3: Assume antagonists A and D each possess enough nuclear weapons to effectively destroy the other, but D has the added advantage of a first-strike capability.³¹ This puts A in an unenviable position not unlike that of B in Case 1. Should a war that threatens either side's vital interests ensue, D would gain a decisive advantage by striking first against A's nuclear forces (thereby also extinguishing large portions of nearby population and industry).

The war could conceivably end in this single spasm or continue under conditions and logic resembling Case 1. But if A, fearing it might be disarmed by D, attempted to launch first (i.e. "use 'em or lose 'em,"), it could expect retaliation in kind from D. This would resemble Case 2 and would be similarly unamenable to Clausewitzian logic.

And what if each side possesses not only sufficient nuclear capability to destroy the other, but also to disarm the other with a preemptive first strike? This would create the greatest instability, as it would give a decisive advantage to haste (again, the image of August 1914 looms). As Thomas Schelling noted:

The statesman who, knowing his instrument to be ready *on condition he strike quickly*, knowing that if he hesitates he may lose his instrument and his country, knowing his enemy to face the same dilemma, and seeing war not inevitable but a serious possibility, who hesitates to strike first is . . . in an awful position . . . that both he and his enemy can equally deplore. If neither prefers war, either or both may yet consider it imprudent to wait. He is a victim of a special technology that gives neither side assurance against attack, neither such a clear superiority that war is unnecessary, and both sides a motive to attack, a motive aggravated by the sheer recognition that each other is similarly motivated, each suspicious that the other may jump the gun in 'self defense.'³²

Thus, the vulnerability of one side's nuclear forces to the enemy's quick, decisive preemption makes the task of controlling escalation immeasurably more complex than it had already been under Case 2. Once again, the Clausewitzian model, which presumes a substantial degree of rational political control in war, is found wanting. We should note, however, that as today's East-West detente broadens and the nuclear genie is lured part way back into the bottle, then the Clausewitzian model begins somewhat to reassert its relevance.

Clausewitz and Transnational Constabulary Warfare

The so-called war on drugs, into which the military services of the United States have been somewhat reluctantly conscripted,³³ is only the latest instance of the use of American military troops as constabulary forces. Precedents include, for example, the war with the Barbary pirates of Tripoli from 1802 to 1805; much of the Army's 19th-century frontier experience fighting various Indian tribes; Army border patrol duty from 1910 to 1916; Pershing's 1916 Punitive Expedition into Mexico to pursue and disperse Pancho Villa's *banditti* ("with scrupulous regard for [the] sovereignty of Mexico"³⁴); and the extraordinary exploits of Marine Corps paladin Smedley D. Butler, who, for nearly three decades, sailed about with boatloads of

Marines protecting American business and political interests in Central America, the Caribbean, and the Far East.³⁵

Skeptics will argue, with much justification, that use of the term "war" to describe transnational police actions against drug-dealing criminals (even if they involve some limited use of military forces) is merely a hyperbole that has become fashionable for journalists and useful for politicians trying to assuage uneasy citizens. After all, officials or political candidates regularly pronounce the need to "wage war" on this or that civic problem. But it seems likely that political frustration over the futility of alternative "solutions" to the drug problem and mounting concern over the vast outlawry, violence, wealth, and power of *narco-traffickers* will inevitably lead to an increased role for American military forces in transnational anti-narcotics operations.³⁶

When this occurs, the war on drugs will become less metaphorical and more literal. At least one shooting incident involving US military forces has already occurred.³⁷ Moreover, US armed forces are providing advice and training to civilian agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the US Border Patrol as well as to foreign armed forces, raising the possibility of a drug war scenario in which anti-narcotic operations could be planned, coordinated, and supported by the military, but actually fought by paramilitary proxies.

Any such campaign, however, whether military forces were engaged in direct combat or used only in a supporting role, would fall outside of the Clausewitzian concept of war, which considered only conflicts between states or nations. Indeed, in concluding that "war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means,"³⁸ Clausewitz made clear that he considered war to be a form of political relations "between peoples and between their governments."³⁹ Thus, applying Clausewitz's logic, a conflict between antagonists who could not reasonably be expected to engage in any sort of political intercourse, as between a settled nation and a fractious band of transnational outlaws, could not accurately be called a war, however violent the interaction. This appears to be one way in which war, as defined by Clausewitz, differs from mere police activities.

The notion of fighting a war largely with nonmilitary proxies also accords poorly with the Clausewitzian concept. For Clausewitz, the principal expression of warfare was combat by military forces.⁴⁰ Appropriately subordinated to political authority, generals developed military objectives and war plans to support the political object. Armies were their essential instruments. In the drug war, however, the military services are among a host of agencies establishing objectives, setting priorities, planning operations, and engaging in combat against transnational narcotics traffickers. These include, for example, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the CIA, the FBI, the Border Patrol, and various foreign police and armed forces. This diffusion of responsibility and effort can be expected to enormously complicate the planning,

operations, and political control of such a war in a way that today would surely surprise a time-traveling Clausewitz.

And what of the political object itself? Crucial to Clausewitz's concept of war is the relationship between the political and military objectives; that is, the political object of a war "must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration."⁴¹ Underlying this proposition are at least two key assumptions. First, the ends to be achieved by war must be clearly established, tangible, obtainable, and understood by political and military leaders. According to Clausewitz, military commanders and staffs plan campaigns designed to achieve an operational objective that supports the desirable political end-state:

No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and make its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail.⁴²

Clearly implicit in this is a second assumption that any war has both a definable beginning and end. The end—the decision to make peace—is expected when either the operational objective supporting the desirable political end-state has been achieved or when "the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object."⁴³ This is another way in which war—at least as Clausewitz defined it—can be fundamentally distinguished from police activities. War is an extraordinary undertaking designed to achieve an extraordinary political object. It usually ends in what passes for victory or defeat. On the other hand, a police force usually operates continuously—reactively and proactively—to respond to this or that disturbance and to reduce crime in its precincts to some acceptable level. Its victories are typically small and ephemeral—an arrest today on this beat, a crime tomorrow on that.

Does the current drug war comply with these two Clausewitzian assumptions? At this point, it seems fair to say that the political object—and hence the level of resources that ought to be devoted and the operational objectives that ought to be pursued by military (and paramilitary) forces—is ambiguous. There appears to be no defined end-state the achievement of which will entitle the US forces engaged to declare victory. If such a goal is eventually articulated, the appropriate test for determining whether Clausewitz's conditions are met is to see if there exists a reasonable measure of correspondence among operational objectives, the resources devoted to achieve them, and the established political object. However, if no desirable, attainable end-state is defined, military and other forces fighting transnational drug traffickers will be expected, like police forces, to operate more or less continuously, always vigilant and ready to stamp

out criminal activity here and there as necessary. Yet Clausewitz's concept does not admit of such an endless war.

Anti-narcotics operations represent merely one example of how American military forces can expect to be involved in transnational constabulary warfare. Anti-terrorist operations are another, and pose equally difficult problems for Clausewitzian theory. If anything, terrorist organizations, networks, and splinter groups are even more amorphous, shadowy, motley, and dispersed than transnational drug enterprises (which, of course, may themselves engage in terrorism).

Clausewitz and Modern Statecraft

Nuclear weapons and new types of warfare are not the only developments that challenge the Clausewitzian model. So do some important political changes. Among the most far-reaching of these is the high degree to which both the political and military vocations have become professionalized in the developed Western democracies and even in some totalitarian regimes, including the Soviet Union. The technical complexities of both modern warfare and national-level statecraft require more specialization than was typical during the wars studied by Clausewitz, when it was still common for monarchs such as Frederick and Napoleon to lead their armies on horseback. Seldom today can one find leaders highly competent in both political and military affairs.

This increased specialization naturally creates difficulties now and then in integrating military objectives with, and properly subordinating them to, political objectives. Indeed, it is not uncommon for modern statesmen to ask generals for "purely military advice" or for modern military officers to express frustration about politicians (even those who are Commanders in Chief!) who "interfere" in "purely military" operations.⁴⁴ Such attitudes would undoubtedly be nonsensical to Clausewitz, for whom war was an extension of politics.⁴⁵ This is not by any means to suggest that Clausewitz was wrong in any prescriptive sense. Today, as then, war *ought* to be an extension of politics, not some separate realm of activity guided exclusively by generals. But Clausewitz assumed that political leaders, in matters of war, were less dependent on the technical advice of soldiers than they typically are today.

Finally, the basic outline of government in the United States clashes with Clausewitz. In establishing a decentralized political system of separate institutions sharing powers, the US Constitution (which predated Clausewitz's writing but was unconnected to his education in the art and science of war) set up knotty arrangements for exercising civil control over the military that do not readily comport with important Clausewitzian assumptions. In positing that government provides the essential rational element of control over warfare, Clausewitz creates an image of the state as a person, from whom policy emerges "as the product of its brain."⁴⁶ He uses this image again in

stating that "policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument."⁴⁷ Thus the government, as the "brain," conceives policy. Consequently, it determines whether, when, why, and (to the extent possible) under what conditions to go to war. It then provides a measure of rational guidance for the overall conduct of the war (again, to the extent possible within the context of the interaction of two states at war), exerting its influence to ensure that the scale of effort and the military objectives pursued are in consonance with the political object.

But what happens when there is more than one brain controlling the instrument? Our Founding Fathers, because they feared the threat to liberty that might conceivably be posed by an executive with too much prerogative over the size and use of military forces, distributed various war powers among independent branches of government.⁴⁸ Hence, the President is Commander in Chief, but the Congress has the exclusive right to raise, fund, and maintain armies and a navy, declare war, decide when and if there will be a draft, establish regulations governing the armed forces, and confirm appointments to high military position. The judiciary also shares some power, as demonstrated when it prohibited President Truman from running the steel mills during the Korean War.

It is not my purpose here to pass judgment, from the perspective of over 200 years of American history, on the wisdom of the Founding Fathers' distribution of war powers. Plenty of informed arguments on this score are widely available.⁴⁹ My intent is only to suggest that the sharing of war powers among independent political branches of government is not consistent with a key assumption—unified government—underlying Clausewitz's concept of war. This is less pertinent when there is broad political consensus between the President and Congress concerning foreign policy or when one branch defers to the other. But when there is a high degree of political fragmentation and debate between the President and Congress over foreign policy objectives and the appropriate uses of military force, one can expect a corresponding diminution of the American government's capacity for applying rational control over war (especially a large or protracted one). This situation is exacerbated by

*Our modern-day diffusion of responsibility
and effort would surely surprise
a time-traveling Clausewitz.*

differing interpretations of constitutionally designated prerogatives. Hence the War Powers Act of 1973 and the continuing controversy that surrounds it.

Conclusions

The foregoing analysis suggests that, for the United States, some important historical developments in methods of warfare and statecraft are at variance with key assumptions underlying Clausewitz's carefully constructed concept of war. Among these are modern nuclear weaponry, transnational constabulary warfare, the increased specialization of both warriors and statesmen, and the Constitution of the United States.

Clausewitz's concept of war assumes that considerable limitations in the ways, means, and purposes of war will moderate the natural tendency of war to escalate to extremes. Consequently, he postulates both a need and a substantial capacity for political leaders to subordinate war to their rational control to achieve the political objective that is the original motive for war. But nuclear weapons (and the means to deliver them quickly) remove many, perhaps most, of the limitations considered by Clausewitz and create the danger that uncontrollable escalation will lead to spasms of destruction wholly disproportional to rational political objectives.⁵⁰ Clearly, nuclear weapons make possible a type of warfare inconceivable to Clausewitz, who believed that Napoleonic warfare approached the absolute extremities that war could achieve.⁵¹

The immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the consequent reluctance to use them (especially against a nation that could retaliate in kind) also created the conditions for the Cold War, in which powerful nations competed without fighting directly at all. War by algebra, in which comparative figures of strength became the principal means of military competition between the world's superpowers, was the result, featuring both a tremendous mobilization of military and industrial might by each side and, from time to time, negotiations aimed at controlling the competition.

In the United States, this algebraic war, the political object of which has not been military victory but deterrence (that is, persuading the enemy not to launch a *real* war), also spawned a new type of strategist—neither military man nor politician. These civilian defense intellectuals, applying new analytical techniques such as game theory and dynamic modeling, wrested from the military much of the claim to expertise in the art of strategy. All of these developments would undoubtedly shock the ghost of Clausewitz, should he descend to peek at how his theory is holding up in the late 20th century. War by algebra, already contemplated by some theorists who preceded Clausewitz, was dismissed by him as an "obvious fallacy."⁵²

Nuclear weaponry is an illustrative example, albeit an extreme one, of how technology has changed the nature of war to a degree not accommodated by Clausewitz's model. It has not rendered his theory wholly obsolete, however, any

more than Einstein's discovery of relativity rendered Newton's laws of motion obsolete. Just as Newton's theory approximates reality under certain conditions, Clausewitz's theory explains much about conventional war even today. The wars in Vietnam, the Falklands, and Afghanistan showed that, at least under the conditions of Case 1 above, nuclear powers may fight without resort to their nuclear arsenals.

Nevertheless, some emerging forms of non-nuclear warfare are also inconsistent with Clausewitz's paradigm. This is certainly the case with transnational constabulary warfare. Though Clausewitz supposed that wars were waged between states or nations, the dangers to national security interests posed by such activities as narcotics trafficking or terrorism may make necessary warlike actions against autonomous, non-state organizations and transnational criminal networks. Certain types of transnational constabulary warfare may also fail to conform to other Clausewitzian premises: for example, his assumptions that wars are fought almost exclusively with military forces by means of combat, and that essential conditions for victory (and consequently for ending the war) would follow necessarily from the political object which was the original motive for war.

One might argue, not unreasonably, that transnational constabulary warfare is aberrant—that it is not war per se, but only takes on some of the trappings of war in the context of what remains essentially a police action. But today, as the drug-trafficking problem demonstrates, some transnational criminal enterprises may be able to accumulate greater disposable wealth than some small countries (allowing them, among other things, to recruit their own armed forces and buy modern weaponry) and to achieve a level of sophistication in command, control, and organization that makes them formidable opponents. Combat against such organizations may reach a level of intensity which renders it difficult to distinguish, at least at the tactical level, from more traditional forms of warfare. This holds true especially if one considers the further possibility that a transnational criminal network—of terrorists, for example—may someday acquire weapons of mass destruction.

Furthermore, given the spectacular turn of events in Eastern Europe today, it is likely that the US military will place increasing focus on expeditionary forces and transnational constabulary warfare. A theory of war which excludes, by definition, a form of warfare that may increasingly occupy modern American warriors and statesmen is surely inadequate.

Neither does Clausewitz's model square with certain important political developments. Specifically, for modern industrialized nations the arts of both war and government have become far more technocratic and complex than Clausewitz could have imagined. Both fields have become so specialized that one is far less likely to find national political leaders who can claim competence in matters of war. Thus, they tend to rely more on military experts for advice,

and there is even a greater tendency than when Clausewitz wrote (and his writing suggests that the tendency was strong then!) to consider certain matters of war “purely military” and others “purely political.” This false dichotomy increases the difficulty modern statesmen face in integrating military with political objectives and ensuring that war is a true instrument of policy.

Finally, the US Constitution’s dispersal of war powers among independent political institutions—and continuing disputes over how properly to interpret this dispersion—creates unique problems for the United States in subjecting war to rational control as an instrument of policy.

Thus Clausewitz’s concept of war needs substantial modification, though not complete overhaul, if it is to be sufficiently comprehensive for modern American warriors and statesmen. Some thoughtful ideas have already been put forward by today’s theorists⁵³ and deserve the attention of those interested in understanding the nature of war.

NOTES

1. The best English edition is Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976).

2. Two decades ago, Morris Janowitz saw the likelihood of increasing constabulary missions for the armed forces. See Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 418 and Epilogue, passim. The term “transnational” is more accurate than “international” in this context, since it connotes warfare against autonomous, non-state actors rather than sovereign states.

3. Clausewitz, p. 75.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 87. This is the most often quoted definition of war attributed to Clausewitz.

6. Though Clausewitz’s approach was certainly not as sterile or tidily arranged as those of Kant or Hegel. He seems to temper his intellectual enthusiasm for logical elegance with a strong respect for empirical reality.

7. Clausewitz, p. 78.

8. This is when the balance of strength shifts from attacker to defender because of the attacker’s overextension, exhaustion, etc. This Clausewitzian concept has been revived in the US Army’s Air-Land Battle doctrine. See US Army, FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington: GPO, 1986), pp. 181-82.

9. See Clausewitz, pp. 119-21.

10. Ibid., p. 87. My italics.

11. Ibid., p. 89.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 78.

14. Ibid., p. 80.

15. Clausewitz did, however, believe that under Napoleon, war “rather closely approached [its] true character, its absolute perfection. . . . [A]ll limits disappeared.” See Clausewitz, pp. 592-93.

16. The belligerents may be single nations or coalitions.

17. The phrase “first-strike capability” indicates an ability to launch a preemptive, disarming nuclear strike against another nuclear power. Thus, it is possible for a nation to use nuclear weapons first (“first use”) without achieving a “first strike.”

18. “Assured destruction” is typically considered to mean the ability to destroy one third of a nation’s population and two thirds of its industrial capacity. Clearly most nations would find far less destruction unacceptable.

19. This assumes B’s government is rational. Assuming rationality is an unfortunate limitation on virtually every theory of human behavior (including Clausewitz’s), since irrational behavior defies prediction.

20. That is, unless another nuclear power comes to the aid of B. Then, however, Case 1 would no longer be valid—either Case 2 or Case 3 would ensue.

21. Clausewitz, pp. 85 and 89.
22. This situation currently obtains between the United States and the Soviet Union.
23. Clausewitz, p. 86.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
25. *Ibid.*
26. Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, 27 October 1962, US Department of State *Bulletin*, 12 November 1962, pp. 741-43, cited in Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 132. See also Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), p. 87.
27. Letter from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, 28 October 1962, US Department of State *Bulletin*, 12 November 1962, pp. 745-46, cited in Allison, p. 132.
28. Robert F. Kennedy, pp. 69-71.
29. Perhaps both Khrushchev and Kennedy exaggerated their concerns over the unmanageability of the crisis to instill uncertainty and caution in the opponent. However, several reexaminations of the affair by participants and analysts have persuaded me that the concerns were genuine.
30. Clausewitz, p. 87.
31. Again, the belligerents may be single nations or coalitions.
32. Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1966), p. 224.
33. Legal constraints continue to restrict military forces largely to a supporting role. Clearly, however, many officials expect the military's current involvement in drug-fighting missions to expand. See, for example, William Matthews, "Drug Fight: What Kind of War?" *Army Times*, 18 December 1989, pp. 14-16.
34. The Mexican government nonetheless considered the expedition a profound violation of Mexican sovereignty. Frank Tompkins, *Chasing Villa* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1934), p. 70.
35. See Lowell Thomas, *Old Gimlet Eye: Adventures of Smedley D. Butler* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1933).
36. A post-Civil War law ("Posse Comitatus") restricts federal military forces from engaging in domestic police activities, including searches, seizures, and arrests.
37. The incident involved a Marine Corps reconnaissance unit that exchanged fire with drug smugglers along Arizona's border with Mexico.
38. Clausewitz, p. 605.
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 579.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 92. Clausewitz recognized, of course, that the original political objects can change during the war.
44. For example, see William Manchester's discussion of McClellan, Mitchell, and MacArthur in *American Caesar* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), pp. 629-77. See also Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy* (New York: Dell, 1982), p. 136.
45. Clausewitz, pp. 605-09.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 607.
48. Today, of course, it is the prospect of adventurism, not tyranny, which most disturbs those who favor strong checks on presidential war powers.
49. See George C. Edwards III and Wallace Earl Walker, eds., *National Security and the US Constitution* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1988), esp. pp. 136-58.
50. Ironically, the recognition that nuclear escalation could usurp policy has prompted political leaders (at least in this country) to try to effect tighter control over military forces. Elaborate procedures and lines of authority have been established in an effort to prevent accidental precipitation of a nuclear crisis. In the Cuban missile crisis, the potential for a nuclear holocaust justified, and modern communications made possible, tighter personal control of military operations by political leaders than perhaps had been seen since the age of Clausewitz, when many monarchs still led their nations' armies in person.
51. Clausewitz, pp. 592-93.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
53. See, for example, Michael I. Handel, "Clausewitz in the Age of Technology," in *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*, ed. Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass, 1986), pp. 51-92. Handel suggests one way of incorporating technological and technocratic changes into the Clausewitzian model.

Off the Beaten Path

Deconflicting the Humma-Humma

DOUG NAQUIN

I've always sensed a certain wariness between civilians and the military. As the son of a Marine, I grew up thinking of civilians much as the nuns who schooled me regarded non-Catholics: There might be some good ones out there, but they'll never get into heaven.

Having now spent my professional life as a civilian, I looked forward to my year at the US Army War College as an opportunity to get to the root of this cultural barrier. After all, I have spent half my life in a military environment and half in the civilian netherworld. As a member of the civilian government bureaucracy, I have worked often with the military and continuously been impressed with both that organization's integrity and intellect. What, then, causes several of my civilian acquaintances to draw the verbal caricature of the "military mind" and many of my military friends to view civilians as a species just below jellyfish and slightly above the US media?

I figured if I could do some original study on this issue, I would go far in accomplishing my mission of promoting peace, understanding, and mutual respect between our two cultures. I could also satisfy a writing requirement or two. I could assume the perspective of one of the International Fellows who attend the War College, watching, listening, and learning about just what makes the military—in particular the Army—unique.

My initial clue came when we all gathered in Carlisle Barracks' Bliss Hall auditorium that first steamy August day of last year. At one point during that morning's welcoming remarks, the word "infantry" was mentioned in passing. As soon as this word issued forth, no fewer than 25 of my classmates bellowed OOO-AH! (I remember being somewhat disappointed that it was not in unison,

but it was, after all, our first day). In addition to easing my concerns about my professional maturity in handling the rigors of the War College, this event caused me some angst over the meaning of "OOO-AH." Having spent many an evening in base movie theaters in Panama and Okinawa, I'd always heard "OOO-AH" belched after the national anthem by young men in buzz cuts and muscle shirts, with eagle tattoos on their arms. Thus, I'd always thought "OOO-AH" meant "Let the movie begin." Now, it seemed to mean something else. And I couldn't find the word in any of the 500 JCS PUB DASHES we were given to read.

As we moved into seminar discussions and course readings, the root cause of the military/civilian disconnect became more apparent. I was fairly convinced of the problem when one of my reading assignments included the sentence: "In addition to AMC and TRADOC, other MACOM serve as the MATDEV or CBTDEV for certain types of equipment." All doubt was removed, however, when one day in the coffee shop I overheard several LTC(P)s bemoaning the plight of the Serbs. Thinking that I was entering a heavy discussion on the nationalities question in Yugoslavia, I offered as how I thought the Serbs were quite efficient. It wasn't until a week later that I found out I had broken in on a debate over Selective Early Retirement Boards. The barrier between the military and civilians is not one of ethics, discipline, or patriotism—it's language.

This is more than just a question of acronymphomania, however. My research shows that militaryspeak goes back at least as far as Alexander's time. But even before Haig, there was one person whose influence on military-speak is felt even to this day, and he wasn't even an American.

Everybody at the War College has to read and pretend they understand Carl von Clausewitz. We are told Clausewitz is the master writer on war, although he based his writings primarily on Napoleon's romp through Europe and on armies that had to see each other to fight. Clausewitz, or his translator, wrote complexly about war's complexity. He uses words like "adjunct" a lot and refrains from punctuation to the extent possible, presumably to avoid distracting the reader from his insight. Being German, Clausewitz also had little use for a verb when three or four nouns would do perfectly well.

Because every colonel wants to be a military genius, it is natural to begin the transformation by talking like one. The same principle went for

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football coaches during the Lombardi era. Thus, I venture that Clausewitz's real influence on the US military lay primarily in his influence on its language.

So how can a civilian conquer this language barrier? There are no shortcuts to acronyms, unfortunately. The best thing one can do is to find a pronounceable acronym or two—TIPFIDDLE is my favorite—and throw them around during seminar discussions. If one wants to know what the acronyms actually mean, studying might be required. (But such considerations are beyond the scope of this article.) Aside from acronyms, however, there are a couple of words civilians should learn so they can hold their own—a sort of street militaryspeak.

In addition to the aforementioned “OOO-AH,” “Humma-Humma” is quite useful. “Humma-Humma” is roughly translated as “et cetera,” “B.S.,” or “I forgot what I was going to say.” This word comes in handy during speeches. I listened to one general use “Humma-Humma” so often in a lecture that I thought he was reciting a Buddhist mantra. For my own purposes, I've found “Humma-Humma” to be useful when giving oral reports to the seminar.

A second tip, especially helpful in writing, is to cluster three or more nouns together, e.g. military manpower procurement problem. I believe this practice descends directly from Clausewitz. At the War College, noun clusters not only help fulfill wordage requirements, but they sound military. I was able to hide my civilian identity for three weeks in one advanced course by keeping my noun-verb ratio at four to one. I blew it when I went and said something nice about Jimmy Carter, the US Congress, and the media all in one day.

As for verbs, civilians can get away with using English most of the time, but there are a couple of high-impact verbs to keep in mind. “Prioritize” is the word most military people claim they hate to use but use anyway. As best as I can trace it, “prioritize” was first used during Alexander Haig's tenure as Secretary of State.* It is a word familiar to everyone in the US government, so it shouldn't pose much of a problem for those with no previous training in militaryspeak. However, a much more powerful and versatile verb is “deconflict.” Given the chance, civilians will choose wimpy words like “compromise,” “mediate,” or “negotiate.” Military officers, on the other hand, can simply use “deconflict” to cover all such unpleasant situations. I've also come to use “deconflict” in place of “prioritize,” because deconflicting connotes accomplishment whereas prioritizing sounds almost wishy-washy by comparison. On those days I don't actually get any work done, I can always claim I deconflicted my schedule; it at least sounds as if I spent time wrestling with a difficult problem. If I just say I prioritized my workload, however, I find it harder to cover up for procrastination.

* Some linguists maintain that during General Haig's tenure at State he in fact created a new language by combining the thought processes contained in US policy statements with military syntax and expression.

Finally, academic life is only one facet of the Army War College. Socially, it is important for all students to know the meanings of "ring knockers," "cannon cockers," and, of course, all the O-words. I'd spent two weeks memorizing all the ranks in the four services and could even think of generals in terms of movies (a one-star, two-star, etc.), but when I heard that Joe So-and-so made O-7, all I could think of was that it had something to do with Bingo. The potential for such social gaffes are many. Finally, please realize that the blank designated as "DOR: ____" on the information sheet all incoming students receive is not asking if you are a member of the Daughters of the Revolution. If you put in "no" like I did, it may cause administrative problems.

Overall, with a few well-chosen words, a repertoire of multisyllabic noun clusters, and a dozen or so acronyms thrown in for good measure, civilians should be able to overcome the military language barrier. Until civilian agencies are able to open up formal language training, I'm afraid this is the most that can be done. The effort is worthwhile, however. As the military gets more and more into LIC, as well as MIC and HIC, we civilians are going to be called on more and more to work with our uniformed counterparts in deconflicting the world's humma-humma. ☐

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View From the Fourth Estate

Just Cause to Stand Tall, But Not to Stand Pat

DAVID H. HACKWORTH

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On this past Memorial Day, for a change, our nation could salute an American military operation that was marked by operational competence. As a long-time military officer and critic, I am proud to acknowledge that, unlike some other recent military forays, Operation Just Cause in Panama in December 1989 was well planned and effectively executed. The brass at the top got everything right and the warriors at the cutting edge were highly motivated, maneuvered well, and hit hard. They accomplished the assigned mission and sent a signal to the world that our military machine is once again a professional, combat-ready force.

But despite our success in Panama, it wasn't all roses for the infantryman—the guy on the ground who really takes the chances, the prey of another trained human being methodically trying to kill him. Our infantryman must be the best and have the best: the best training, the best leaders, and the best gear. In Panama, he won despite the fact that he did not have the best of everything. He was not well served.

Yes, the megabuck Stealth fighter supported him. It cunningly swooped through Noriega's air-defense system and blew up a garbage dump or something just as strategic. Yes, the Sheridan tank that failed the course in Vietnam 20 years ago rumbled through the streets of Panama, supporting the groundpounder with a crew that was more frightened of the piece of junk they were riding in than they were of the enemy. (The Abrams tank that has cost our nation billions of dollars could not be airlifted to Panama because it was too heavy, and if it could have been deployed, it would have collapsed virtually every bridge it attempted to cross.)

The individual GI still packed the modified M16 rifle that, as in Vietnam, jams excessively and gets so hot after firing two magazines that the gunner needs gloves. He used the M60 machine gun that I took into Berlin almost 30 years ago. His radio, uniform, load-bearing equipment, and jungle boots haven't changed much since Vietnam. He still doesn't have an effective antitank weapon. He still totes his grenades in an old canteen cover or discarded gas mask container because he doesn't have a grenade pouch. And for our soldiers stationed in South Korea, there still isn't a decent winter glove or winter boot in the inventory.

If you compared a photo of today's infantry warrior all suited up for battle with his father's photo from Vietnam 25 years ago, you would see little difference, except for the new *Wehrmacht*-style helmet and the camouflage war paint.

But another, more important thing remains unchanged: Our infantrymen still are not trained hard enough. During the Vietnam War, at least 70,000 Americans were

killed or wounded by our own firepower—a tragedy I attribute in large measure to poor training. We didn't learn. Except for our top-notch Ranger battalions and a few infantry units with determined commanders, today's groundpounder doesn't get to fire his individual or crew-served weapon enough and he isn't trained to live and fight in a realistic and risky armed environment. This criminal shortcoming is exacerbated by two deliberate policy decisions.

One is to save ammunition and hence money by curtailing "live fire training"—even though each warrior's life depends upon his ability to shoot. The money that it costs for one fuel-guzzling Abrams tank would provide enough bullets and shells to supply each combat infantry division for a year or more. Instead, the shortage of training ammo will get worse as the defense dollar shrinks. This has happened after every war since World War II, and the doughfoot has always paid the price in blood because he has not been ready for the real thing. The battlefield is the last place to train infantrymen.

"Safety first" is another reason for not training in a live-fire environment anywhere near as realistically as our soldiers' grandfathers trained for WWII. This emphasis results in part from a policy of changing division commanders and assistant commanders every year: with only one shot at division command, few CGs will risk blowing their careers on casualties in training. Congress could take the heat off the safety issue if they'd cool it with their stinging tell-me-what-happened letters, realize that preparing men for battle is a high-risk business, and understand that accidents happen. I would rather lose one man in training than 50 men on the battlefield because they were not properly prepared.

It's about time that the people at the top get their priorities straight. It is their sacred responsibility to insure that the fighters in the middle of the action get the best gear and best training for their life-and-death occupation. Our Army has spent billions of dollars since the Vietnam War ended. The lion's share of its hardware money since the 1960s has gone for wonder weapons like the Abrams tank, the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, the Sergeant York, the Pershing missile, and the Apache helicopter, all in preparation for the least probable war scenario—Western Europe. Meanwhile our light infantry—which actually fights the wars—has gotten the scrapings at the bottom of the defense-dollar barrel.

The top guys today are not responsible for this crime. They were captains and majors when most of these high-tech wonder weapons were on the drawing boards. But they must stop defending this junk and start putting our defense dollar where it's needed.

I think the Secretary of the Army, Michael Stone, can provoke his senior Army leadership to do just this. He recently said, "Our Army must be superbly trained and superbly equipped and be ready to fight." And that is exactly right. If the Army could get the big picture right, as it did so well in Panama, then it should be a piece of cake to equip, train, and provide leadership for the infantryman who will fight in the dirty little wars which the last four decades have proven to be the most probable.

—Colonel David H. Hackworth (USA, Ret.) is the coauthor of About Face. This article is a slightly edited and abridged version of one that appeared originally in The Washington Post (27 May 1990, p. B5) under the title, "A Memorial Day Manifesto."

Commentary & Reply

A SECOND SERVING OF *SERVING AMERICA*

To the Editor:

In his brief comments about my book, *Serving America*, on the success of the volunteer force (*Parameters*, March 1990), Colonel William Hauser asked how certain statements "could come from the military correspondent of a major newspaper."

My reportage that jogging was among the causes of a lack of upper body strength in some young American men today came from many conversations with military officers and senior sergeants and chief petty officers. They pointed to the remedial training to overcome such weaknesses that each service runs before putting the youngsters into boot camp. Colonel Hauser left out of his commentary another reason they cited and I reported, the reductions in high school intramural athletics and gym classes caused by budget cuts. The difficulties that young privates had in learning military courtesies, like when to salute, were reported to me by an experienced Marine drill sergeant. While not ascribing that view to anyone beyond the sergeant, I found it credible because my own experience shows that many American civilians cannot tell the difference between a corporal and a colonel.

Colonel Hauser, an avowed proponent of the draft while I am an advocate of the volunteer force, misstates my position on the propriety of having the armed forces instill values in young men and women. Those who favor the draft often argue that mandatory military service would teach patriotism. I asserted: "But the role of the American armed forces is to defend the nation's interests, not to instill values, teach patriotism, or instruct young people in their civic obligations. In America, those functions are the prerogative of the home, the school, and civic organizations, not of sergeants on the rifle range. (There is also the remote possibility that military officers might teach values inimical to American democracy.)" The parentheses were mine.

As a citizen who believes that American soldiers should stay out of politics, however broadly or narrowly defined, I stand by those propositions.

Richard Halloran
Honolulu, Hawaii

The Reviewer Replies:

My disagreement with Mr. Halloran over the merits of conscription had nothing to do with my unfavorable judgment of *Serving America*; in fact, I had similar differences of opinion with the authors whose works were praised in the same review. As for the items I singled out for criticism, they were exceptional only in that their faults were so obvious that little elaboration was required. To summarize, I was terribly disappointed in the book as a whole, considering it a rather hasty and careless treatment for so important a topic. Mr. Halloran's usual excellence as a journalist only heightened the disappointment.

William L. Hauser

A MESSAGE TO MANUEL

To the Editor:

Colonel Alexander Shine is right to express concern about how to further the spread of democracy in the Third World ("Abetting Democratic Revolution in the Third World," *Parameters*, March 1990), because the crumbling of Marxism as an attractive alternative in Eastern Europe does not automatically transfer from the Second World to the Third. From now on we can view the true nature of the North-South relationship without the distorting effect of the diminishing East-West conflict. Thus the acceptance of democracy in developing countries is important in its own right, not as a sideshow event to the Europe-centered Cold War.

Colonel Shine characterizes our policy toward the Third World as "fundamentally and fatally flawed because we lack a coherent vision for positive change." There are good reasons to think that he has overstated the case.

Our government's declaratory foreign policy is not highly important. Other governments and astute foreigners see that our deeds don't always match our intentions. But at a more fundamental level, total US government policy (declaratory and actual policies) is only a portion of American policy. The most far-reaching part of American policy consists of the messages implicit in the products and services of worldwide networks of American private-sector communications and entertainment businesses. These organizations present us graphically to every corner of the globe with unprecedented effect. Regardless of what our government does or does not do, these networks bombard the Third World daily with messages about the beneficial effects of democracy. Once one accepts American communications and entertainment businesses as purveyors of American policy (no matter how unintentional that effect may be), their effectiveness becomes clear immediately. American taxpayers pay for the government's formal development and publication of foreign policy. Foreign consumers pay handsomely for the unofficial commercial version.

In the absence of significant restrictions to the free flow of information, Western communication and entertainment businesses will create a market for democracy. This process will take time. One cannot impose democracy on a country; the population must want it and achieve it itself. I see this process as the long-term trend. Well-conceived and well-executed US government policy can be helpful only at the margin. The revolution of rising expectations results from our commercial enterprises, because they are a demonstration of successful policy. Only that revolution can educate people sufficiently to make them receptive to less-inhibiting social forms and to more enlightened reasoning. Our government policy won't do that.

Is our Third World policy therefore fundamentally and fatally flawed? I think not. We have implicitly transferred effective policymaking to the commercial sector, and that sector is effectively convincing people in the Third World that enlightened capitalism based on democratic values and practices is the best available system.

What can our government do? It should set the rules of the game so that our business enterprises can operate effectively and humanely overseas, and it should

continue its role of stating an enlightened declaratory policy. Otherwise it should stand aside and let the really effective policy purveyors work.

Lieutenant Colonel Douglas O. Fleck
Chesterfield, Missouri

The Author Replies:

Lieutenant Colonel Fleck's provocative letter is a helpful response to my article. I agree to a large extent with his observations, but differ fairly significantly on the thrust of his conclusions.

Colonel Fleck is right when he points out the major role of American businessmen and entertainers in presenting America to the world. They are indeed pervasive emissaries, and they advertise dynamically the benefits of individual freedom and economic prosperity which give democracy its great appeal. The problem with these emissaries, however, is that they picture the fruit of the tree of democracy, but give little understanding of the delicate balance of individual, societal, and governmental checks and balances which keep the tree healthy. Nor can they coherently explain how to successfully plant the tree on rocky soil. Like those of us who were advisors in Vietnam, or those involved in El Salvador who were quoted in my article, these emissaries have lived with successful democracy so long that they have little understanding of what its real essence is. Thus, they are of limited help in answering either of Manuel's questions: "What are the essential elements of democracy?" and "How do we get there from here?" Yet it is precisely such answers that the Manuels of the world need. As Colonel Fleck writes, "One cannot impose democracy on a country; the population must want it and achieve it itself."

What is the government's role? I agree that it should "set the rules of the game so that our business enterprises can operate effectively and humanely overseas." (I would emphasize "humanely.") However, it also has a major educational role. This is best executed through agencies such as the National Endowment for Democracy or perhaps even a nationally sponsored "School of Democracy." Discussion of Manuel's questions should be a major part of the education we provide for foreign nationals in our military and diplomatic schools. It should be a part of the training of our own personnel involved in our security assistance programs. And it should be offered and encouraged for many of those engaged in private endeavors overseas.

My contention is that most Americans have only the shallowest understanding of what it really takes to make democracy work. We are not very helpful to the Manuels of the world because we offer them either a simplistic political and economic model which may be very poorly suited for their particular situation, or we advertise to their people an image of freedom and plenty that is unattainable. Like any salesperson, if we are going to be successful in selling our product, we must first be able to communicate an understanding of it. Then—and this is critical—we must focus our thoughts and efforts on determining how the product (in this case democracy) will genuinely benefit our customer by meeting his real needs in a workable way that is demonstrably better than other alternatives. Only if we can do these things will we have a product worth selling, and will we be successful salesmen.

Most of us who work for the government are ill prepared to do this selling; to expect those from the private sector to be better prepared is overly optimistic.

Colonel Alexander P. Shine

**LUTTWAK ON JUST CAUSE:
JUST CRITIQUE OR JUST A CROCK?**

To the Editor:

I suppose that demanding a retraction from Edward Luttwak is more than this reader and pedestrian student of military art and science ought to expect; nevertheless, his 31 December 1989 criticism of Operation Just Cause in Panama, which *Parameters* reprinted in its March 1990 issue, looks like a premature volley. It was fired only 11 days after the operation was launched, and thus lacked the careful, reflective, and rigorous thought that one expects—nay, demands—from responsible commentators.

Mr. Luttwak writes as though he were there observing the action through the gun sights of the soldiers on the ground. His selection of terms—"casual use of field artillery . . . liberal firing of machine guns in the general direction . . . manifestly frivolous use of weapons . . . grossly excessive use of firepower . . . the result of questionable command decisions"—leads to his bottom line that "US troops . . . are still the product of a 'shake and bake' training system," the very embodiment "of an out-dated system of mass-production training."

I don't know how Mr. Luttwak could be so utterly out of touch with the US Army of today—its soldiers, its training, and its *leadership*. His assertions exude a degree of analytical casualness completely out of step with the high professionalism actually demonstrated in Panama by commanders from the squad leaders up to the CINC. Luttwak obviously allowed his perception of events to be skewed by the speculative reporting of a media absorbed itself in the fog which inevitably accompanies the tactical execution of operational design.

In point of fact, the US forces which executed Just Cause brought to life the spirit of James Fenimore Cooper's Deerslayer, who observed that "a stout heart and a steady hand, them's what counts in a fight." And, one might add, "them's what counts" in an army.

Captain Mike deMayo
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Book Reviews

Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam. By William Colby with James McCargar. Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989. 438 pages. \$22.95. **Reviewed by Guenter Lewy,** author of *America in Vietnam*.

Few Americans are better qualified to assess the American experience in Vietnam than William Colby, who was a chief of the CIA station in Saigon and head of the pacification effort. Yet this book, as several reviewers have pointed out, is fundamentally disappointing.

Colby's account of the American involvement in Vietnam covers the years 1959-75. He describes how from the beginning both the Vietnamese and the Americans tended to neglect the political side of the conflict and invested excessive assets in a purely military response to the communist insurgency. In a revolutionary war, Colby argues, the key task is to involve the people of the countryside in a common effort to defend themselves, not to add up body counts. This fundamental mistake was magnified by the massive engagement of US combat forces who sought to "find, fix, fight, and finish" an enemy who refused to play by the rules of conventional warfare. The strategy of attrition failed to convince the North Vietnamese to abandon their design to take over the South, while the massive use of firepower antagonized and dispirited the people the Americans were supposed to defend.

Colby calls the year 1967 the turning point. It marked the emergence of four men—Robert W. Komer, Ellsworth Bunker, Nguyen Van Thieu, and Creighton W. Abrams—who collectively, he argues, finally found a winning strategy and created the organization to carry it out. Most of the credit is given to Robert Komer, who organized a meaningful and coordinated pacification effort (CORDS). In late 1968 Colby succeeded Komer, and by 1971, Colby maintains, the new strategy had proven itself. It passed its crucial test in 1972 when the South Vietnamese, unaided by US ground forces, were able to defeat the North Vietnamese Easter offensive. Colby acknowledges the important role played in that offensive by American logistical and air support, the absence of which proved crucial in the final defeat in 1975. Demoralized by the failure of the American government to maintain the required level of material assistance and to make good on President Nixon's promises of military support, South Vietnam collapsed in the face of heavily armed North Vietnamese divisions.

According to Colby, this defeat could have been avoided. Our "primary (and perhaps worst) error" was American encouragement of the coup against Diem in 1963. "The two later ones—fighting the wrong war, refusing to help an ally at the critical moment—stemmed inexorably from it." Some of these conclusions, as Colby admits, are speculative. He argues that there was a 50-percent chance that Diem might have been able to repair the deficiencies of the strategic hamlets program—a slender reed upon which to rest American policy. Even more basically, Colby consistently overrates the performance of the South Vietnamese. It is true that by 1972 the situation in the countryside had much improved. Still, none of this proves Colby's further conclusion

that it was only our failure to last the course and our abandonment of South Vietnam that caused the final humiliating defeat in 1975. There is abundant evidence to be found in the records of CORDS that the weakened posture of the Viet Cong following the failure of the Tet offensive of 1968 had not become the gain of the government of South Vietnam. This crucial point is stressed in Jeffrey J. Clarke's recently published history of the American advisory effort (*Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973*). No amount of American advice and assistance could make up for the failure of South Vietnamese military leadership, which until the end remained for the most part inept, corrupt, and self-serving. Neither could outsiders create a sense of commitment and community which was essential to military morale and the willingness of the ordinary soldier to make the ultimate sacrifice. For Colby to explain the final collapse of 1975 in terms of lacking supplies or as the result of "tactical failures and mistakes" and "contradictory orders" is to focus upon the most superficial causes and to ignore the kinds of political and social factors he correctly emphasizes in the rest of the book.

I agree with Colby that the lesson of Vietnam "is not that the United States should avoid involvement in revolutionary situations or that counterinsurgency is a hopeless, and dangerous, art for Americans." With the ending of the Cold War, these low-intensity conflicts may well become the most frequently encountered situations calling for an American military engagement. What we must bear in mind, however, is that we cannot help those who lack the willingness and stamina to help themselves. This may well be one of the most important lessons of Vietnam.

The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance. By Martin van Creveld. New York: The Free Press, 1990. 134 pages. \$19.95. **Reviewed by Dr. Harry P. Ball, Colonel, USA Ret.,** author of *Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War College*.

It needs to be said straight off that this book is highly critical of professional military education as conducted in the United States. Nonetheless, its recommendations for change, while to a degree dramatic, are not novel. Military education in the United States is well-plowed ground; perhaps there remains little new to suggest.

Martin van Creveld, a military historian of solid reputation, not surprisingly takes a historical approach to the problem. The evolution of professional military education in Western societies consumes the front half of the book. Focus then settles on current American practices. The author compares them (unfavorably) to those of Europe, past and present, reaches conclusions, and makes his recommendations for improvement. Improvement translates in large part into moving closer to the practices of the Prussian/German *Kriegsakademie*, the Soviet Frunze Academy, the Soviet General Staff Academy, and civilian post-graduate schools.

Among the more eye-catching features of Van Creveld's prescriptions is a drastic curtailment of advanced civil schooling. At the staff college level there is the use of qualifying entrance examinations and also a proposal that all services establish for selected students a second year of study patterned somewhat on the Army's Advanced Military Studies Program at Fort Leavenworth. At the senior level Van Creveld recommends that the war colleges of the individual services and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces be eliminated (and also apparently the Armed Forces

Staff College). In their stead would be a reformed National Defense University (relocated away from Washington) offering a two-year course.

In Van Creveld's proposal the first year of staff college qualifies the student as a staff officer at division through field army levels (or their equivalent in the other services), has him master the operational level of war, and familiarizes him thoroughly with branches of the service other than his own. The second year provides studies of a more theoretical nature and might lead to an M.A. in military science. At the senior service college, the first year is devoted to joint operations. The second year, for a selected "elite," treats the political, social, and economic aspects of war, including industrial mobilization. The second year carries with it the opportunity to take the Ph.D. in military science or a related field.

Throughout Van Creveld stresses faculty quality. Except for purely non-military subjects, the faculty members would be military officers who are older, more experienced, and of higher rank than their students. Only the instructors of the first year of the staff colleges would not be required to hold Ph.D. degrees. The faculty of the National Defense University would become the "intellectual flower of the forces." Faculties (and students) would not be tied to excessive hours in class but have the time for and be required to do original research.

The merits of Van Creveld's suggestions cannot in any definitive way either be confirmed or refuted in this brief review. It might be noted, however, that the Army from 1919 to 1922 and from 1928 to 1935 conducted a two-year staff school at Leavenworth. In both instances when it reverted to a one-year course the reasons were to economize and to increase the output of graduates. In 1946 a planned ten-month course at the new Armed Forces Staff College was reduced to five months because Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz held that the fleet could not be deprived of officers over the longer period. Also in 1946 the Army decided not to reopen its war college because it expected the new National War College to meet its requirements. By 1950, however, a wide gap had developed between the level taught at Leavenworth and that at McNair. The Army then reactivated its own war college. These events illustrate two realities. First, military education competes in an arena of finite appropriations and a finite number of officers on their way up. The two don't always match. Second, each military department has unique requirements in the education of its officers that are legitimate and that simply cannot be wished away in a worthy search for jointness.

To convince the reader of the merits of his proposals, Van Creveld must establish beyond doubt that there are failures in the present system. This he does not do, primarily because he does not distinguish clearly among the practices of current institutions. The Air University and its subordinate colleges do not even earn entries in the index; the same fate befalls the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. While there are commonalities among the staff schools and among the war colleges, there are also important differences. Excessive use of generalizations weakens the author's arguments, annoys the reader who is familiar with the institutions, and misleads the reader who is not.

The author creates another problem for himself by arbitrarily excluding from his study any concern with the structure of officer careers. Such exclusion eases explanation but separates education from the professional development that takes place beyond the walls of an educational institution. The two, however, are interdependent;

together they comprise career structure. Discussion of this interdependence is fundamental to the credibility of any book devoted to the training of officers.

Concern with the nature of military professionalism in a modern democratic society was also excluded from the study. If Van Creveld had shown such concern, he may have been a bit less enthusiastic about creating a National Defense University containing within itself a self-perpetuating military/intellectual elite with real influence over selection and promotion. Military elites have not attracted large followings in the United States, and neither incidentally have intellectual elites. It is predictable that the more elitist the institution becomes, the less influence it will have and the less support it will receive from both the services and the people's representatives.

It is thus difficult to take this book seriously if for no other reason than that the boundaries placed around the investigation are too confining. That is unfortunate because from earlier studies some of the proposals presented are known to have merit. They deserve more careful elaboration and justification than they receive here. The sweeping generalizations, the too-frequent use of hyperbole, and the shallowness of analysis, however, all leave the impression that the book was designed as much to startle as to inform and persuade. The real outcome is—to borrow a word from the title—irrelevance.

The Defeat of Imperial Germany, 1917-1918. By Colonel Rod Paschall, USA Ret. Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books, 1989. 247 pages. \$22.95. **Reviewed by Brian Bond**, Professor of Military History at King's College, London, and author of *War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970*.

I agreed to review this book because I assumed from the title that it would consist of a scholarly analysis of the causes of Germany's defeat in 1917-18. Such a study, drawing on German sources, would explore the connections between failure and retreat on the Western Front, the increasing war-weariness of Germany's lesser allies and their need for reinforcement, the effects of the naval blockade, and political discontent on the home front. A bold author might even attempt to assess their relative significance. If such a study exists in English I do not know of it and so expected much of this volume.

Alas, under this misleading title, Colonel Paschall has chosen to write a straightforward operational narrative on the theme, if that is not putting it too strongly, that despite all the efforts of innovating tacticians and commanders, attritional warfare prevailed to the end. This is a persuasive viewpoint and the author writes clearly, giving due attention to secondary fronts such as Italy, but it is not clear why such a book should be written—and published—in the late 1980s when a younger generation of scholars has moved on to examine relations among social, economic, and military history; to reappraise the leading commanders; and, above all in the present context, to throw new light on technological innovation, the generals' "mindset," and the resultant confusion in methods and objectives. In sum, one would not now expect a serious study of operations in 1917-18 to neglect the work of scholars like Tim Travers and Dominick Graham. It is not as though the final year of the war has been ignored by others: there are excellent studies by Hubert Essame, Martin Middlebrook, Guy Pedroncini, Marc Ferro, Barrie Pitt, John Terraine, and Correlli Barnett, to name but

a few; but the German viewpoint is worth more attention. Colonel Paschall's account does not shine in this company but does have the merit of giving much more space to the American operations than any of the authors mentioned above. He also has adequate maps and an excellent selection of illustrations, many of them covering American aspects of the war. But on the debit side the text lacks detail and references on critical issues (such as casualty statistics), and the essay on sources suggests that in several areas the author is sadly out of date. Surprisingly, he singles out for special mention the eight-volume *The History of the First World War* (London: BPC Publishing, 1971) which provides a popular introduction but is hardly satisfying fare for the serious student. Perhaps the author's aims are modest and he is writing for non-historians, in which case this review will seem excessively critical. The book can indeed be safely recommended to the "armchair strategist" mentioned on the dust jacket as a generally reliable but undemanding narrative.

Napoleon and Hitler: A Comparative Biography. By Desmond Seward. New York: Viking Penguin, 1989. 319 pages. \$19.95.
Reviewed by Colonel John R. Elting, USA Ret., author of *Swords Around a Throne: Napoleon's Grand Armée*.

Once upon a time, so it is said, proper British nannies would reduce their more obstreperous charges to trembling obedience with the dire threat that—if you don't eat your porridge, quit pulling your little sister's pigtails, and otherwise cease and desist—"BONEY WILL GET YOU!" After reading this book, one begins to wonder if Mr. Seward weren't the product of that same upbringing, wherein Boney—Napoleon Bonaparte—looms as a bugaboo of terrifying proportions.

The book's theme is proper enough—a comparison of the lives and fortunes of these two momentary masters of continental Europe and the various factors which Mr. Seward believes influenced them. He concludes—somewhat regretfully, it seems—that Hitler did by far the more evil, though possibly only because he had modern technology to facilitate his dirty work. The most striking difference he finds between the two was their attitude toward the Jews, Napoleon giving them full citizenship, Hitler destroying them. As a partial balance he insists that Adolf was kinder to women, small children, and dogs. (It is an odd fact that, except for Josephine's possessive poodle, Napoleon seems to have had no close association with dogs. However he was fond of horses, which Hitler obviously disliked.)

The author attempts to find a "subtle link between the pair . . . in the writings of that baneful genius Carl von Clausewitz." Napoleon inspired Clausewitz, this theory goes, and Hitler intently studied Clausewitz; ergo, Napoleon inspired Hitler. Clausewitz is quoted frequently throughout the book and often to the point, but whether the author understands him remains uncertain. Hitler certainly didn't!

The major requirement for such a comparison is an accurate knowledge of both men, and this the author does not have. He obviously dislikes Napoleon, producing a characterization that might have been expected of an English author in 1809. His sources are Bourrienne, de Stael, Rémuset, Barras, and Marmont—all of them proved unreliable or malicious, or both. He accurately defines Fouche as a scoundrel, but accepts as gospel truth anything Fouche has to say against Napoleon;

also, he obviously considers Metternich a scrupulously honest statesman, rather than one of history's most slippery diplomats.

With Hitler, the author has little need to pick and choose among his possible sources, since all witnesses are hostile. Even so, he glosses over the surprising deterioration of Hitler's personal courage during 1943-1945, as shown by his refusal to visit the battle fronts. He does emphasize one often-overlooked facet of der Führer's complexly cut personality—the "quixotic" (so he terms it) quality that led him to prop up and rescue an increasingly useless Mussolini, and to declare war on the United States out of loyalty to his Japanese allies after Pearl Harbor, thereby relieving President Roosevelt of the difficulties he would have faced in securing a declaration of war against Germany and the subsequent diversion of the major American war effort from the Pacific to Europe.

As history this book is worse than worthless, being so full of errors as to thoroughly mislead the casual reader. Seward confuses Guibert and Gribeauval, and proclaims that Pomerania and Silesia had never been part of Germany before 1939, that the Americans were "repulsed" at Omaha Beach, that a single German battalion was sufficient to overrun Denmark in 1940. He revives the spavined old fables that it was Hitler—accidentally inspired by Manstein—who planned the Ardennes offensive of that same year, and that Napoleon had no interest in military technical innovations. The minor bobbles are endless. The author has General Bonaparte riding with an escort of 300 lancers in 1797 (there were no lancers in the French army); puts the Consular Guard into "dazzling yellow uniforms" (yellow was the one color they didn't wear); and thinks that Hortense de Beauharnais wrote the *Chant du Départ*. He invents little stories such as the one about how the captive Göring "charmed" a GI guard at Nuremberg into giving him the poison capsule with which he committed suicide. And his statistics come from God alone knows where.

In short, buying this book is a waste of money. Reading it—unless you have a perverse interest in the alleged sex lives of the great and famous—is a waste of time.

Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis. By Raymond L. Garthoff. Revised ed. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1989. 236 pages. \$9.95. Reviewed by Professor Dan Caldwell, author of *American-Soviet Relations: From 1947 to the Nixon-Kissinger Grand Design and Grand Strategy*.

Those picking up yet another book on the Cuban missile crisis may recall the words of *Ecclesiastes*: "There is nothing new under the sun." What fresh information could possibly be added to the record of the most extensively documented crisis in the history of American foreign policy?

Raymond Garthoff is distinctively qualified to write about the Cuban missile affair because he participated in it as a staff member of the Office of Politico-Military Affairs in the Department of State. After a distinguished career in the Foreign Service, Garthoff retired and has written important articles and books concerning Soviet-American relations. In 1987, Garthoff published the first edition of *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis*, which coincided with the 25th anniversary of what the Soviets refer to as the "Caribbean crisis."

The revised edition is the beneficiary of dividends from the Soviet policy of *glasnost* and from the information obtained from two conferences for the "alumni" of the Cuban missile crisis. The first of these conferences, sponsored by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, was held in October 1987; the second, sponsored by the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, was held in Moscow in January 1989. Interestingly, the second conference included several Cuban participants as well as Soviets and Americans.

Garthoff summarizes the new disclosures and presents revised interpretations concerning some of the important aspects of the crisis. For example, he points out that the proposal calling for the USSR to remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange for a commitment by the United States not to invade Cuba, made by Aleksandr Fomin (reputedly the KGB station chief in Washington at the time of the crisis) to ABC newsman John Scali, was made at Fomin's own initiative and was not, as all previous accounts have suggested, an official Soviet government initiative. Garthoff analyzes the critical question of whether the Soviet Union deployed nuclear warheads in Cuba, and on the basis of newly available information reverses the judgment he made in his 1987 book. He now concludes that there were probably 20 nuclear warheads in Cuba.

In the final chapter, Garthoff presents a number of propositions concerning crisis management, crisis prevention, and crisis avoidance. He argues that Americans generally believe that crises can and must be effectively managed. Soviets, on the other hand, tend to be more pessimistic concerning the manageability of crises and have therefore emphasized the need for crisis prevention.

The revised edition is well worth reading, even for those already familiar with the first edition. It is significantly longer, more extensively documented, and richer in contemporaneous source material as set forth in the appendix.

Garthoff raises many points that are worth pondering, two in particular. First, despite the disclosures of the past several years, he notes that "even today the crisis is not sufficiently understood." We know little, for example, about the deliberations of the group advising Khrushchev during the crisis. Second, Garthoff observes that the Cuban missile crisis may be *sui generis*: "No past crisis has had, and none in the future can be expected to have, such a lengthy period for decision free from external and domestic political pressures." So there are still significant holes in our understanding of a crisis that, for various reasons, may be unique. But because this crisis represents the closest to war that the United States and the Soviet Union have come since the end of World War II, it still deserves close attention.

Diplomat in Khaki: Major General Frank Ross McCoy and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1949. By A. J. Bacevich. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1989. 304 pages. \$29.95. **Reviewed by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel**, Teaching Fellow, Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College.

Tradition has it that American military officers have, as a rule, abstained from participation in partisan politics and from attempts to influence the formulation of national policy. Many officers serving between the World Wars took pride in the fact that they had never cast a ballot. Part of the Regular's prejudice against National

Guard counterparts stemmed from the "political" nature of Guard commissions. Officers who sought advancement through political connections sometimes found their efforts counterproductive and their credibility with their peers compromised.

In reality, the military and political spheres have never truly operated in isolation from each other. No fewer than 13 Army officers have gone on to the Presidency. Looking again to the prewar and World War II period, one finds some obvious examples of politically oriented Army officers. Douglas MacArthur's antiquated notions of American politics are well known, but certainly cast little credit upon the officer corps. In contrast is Dwight Eisenhower's perceptive and sophisticated approach to coalition-building, which involved him in both national and international politics at the highest levels. But Eisenhower and MacArthur are scarcely representative. What of the officer corps as a whole? Did officers of lower ranks and more traditional careers ever play a role in policy formulation?

In *Diplomat in Khaki*, Colonel A. J. Bacevich aligns himself with the revisionist historians who are seeking to establish that the US Army in the 20th century has enjoyed a more active and complex relationship with American government than the traditional interpretation of events would suggest. As his vehicle, Bacevich has chosen the career of Frank Ross McCoy, an eminent soldier who also gained considerable stature in the foreign policy community. Bacevich concedes that McCoy was not a "great man." His military career was one of "near misses." Too young for high command in World War I, McCoy was too old for active duty in World War II, having retired in 1938 after being passed over for Army Chief of Staff. Nor does Bacevich claim great things for McCoy as a diplomat. Although competent, loyal, and forthright, he lacked the intellect and originality of the true statesman. What Bacevich finds noteworthy is the facility with which McCoy combined the two careers.

Of the two sides of McCoy's public life, Bacevich focuses on the diplomatic. This began in 1898 when the young McCoy participated in the Santiago campaign and the subsequent attempts to reform Cuban government and society. It was in Cuba that McCoy first met Leonard Wood, who became his mentor. Under the influence of Wood, Theodore Roosevelt, and others, McCoy developed into a full-fledged Progressive, whose beliefs included notions of public service, internationalism, and the superiority of American institutions. A tour of duty in Mindanao placed these Progressive ideals in direct conflict with the reactionary society of the Moros, an experience which taught McCoy some lessons in the integration of force and diplomacy. Later, as military attaché to Mexico, McCoy developed a pronounced contempt for corrupt, inefficient government.

Following World War I, during which he rose to brigade command, McCoy became something of a diplomatic troubleshooter for the Republican administrations of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover. He attempted to bring stable, pro-American government to Nicaragua, helped adjudicate a border dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, and represented the United States on a League of Nations commission to Manchuria. Spending the war years largely in private life, McCoy returned to diplomacy as chairman of the Far Eastern Commission, an inter-Allied body charged with overseeing the occupation and reconstruction of Japan.

Significantly, few of McCoy's diplomatic missions were particularly successful. Sandino thwarted his initiatives in Nicaragua. Japan contemptuously ignored the League's investigation of the Manchurian "incident." MacArthur usurped the Far

Eastern Commission's authority, marking the end of Progressive internationalism while marking the onset of Cold War bipolarity. In a sense, though, McCoy's frustrations actually substantiate Bacevich's thesis. McCoy involved himself in foreign affairs out of a soldierly sense of duty and idealism, not self-promotion. That McCoy never attained first-rank status as either soldier or diplomat simply proves that it was possible for a talented, well-connected officer to operate in both the military and political elites if he was so inclined. Greatness was not a prerequisite.

Diplomat in Khaki offers a new perspective on the Army as an institution in American society. Even though the subject of this study is the life of a career Army officer, this work should make its way into the literatures of American diplomacy and of Progressivism, as well as that of military biography.

Churchill: The Making of a Grand Strategist. By David Jablonsky. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1990. 97 pages. **Reviewed by Dr. Steven Metz,** Professor of National Security Affairs, US Army Command and General Staff College.

In the increasingly tumultuous global security environment of the 1990s, the US needs greater strategic acumen. That much is evident, but how to generate strategic skill is not so clear. The standard American approach is to spend money, organize conferences, pass laws, and create institutions. While some good grows from this frenetic effort, eventually we must admit that history holds the key to the development of strategic skill. Colonel David Jablonsky, as shown by his monograph on the formation of Churchill's approach to grand strategy, already knows this.

Jablonsky assesses Churchill with a simple but useful analytical scheme. Grand strategy organizes the military, political, psychological, and economic elements of national power toward a single goal. During wartime, strategists must link this horizontal dimension to the vertical continuum of war—the tactical, operational, and strategic application of military force. When these two dimensions are smoothly joined, a sound strategy results.

With maturity, Churchill fully understood this basic truth. Yet his initial approach to military affairs focused on the strategically decisive battle. Jena and Sedan were his models rather than the grinding horror of Sherman and Grant's 1864 campaigns. But, unlike many of his contemporaries, Churchill eventually transcended the Napoleonic illusion and saw that 20th-century strategy was radically different from its predecessors. By studying history and observing the Boer War and World War I firsthand, Churchill developed a thoroughly modern and effective notion of grand strategy.

Several key tenets grounded this. Churchill recognized the need for integrating the horizontal and vertical dimensions of grand strategy. He appreciated the role which force multipliers such as technology, science, deception, and intelligence play in linking the levels of war. He accepted the limitations of naval power and stressed joint military operations in support of grand strategy. And, finally, he accorded the political and psychological dimensions of grand strategy greater importance than winning major battles. All this bore fruit in World War II. By pursuing a clear goal, assuming unitary control of the instruments of grand strategy, linking the horizontal and vertical dimensions of strategy, and using multipliers such as Ultra (the great code-breaking coup) and

Fortitude (the Allied deception plan for Operation Overlord), Churchill crafted a grand strategy which allowed Britain to persevere against great odds.

One might quibble with some of Jablonsky's points. He does, for example, overestimate the extent to which Marlborough affected Churchill's strategic thought to the exclusion of other historical figures. Yet, by blending strategic theory and history, *Churchill: The Making of a Grand Strategist* is a success. Unfortunately, it is a limited success. Jablonsky does not push his analysis to its logical conclusion and draw implications for US strategy. But the foundation is there. In what is perhaps the most profound thought of the book, Jablonsky observes that "the ultimate goal of grand strategy" is "the winning of the *peace*" [emphasis added]. Not the winning of the war, but of the peace.

The United States may now be in a position to declare victory in the Cold War. Whether we win the peace will, in part, depend on the degree to which Americans understand the successes and failures of past strategists. Despite its limitations, Jablonsky's little book is a useful tool for building such understanding. All officers would gain from reading it.

Military Leadership and Command: The John Biggs Cincinnati Lectures, 1988. Edited by Henry S. Bausum. Lexington, Virginia: The VMI Foundation, Inc., 1989. 154 pages. **Reviewed by Colonel Howard T. Prince II**, Professor and Head of the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, United States Military Academy.

This is the final book of a trilogy based on a series of leadership lectures at the Virginia Military Institute. The lecture series was based on two premises: leadership is not easily learned and one of the more powerful ways of learning is by studying the examples of leaders. The editor of the series is careful to remind the reader, however, "that it is risky to make any single leader a role model of leadership." The articles he has included thus are wide-ranging in their choice of military leaders, covering such figures as George Washington, Benedict Arnold (yes, we can learn from negative examples!), Napoleon, Wellington, Simón Bolívar, Mao Zedong (we can also learn from non-Western leaders), Zhukov (though he was on the communist side he was an ally during WWII), Nimitz, Spruance, Westmoreland, and Abrams.

Seven of the nine articles attempt to inform the reader about the leadership of one or more of the figures just listed. The other two take a different tack. Dave Palmer's opening essay, for example, differs in that it focuses on a single dimension of leadership by contrasting Washington with Arnold. Palmer argues convincingly that the hallmark of leadership is integrity. Without it all other qualities and accomplishments will be forever tarnished and diminished, as the contrast he draws between two leaders of the American revolution makes clear. The concluding essay, also different, is by a student at VMI whose paper won a student writing award. It discusses the essential traits of military leadership as induced from a broad survey of successful leaders, including several treated in the other essays.

While historical accounts of leaders may provide the basis for vicarious learning of leadership, the essayist must go beyond the traditional treatment of the leader as tactician, strategist, or even commander if we are to benefit as students of leadership. The authors of the seven essays spoken of above have taken two very

different approaches to the challenge of using the historical record as a source of leadership, knowledge, and insight. Most of the essays deal with the search for personal qualities or attributes. For example, Napoleon is said to have been a great leader because of his superior intellect (he was probably a genius), personal charisma, and panache—coupled with boundless drive and energy. Mao Zedong is described as persistent and persuasive but not charismatic; indeed Mao was seen as aloof. He was knowledgeable but not a gifted genius in the intellectual sense. He was supported by others because he was pragmatic and effective during long periods of national crisis and protracted revolution.

In two of this group of seven, however, the authors have used their historical figures to illustrate or test a contemporary framework of leadership. Dean Allard uses Nimitz and Spruance effectively to present ideas that many view as central to successful senior leadership in the military as well as in other complex settings. For example, both of these admirals practiced the concept of setting goals and direction, leaving subordinate leaders and staff to carry out the details. Spruance and Nimitz, like George Marshall, also understood the importance of systematically selecting and developing subordinate leaders. Spruance also practiced the art of drawing upon the ideas of his subordinates. Since "no one of us can be highly competent in all fields," he tells us, "it behooves us . . . to take advantage of the superior knowledge and capabilities of others." Ronald Spector demonstrates in his essay on Abrams and Westmoreland in Vietnam that the very complexity of the problems the senior leader faces may make it difficult, if not impossible, to be successful. He points out the many differences between the two generals and argues that the situation was probably overwhelming for both.

This brief volume is rich with historical material. Since it is organized around at least two competing frameworks for the study of leadership, it should be of interest to a broad range of readers.

Treat 'Em Rough: The Birth of American Armor, 1917-20. By Dale E. Wilson. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989. 242 pages. \$24.95. **Reviewed by Major Daniel P. Bolger**, author of *Americans at War, 1975-1986: An Era of Violent Peace*.

The development of tanks, the nature of tank commanders, and the history of tank warfare have been discussed in millions of printed words, yet very little has been written about the American roots of this most American of weapons. To read many popular histories, one might think that the tank and the blitzkrieg style sprang fully formed from the fertile minds of J. F. C. Fuller, Basil Liddell Hart, and Heinz Guderian. Common knowledge may extend to the unreliable, scuttling British and French prototypes of World War I, but only a few specialists know much about the United States' early armored force. How did a handful of determined soldiers forge the organizations, tactics, and techniques that turned the ungainly Holt caterpillar tractor into a decisive weapon? It is a tale worth telling, especially for a US Army committed to exploiting new technologies.

In *Treat 'Em Rough*, Dale Wilson has told this important story, rescuing the tough innovators of the American Expeditionary Forces Tank Corps from undeserved obscurity. As a former enlisted infantryman with Vietnam combat experience, armor

officer, trained journalist, and military historian schooled by the estimable Russell F. Weigley. Dale Wilson brings a wealth of useful perspectives to his subject.

These talents show in the crisp style that draws the reader into the story. *Treat 'Em Rough* is not a dry, pedantic chunk of lifeless scholarly prose—rather it features a sparkling battle narrative of the sort made famous by Bruce Catton. You don't need a doctorate in military history to understand this one, yet even the subject-matter expert will be intrigued and challenged by Wilson's lucid analyses of key developments.

Wilson concentrates on the men who created the AEF Tank Corps and led it into battle. Although many of the situations they faced were obviously unique, the reader will recognize quite a few familiar problems. *Treat 'Em Rough* speaks to the sorts of issues that face anyone attempting force modernization, whether it be the introduction of the Renault light tanks in 1918 or M-1A1 Abrams main battle tanks in 1990. Wilson's story is particularly instructive because, unlike many contemporary force changes, the early European armor he treats was tested and refined in actual combat.

Building an armored component from scratch was not easy. In 1917, the United States had never produced a tank. When the War Department called, however, industry jumped, with dozens of contractors and subcontractors falling over each other to bid for chances to manufacture the new mechanical monsters. Wilson's examination of the bungling procurement efforts of that period would be comic if they were not so hauntingly familiar today. By war's end, the arsenal of democracy had cranked out only a handful of vehicles, none of which made it to the front lines. Doughboys depended upon borrowed French light tanks and British heavy tanks.

But if the tanks were borrowed, the new tank leaders were definitely made in the USA. Some names prompt instant recognition. In France, young Major George S. Patton, Jr., energized the AEF light tank initiative. In the United States, a junior infantry captain named Dwight D. Eisenhower trained follow-on units. Others are not so well known, but Wilson shows convincingly that Patton and Eisenhower were not the only fine commanders schooled in the Tank Corps, but simply the most famous. In *Treat 'Em Rough*, the reader discovers a pantheon of forgotten heroes, among them Samuel D. Rockenbach, Elgin Braine, Ralph A. Sasse, and Sereno E. Brett. These men and many others cooperated to develop everything necessary for armored warfare: training simulators, mounted tactics, tank/infantry teamwork, practical battle maintenance procedures, and even the traditional yellow/blue/red "pyramid of power" logo that still adorns US armored force soldiers.

The fledgling tankers tested their mettle in three major campaigns. Wilson provides informative discussions of the light tank fighting in the St. Mihiel salient and in the bitter Meuse-Argonne. In addition, he offers the only known popular account of the AEF's heavy tank battles in support of British efforts to crack the Hindenburg Line. As Wilson explains, these sharp engagements taught hard lessons about reconnaissance, maintenance, and cooperation with infantry, as applicable today as in 1918.

American tanks made only a small contribution to winning World War I, but they provided a tantalizing glimpse of how a future war might be won. Undaunted by the limits of his balky Renaults, young Patton exhorted his men: "Your last conscientious effort must be to regain your formation and push on and ever on until there are no more Huns before you and the smiling vineyards of the Rhine open to your eyes."

While that ambitious vision escaped the Tank Corps of 1918, those hardy men sowed the seeds that grew to fruition in World War II, taking Patton and a second generation of US tankers to the Rhine and beyond. *Treat 'Em Rough* tells us how the legend began.

The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare. By Edward Hagerman. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1988. 366 pages. \$24.95. **Reviewed by Dr. James J. Schneider**, Professor of Military Theory, US Army Command and General Staff College.

Professor Hagerman has written one of those rare books whose interest extends beyond the immediate scope of the author's relatively narrow specialty to appeal to a broader reading audience. He serves the discipline of history in general by decisively establishing the origins of modern warfare. He serves the active-duty officer in particular by identifying the historical emergence of operational art within the broader development of modern warfare.

The whole question concerning the origins of modern warfare continues to be a favorite shibboleth among historians. Arther Ferrill (*The Origins of War*, Thames and Hudson, 1985) discovers the emergence of *modern* (!) warfare in the time of Alexander the Great (c. 356-323 B.C.). Geoffrey Parker (*The Military Revolution*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988) hedges his bets, finding the origins of modern warfare within the span of a 300-year "revolution" (1500-1800), while stretching the term revolution out of meaningful shape. Dr. Hagerman, on the other hand, posits a very different thesis: modern warfare can have developed only upon the forges of the Industrial Revolution. Hagerman's thesis echoes the important insight of Eric J. Hobsbawm (*Industry and Empire*, Viking Penguin, 1986) that "the Industrial Revolution marks the most fundamental transformation of human life in the history of the world . . . no change in human life since the invention of agriculture, metallurgy, and towns in the New Stone Age [having] been so profound as the coming of industrialization." It was the Industrial Revolution that led to a change in warfare and the manner in which it was to be conducted. In the theater, this new style of warfare—which eventually came to be known as *operational art*—brought about a great eclipse in classical and Napoleonic strategy.

With the coming of industrialization, nations increasingly were forced to defend their developing industrial and agricultural infrastructure. Since this infrastructure was distributed throughout the entire country, force deployment followed a similarly distributed pattern. Hagerman notes, for example, that the Confederates had to defend simultaneously Texas (horses, troops), southern Tennessee (iron ore), western Virginia (agriculture), and Richmond (heavy industry). These security concerns caused the lateral deployment across the primary theaters of operations. The concentric crunch of all forces on a dense Napoleonic battlefield became largely outmoded by the end of the American Civil War. This rapidly emergent process, induced by the Industrial Revolution, imposed itself inexorably upon the military actors of that war.

Hagerman skillfully creates a stage for the emergence of operational art. The author uses the Civil War battles as scenery, with center stage reserved for the commanders and their interaction with several key props. The first of these is the railroad. The railroad provided a means of transportation and supply to move rapidly

and sustain the dispersed forces. In 1820, as the Industrial Revolution began to spread from England to America and the Continent, the United States had just 24 miles of rail. By 1890, 182,000 miles had been laid. The watershed year was 1854, when the United States began to lay 3400 miles of track *annually*—more than any other nation in the world had in the aggregate. By the time the Civil War ended the railroad had become the “bones” of operational art. The railroad provided another benefit, for in the wake of the railroad came the telegraph—the “nerves” of operational art.

Hagerman’s second prop, the telegraph, provided for the first time a reliable command and control system to coordinate operations across thousands of miles of interior and coastal territory. Perhaps the most remarkable discussion in Hagerman’s book concerns the role the telegraph played in the emergence of operational maneuver. In virtually every account of the battle of Chancellorsville, the reader is regaled with a description of Union generals falling in defeat at the hands of Lee and Jackson. Hagerman shows, however, that Hooker effectively initiated the first operational battle in military history. Hooker, realizing that Lee’s 25-mile-long entrenched position was impenetrable, maneuvered off the battlefield in an attempt to turn the Confederate left flank. Lee, as Hagerman points out, was completely “baffled” by Hooker’s maneuver. Overlooked in virtually every account of the battle was Hooker’s use of the Beardslee field telegraph for the first time to support his operational maneuver. This telegraphic lash-up allowed Hooker to maintain continuous contact with his left wing in front of Chancellorsville, some 20 miles distant. Standard courier communications would have taken at least three hours. At the same time, Hooker maintained telegraphic communications down to division level. While Hooker led his right wing in the maneuver, his Chief of Staff, Daniel Butterfield, remained at army headquarters coordinating the communications traffic in a manner remarkably similar to Rommel’s staff arrangements during, for instance, Operation Crusader. Hagerman also points out that Grant made extensive use of the telegraph during his operational maneuver through the Wilderness to the James River in 1864. Although the maneuver covered 50 miles, more than 350 miles of telegraph wire was strung to support the move. (One can readily imagine the conduct of the battle of Waterloo if Napoleon had been able to string a telegraph line to Grouchy’s errant army. The results might have been the same but the conduct of the battle would have been qualitatively different.)

The necessity to conduct operational maneuver on an unprecedented scale was imposed upon the contending armies by some of the strategic and technological circumstances already discussed. Hagerman’s third prop, the entrenchment, was a device that induced operational maneuver from the tactical level. The author points out that the use of entrenchments was already part of American military doctrine even before the Civil War and the widespread use of the rifled musket. Hagerman traces the doctrinal employment of entrenchments back to America’s first great military theorist, Dennis Hart Mahan. Mahan argued from experience that no militia-based force could stand up to a regular professional army in battle without the employment of entrenchments. For the American militiaman the spade would be as important as the rifle. Thus, the entrenchment along with the universal employment of the rifled musket after 1862 forced American commanders more and more to seek decisive action by means of operational turning maneuvers that carried the armies to *successive* battlefields. The rifle and the entrenchment had made frontal assaults of the Napoleonic variety impossible.

The charge of Pickett's division at Gettysburg was a Napoleonic solution to a tactical problem that was rejected decisively on the modern battlefield.

Bound up in Hagerman's important work is an implicit yet troubling question: if there is disagreement among historians themselves as to the origins of modern warfare, how can the serving officer determine which segment of the whole vast body of military historiography is professionally relevant? Hagerman clearly suggests that any study of modern warfare that is to have professional relevance must begin with the American Civil War.

August 1914: The Red Wheel/Knot I. By Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Translated by H. T. Willets. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1989. 854 pages. \$50.00. **Reviewed by John L. Romjue**, author of *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982*.

From a world perspective, historians of the 21st century will surely regard the rise and fall of communism as the dominant political fact of the 20th century. Contrary to idealistic dreams and claims, the 73-year experiment in Marxism-Leninism revealed itself not as the synthesis, but the antithesis, of human justice. Tragically, for much of the world the 20th century ushered in a totalitarian age.

Except for the 13-year aberration of Nazi Germany, that age has been defined by revolutionary socialism—from the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia in 1917; through the post-World War II spread of communism to Eastern Europe and China and thereafter worldwide to Northeast and Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Southwest Asia; down to the shattering of the Iron Curtain in 1989.

August 1914 is about the origins and onset of the era of revolutionary socialism in the nation whose ill fortune it was to give it birth and propagate it worldwide. Completely revised and twice as long as Solzhenitsyn's novel of the same name published in 1972, *August 1914* is the first of an epic quartet titled *The Red Wheel*. Further volumes focus on the major events (which the author calls "knots") of October-November 1916, March 1917, and April 1917. What is intended is a literary-historical treatment of the signal events by which Russia passed from the Old Regime through the upheaval of world war and revolution to the unprecedented, totalistic terror state that was the creation of communism in the 20th century.

Solzhenitsyn captures the mentality of the two elements of prerevolutionary Russian society whose conjunction made possible the communist seizure of the popular revolution—the revolutionaries themselves and the educated elite who funded and shielded them. He draws a stunning picture of the political constipation of the Old Regime, personified in Nicholas II, last of the Czars. Solzhenitsyn writes from inside the mind of the woefully inept but kindhearted and God-fearing ruler who was too limited mentally to grasp his world role, much less to function at the level of statecraft.

Anyone interested in military history will find here a fascinating analysis by Solzhenitsyn the historian of the colossal disaster in August 1914 for the Russian 2d Army at Tannenberg, which the Germans encircled in a classic Cannae maneuver. Almost half the book is devoted to this event, which Solzhenitsyn examines at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, but above all at the human level. He portrays

particularly well the military figures whose mental sterility and paramount careerism promoted Russia's blundering entry into war and led to her disastrous defeat.

August 1914 also examines the major political figure Stolypin, the tsarist prime minister between 1906 and his assassination by the terrorist Bogrov in 1911. Operating between a hostile legislature, the Duma, and an inflexible monarch, Stolypin through sheer force of character fostered the emergence of economic and political structures responsible for Russia's leap into an industrial economy in the few short years preceding the outbreak of World War I. Stolypin, who sought to strengthen the self-governing and decentralized assemblies, who took steps to liberate the peasantry from communal land ownership, and who began the establishment of modern-economy farmsteads, is Solzhenitsyn's hero.

Of monumental scope, Solzhenitsyn's epic is the work of a writer who may be the moral voice of our century. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's odyssey is well known—his arrest following war service as an artillery captain and sentence to the labor camps of the gulag, his heroic perseverance in internal exile and under KGB scrutiny as narrator and chronicler of the Great Lie of Soviet communism in *The Gulag Archipelago*, and his expulsion in 1974 after his writings, smuggled to the West, had brought him the Nobel Prize for literature.

Speaking at Harvard in 1978 in a time of resurgent Soviet power, Solzhenitsyn declared that if the world was not approaching its end, it had reached a watershed in history equal in importance to the turn from the Middle Ages to the modern era. Rejecting forcefully what he saw as "the disastrous deviation of the late Enlightenment" in the 20th century, Solzhenitsyn declared that humanity must finally depart the materialist definitions of human life and human society and rise to a new and spiritual vision: "No one on earth has any other way left but—upward."

The ongoing collapse of communism—the materialist colossus of the 20th century—has made the great Russian writer a prophet in his own time.

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From the Archives

William Shakespeare on Man as Soldier

For as long as most soldiers can remember, the issue of young men's obligation to serve their country has remained prominent in discussions of national defense. Such terms as *universal military training*, *conscription*, the *draft*, and *national service* have become fixtures in our defense lexicon. It is interesting to recall that Shakespeare (1564-1616), in a famous rumination on the Seven Ages of Man as spoken by the character Jaques, simply takes it for granted that each man's life will include a phase devoted to soldiership:

All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players.
They have their exits and their entrances,
And one man in his time plays many parts,
His acts being seven ages. At first the infant,
Mewling and puking in the nurse's arms.
Then the whining schoolboy, with his satchel
And shining morning face, creeping like snail
Unwillingly to school. And then the lover,
Sighing like furnace, with a woeful ballad
Made to his mistress' eyebrow. Then a soldier,
Full of strange oaths and bearded like the [leo]pard,
Jealous in honor, sudden and quick in quarrel,
Seeking the bubble reputation
Even in the cannon's mouth. And then the justice,
In fair round belly with good capon lined,
With eyes severe and beard of formal cut,
Full of wise saws and modern instances,
And so he plays his part. The sixth age shifts
Into the lean and slippered Pantaloon
With spectacles on nose and pouch on side,
His youthful hose, well saved, a world too wide
For his shrunk shank, and his big manly voice,
Turning again toward childish treble, pipes
And whistles in his sound. Last scene of all,
That ends this strange eventful history,
Is second childishness and mere oblivion,
Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything.